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Abstract

The growth of various technologies in the modern digital world results in the collection and storage of huge amounts of individual’s data. In addition of providing
direct services delivery, this data can be used for other non-direct activities known
as secondary use. This includes activities such as doing research, analysis, quality
and safety measurement, public health, and marketing. These activities enhance
services experiences for individuals, expand knowledge and making appropriate decisions, strengthen understanding about the eﬀectiveness and eﬃciency of the systems, support public education and aid organisations in meeting customers’ needs.

The collected data may contain personal-specific and sensitive information, such as
medical records and financial records, that may cause privacy breaches if compromised. The process of ensuring an individual’s privacy results in information loss
which renders data less useful. This problem is everywhere were data is collected,
but the problem is critical in the healthcare domain due to the sensitive nature of
the healthcare data and their importance for several secondary uses. Therefore, in
order to increase sharing of the collected data, approaches that ensure an individual’s privacy with reduced information loss that renders the data useful are needed.

There are number of approaches used to ensure an individual’s privacy such as removing Personal Identifiable Information (PII), encryption, and statistical databases.
But most of the existing approaches results in substantial information loss or the
i

anonymisation level achieved may still results in the identification of the individual’s sensitive information. This research investigates the problem of ensuring an
individual’s privacy while reducing the amount of information loss. Thus, the research attempts to answer the problem of how the data holders, such as hospitals,
private, and government agencies, can ensure an individual’s privacy while sharing
data which is still useful.

This research proposes an anonymisation algorithm, named kl-redInfo, that ensures
individual’s privacy with a reduced amount of information loss that renders data
useful. The kl-redInfo algorithm ensures individual’s privacy by achieving the main
two privacy requirements, k-anonymity and l-diversity, that aim at ensuring an
individual’s privacy against both identity and sensitive attribute disclosures. The
information loss is reduced by using the three proposed modified approaches that
reduce the values of the information loss metrics, which indicate a reduction of
the information loss. These approaches are; systematic incorporation of the remaining records in the group that results in lower information loss, using both the
group-creation part of the anatomisation approach and cell-based generalisation,
and sorting the records according to the attributes that can be linked to identify
an individual, also known as quasi-identifier attributes.

The research shows that, each of the proposed modified approaches contribute in
reducing the amount of information loss with the approach of systematic incorporation of the remaining records in the group that results in a lower value of the
information loss metric being the most important. The research find that, even
though each of the proposed modifications contributes in reducing the amount of
information loss, the amount of information loss resulting from the application of

ii

the combined three proposed modifications is significantly reduced. Therefore, the
research uses the three proposed modifications to design the proposed kl-redInfo
algorithm.

The research shows that, the proposed kl-redInfo algorithm results in significant
reduction of the information loss compared to the widely used privacy-preserving
data publishing algorithms that proved to result in lower information loss. This
was indicated by the lower values of the three information loss metrics; Normalised
Certainty Penalty (NCP), Discernibility Penalty (DP), and Kullback Leibler divergence (KL divergence), that implies reduction in the amount of information loss.
The reduction of the information loss resulting from the application of the kl-redInfo
algorithm was due to the use of the three proposed modified approaches, systematic
incorporation of the remaining records in the group that results in a lower amount
of information loss; using both group-creation part of the anatomisation approach
and cell-based generalisation; and sorting the records according to quasi-identifiers.

iii
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1

Research background

The development of various technologies in the modern digital world result in the
collection and storage of huge amounts of individual’s data. Diﬀerent individual’s
data, such as medical records, financial records, and academic records are collected
and stored by both public institutions and private companies. There are several
purposes of collecting these data.

A first example of such purpose is related to research. A number of organisations such as medical institutions and statistical agencies collect and disseminate
data so that not only themselves but also external analysts can use these data
for research purposes, for decision making, and for many other uses. For example, in the healthcare domain the availability of such data helps to prevent medical errors and enhances patient care, healthcare economy and healthcare research
(Pommerening and Michael, 2004).

A Business-oriented focus is another example of the purpose of collecting data. Different private companies collect information about clients, about other companies
and product, so that they can classify or predict clients’ behaviors (data mining),
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or they can compare themselves with the rival companies. This information helps
companies to determine future market strategies (Herranz and Nin, 2010).

Also, the data can be collected for security purposes. Information about people,
purchases, trips, and personal communications is stored to decrease or detect possible security risks for the society or implement control policies. Therefore, this
data is useful in providing better quality services to individuals and its availability is crucial in several activities such as education, planning and decision-making
(Safran et al., 2007).

All these examples illustrate the benefits that a society can obtain by the development of diﬀerent technologies. However, the collected data may contain information about an individual that can be linked or be linkable to identify an individual
(Sweeney, 1997; Samarati and Sweeney, 1998; Klimavicz, 2007). This information,
known as Personal Identifiable Information (PII), includes any information that
can be used to distinguish or trace an individual’s identity, such as name, dates
and place of birth, mother’s maiden name, biometric records, and any other personal information such as age, gender, race, ethnicity, dates and place of residence
(HIPAA, 1996). This data needs to be protected as its disclosure may result in identity theft, embarrassment, or blackmail of an individual, while an organisation may
lose its public trust, legal liability, or may result in high costs to handle the breaches.

Protecting PII results in information loss which renders data less useful. Therefore,
a balance between the two is important in order to ensure both data protection and
data usefulness. Currently more emphasis is on ensuring an individual’s privacy
while the usefulness of such data has not been well-considered i.e., protection of
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PII has received much more attention than the usefulness of the data. As a result,
the concept of data usefulness is less considered. When applying data protection
techniques, preserving the data is a continuous trade-oﬀ between strengthening the
protection of PII and maintaining an adequate level of data usefulness.

Protecting PII while reducing the amount of information loss is still a challenging
problem in the modern digital world. Several techniques have been proposed to
address the problem of ensuring data protection while at the same time supporting
legitimate use of the data, ranging from cryptographic approaches (Quantin et al.,
2000; Hou and Tu, 2005) to perturbation approaches (Muralidhar et al., 1999,
Nunez et al., 2007). But most of the existing techniques provide data protection
while causing a high level of information loss, which reduces the usefulness of the
data. Therefore, it is important to develop techniques that ensure protection of
PII when sharing useful data. This undertaking is called Privacy-Preserving Data
Publishing (PPDP).

1.1.1

Privacy-Preserving Data Publishing (PPDP)

The availability of huge numbers of databases which record a large variety of an
individual’s information, increase concern for privacy in the modern digital world.
This makes it possible to discover information about a specific individual by simply
connecting a certain number of the available databases.

“Privacy” is a term used with many meanings. Therefore, it is very hard to define;
it is commonly used for anything from the state of being alone or undisturbed, our
freedom from interference or public attention, up to the right of anonymity (Wright,
2004).
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Gavison (1979) defines privacy in three inter-related kinds of privacy: secrecy,
anonymity, and solitude. Secrecy concerns information that others may gather
about us. Anonymity addresses how much intently we are in the public, and solitude measures the degree to which others have physical access to us.

The term confidentiality and privacy are often used as synonyms, but they are
diﬀerent concepts. Data confidentiality is about diﬃculty or impossibility of unauthorised users to learn any information about the data. Usually confidentiality is
achieved by enforcing an access policy and possibly using crytographic algorithms.
Privacy relates to the data that can be safely disclosed without leaking sensitive
information about individuals who are subjects of the data.

The most common definition of privacy is the one defined by Westin (1968), “Privacy is the claim of individuals, groups and institutions to determine for themselves,
when, how and to what extent information about them is communicated to others”.
Therefore, in other words, privacy is a ‘claim’, ‘entitlement’ or ‘right’ of an individual to determine what personal information may be communicated to others. This
definition of privacy is diﬃcult to be achieved in the modern digital world where
data is collected in every action we take.

Therefore, for the purposes of this research, a privacy definition as defined in relation to ‘control’ over access to an individual’s information is adopted. The research
defines privacy as the provision of control regarding the use and disclosure of individual’s information. This is based on the state or condition of limited access to
individual data (Walters, 2002).
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An individual’s privacy can be preserved in many diﬀerent aspects which diﬀer
in scope, properties, and limitation. The main privacy aspects are anonymity,
pseudonymity, unlinkability, and unobservability as summaried in Figure 1.1
(Stallings and Brown, 2012). Anonymity means an individual is not identifiable
within a set of data subjects; Pseudonymity means it is not possible to identify true
identity of an individual; Unlinkability means it is not possible to relate the data
with an individual; and Unobservability means it is not possible to identify if an
individual’s information is on the shared dataset (Pfitzmann and Hansen, 2010).

Figure 1.1: Aspects of privacy (Stallings and Brown, 2012)

Privacy-Preserving Data Publishing (PPDP) is one of the broad areas of privacy5
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preserving that deals with anonymising the data so that its privacy remains preserved when shared for diﬀerent purposes. When sharing data it is necessary to
prevent the sensitive information of the individuals from being disclosed. There
are two main types of information disclosure identified in the literature: identity
disclosure and sensitive attribute disclosure (Dalenius and Reiss, 1982; Kim, 1986;
Lambert, 1993). Identity disclosure occurs when an individual is linked to a particular record in the shared dataset. Sensitive attribute disclosure occurs when
new information about some individual is revealed, i.e., the shared data makes it
possible to infer the characteristics of an individual more accurately than would be
possible before the data is shared.

Privacy Preserving Data Publishing has two main phases; data collection phase and
data publishing phase (Fung et al., 2010). Figure 1.2 describes a typical scenario
for data collection and publishing. The scenario starts by the data holder to collect
data from data subjects (e.g., Esther, Ted, Joseph or Angela) in the data collection
phase. This is followed by the data publishing phase where, the data holder releases the collected data to the data recipient, who will then use the shared data for
diﬀerent purposes. For example, a hospital collects data from patients and releases
the patient records to an external medical center. In this example, the hospital is
the data holder, patients are the data subjects, and the medical center is the data
recipient. The medical center could use the shared data for diﬀerent purposes from
a simple count of the number of men/women with a certain disease, to a sophisticated data analysis.

6
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Figure 1.2: Privacy Preserving Data Publishing Phases (Fung et al., 2010)

There are two types of data holders; untrusted and trusted data holders (Gehrke,
2006). An untrusted data holder is not trusted and may attempt to identify sensitive information from the data subject. In this type of data holder, the privacy
issues are mainly considered in the data collection phase. Various cryptographic
solutions (Quantin et al., 2000; Hou and Tu, 2005); anonymous communications
(Chaum, 1981); and statistical approaches (Muralidhar et al., 1999; Nunez et al.,
2007) were proposed to collect records anonymously from their data subjects without revealing the data subjects’ identity.

In the trusted type of data holder, the data holder is trustworthy and data subjects
are willing to provide their personal information to the data holder, for example a
doctor. However, the trust is not automatically passed to the data recipient. This
research assumes the data holder is trustworthy and thus the privacy issues are
considered in the data publishing phase.
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In most cases the collected data is stored in a table form consisting of Unique
Identifier, Quasi Identifier, Sensitive Attributes, and Non-Sensitive Attributes. The
Unique Identifier is a set of attributes containing information that explicitly identifies the data subject, such as name and Personal Public Service number (PPS
number) . The Quasi-Identifier (QID) is a set of attributes that could potentially
identify the data subject such as gender, race and marital status. The Sensitive
Attributes consists of sensitive person-specific information such as disease, salary,
and disability status. The Non-Sensitive Attributes contains all attributes that are
not considered sensitive by the data subject and whose release is not harmful (e.g.,
Favorite color) (Samarati, 2001). The classification of these information is presented
in Appendix A.

1.1.2

The Anonymisation Approach

This research is based on the specific Privacy-Preserving Data Publishing (PPDP)
approach known as anonymisation that deals with removing the association between
the Personal Identifiable Information (PII) and the individual person. The anonymisation approach alters data in order to make it impossible to link individuals with
their data. The approach seeks to protect the identity and/or the sensitive data of
the data subjects when data is shared for diﬀerent purposes (Gavish and Gerdes Jr,
1998; Aggarwal et al., 2005; Pfitzmann and Hansen, 2008).

Usually the unique identifiers of data subjects are removed before sharing the data.
But removing individual’s unique identifiers information does not guarantee the protection of the shared data (Samarati, 2001; Sweeney, 2002; Zielinski, 2007). Since
the shared data often contains other information, which is known as quasi-identifier
(QID) such as gender, marital status and race that can be linked or matched to
8
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publicly available information or by looking at unique characteristics found in the
fields and records of the database itself to identify an individual.

Sweeney (2002a) showed a real-life privacy threat to the former governor of the state
of Massachusetts, William Weld. In Sweeney’s example, an individual’s name in a
public voter list was linked with his record in a published medical database through
the combination of zip code, date of birth, and gender. Each of these attributes
does not uniquely identify a data subject, but their combination often singles out
a unique or a small number of data subjects. Sweeney showed that 87% of the
United States of America (USA) population had reported characteristics that likely
made them unique based only on zip code, date of birth, and gender. This is known
as a linking attack, which is currently a serious problem due to the increase in the
computational power available and easy accessibility of large amount of information.

To prevent linking attacks, the data holder provides an anonymous dataset by applying diﬀerent anonymisation techniques to the QID attributes in the original dataset.
Anonymisation techniques hide some detailed information so that several records
become indistinguishable from each other with respect to QIDs. Consequently, if
a person is linked to a record through QIDs, that person is also linked to all other
records that have the same value for QID, making the linking ambiguous.

Alternatively, anonymisation techniques could generate a synthetic dataset based
on the statistical properties, or add noise to the original dataset. The aim of an
anonymisation approach is to produce an anonymous dataset that satisfies given
privacy requirements determined by the chosen privacy model and to retain as
much data as possible. Diﬀerent information metrics such as Normalised Certainty
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Penalty (NCP), Discernibility Penalty (DP), and Kullback-Leibler divergence (KLdivergence), are used to measure the usefulness of the anonymous dataset. Note that
the Non-Sensitive Attributes are published if they are important to the purpose.

1.1.3

Assumptions when Anonymising Data

Reducing the information loss while sharing data for diﬀerent purposes is still a challenging problem in the Privacy Preserving and Data Publishing domain. Anonymising data has become more diﬃcult due to the following four desirable assumptions
that have to be achieved (Fung et al., 2010):
 It is diﬃcult to know how the data recipient will use the data.

Sometimes, the data holder does not even know who are the recipients at the
time of sharing the data. Therefore, it is diﬃcult to know how the recipients
will use the data.
 The data recipient could be an attacker.

The contracts and agreements cannot guarantee later misplacement of the
sensitive data which in turn could cause the data to end up in the wrong
hands. For example, the data recipient, may be a trustworthy drug research
company; however, it is diﬃcult to guarantee that all staﬀ in the company are
also trustworthy. This property makes the anonymising process diﬀerent from
the encryption and cryptographic approaches, in which only authorised and
trustworthy recipients are given the private key for accessing the cleartext.
The major challenge in anonymising data is to simultaneously preserve both
the privacy and the information usefulness in the shared data.
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 Data should be shared at an individual level and not the group of individuals.

Releasing microdata (personal data in its raw or non-aggregate form) will
have lower information loss than sharing aggregate results. Thus the data
will be more useful, but this may result in the breach of individual’s privacy.
 Released data should remain truthful.

In most of the data sharing scenarios, it is important that each shared record
corresponds to an existing individual in real life. For example, a pharmaceutical researcher (the data recipient) may need to examine the actual patient
records to discover some previously unknown side eﬀects of the tested drug.
If a shared record does not correspond to an existing patient in real life, it is
diﬃcult to deploy results in the real world. Randomised and synthetic data do
not meet this requirement (El Emam, 2008). Although an encrypted record
corresponds to a real life patient, the encryption hides the semantics required
for acting on the represented patient.

1.2

Research Scope

This research is closely related with Privacy-Preserving Data Mining (PPDM). The
main idea of PPDM is to extend data mining techniques to work with the modified
data to mask sensitive information (Agrawal and Srikant, 2000). The key issues
are how to modify the data and how to recover the data mining results from the
modified data. Unlike PPDM solutions that are mainly based on the data mining
task under consideration, Privacy-Preserving Data Publishing (PPDP) may not be
tied to a specific data mining task since the task may be unknown at the time of the
data publishing. Furthermore, most of the PPDP solutions emphasise preserving
the data truthfulness at the record level, but often PPDM solutions do not preserve
11
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such a property (Aggarwal and Yu, 2008). In recent years, the term ’PPDM’ has
evolved to cover many other privacy research problems, even though some of them
may not directly relate to data mining.

The non-interactive query model in statistical disclosure control (Adam and Worthmann 1989) is another related area of this research, in which the data recipients
can submit one query to the system. This type of non-interactive query model may
not fully address the information needs of data recipients because, in some cases,
it is very diﬃcult for a data recipient to accurately construct a query for a data
mining task in one attempt. Consequently, there are a series of studies on the interactive query model (Blum et al., 2008; Dwork, 2006; Dinur and Nissim, 2003), in
which the data recipients, unfortunately including attackers, can submit a sequence
of queries based on previously received query results. The main limitation of any
privacy-preserving query system is that it can only answer a sublinear number of
queries in total; otherwise, an attacker (or a group of corrupted data recipients) will
be able to reconstruct a large part of the original data (Blum et al., 2008), which
is a strong violation of privacy.

This research focuses on a technical problem within the broad domain of privacy
protection and de-identification in the data publishing domain. The problem of
data protection encompasses many legal, ethical, and technical issues surrounding
data ownership, collection, dissemination, and use. Specifically, it investigates the
problem of anonymising data with reduced information loss that renders data useful.
The problem is currently serious due to the increasing pressure of the data sharing as
a result of technology growth. There is much to gain from data sharing, for example
healthcare data can be shared with insurance companies, government, researchers,
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employers, state bureaus of vital statistics, pharmacy benefit managers (companies
that track doctors drug prescriptions), local retail pharmacies, attorneys, and others
to improve healthcare services (Riedl et al. 2008). However, disclosure of Personal
Identifiable Information (PII) may results in privacy breach, prevents each party
from sharing data with others. The research focuses on several key issues in PrivacyPreserving Data Publishing (PPDP) such as privacy models, to be discussed in
section 3.6.1; anonymisation approaches to be discussed in section 3.6.2; information
loss metrics to be discussed in section 5.4; and anonymisation algorithms to be
discussed in section 3.6.3.

1.3

Research Motivation

The application of diﬀerent technologies in diﬀerent domains results in the collection and storage of large amounts of data. Usefulness of the collected data is
reduced due to the presence of Personal Identifiable Information (PII), which has
to be protected. Protection of PII usually causes information loss which leaves the
data less useful. This can result in a data-rich but information-poor problem.

There is much to gain by allowing access to collected data. The collected data such
as medical records may have many reasonable uses serving diﬀerent purposes inside
and outside of the specific domain in which it has initially been collected. The
advantages include, doing academic or commercial research, public healthcare, and
policy making (Mills et al., 2003). Also, access to suﬃcient information will enable
researchers discover, analyse and predict correct trends and thus can improve all
types of decisions by the use of decision support technologies (Goldschmidt, 2005).
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There is an increase of data breaches and privacy aweareness which increases the
need for privacy. This increases privacy protection and hence decreases sharing of
the data. Although privacy and data usefulness are duals of each other, privacy has
received much more attention than the sharing of the data. As a result, the concept
of data sharing is less considered. Therefore, a technique that insure individual’s
privacy with lower information loss that renders data useful is important. So, the
research motivation for this research is to allow sharing of the data without violating
individual’s privacy.

1.4

Statement of the problem

In the modern digital world, eﬀective information sharing between individuals and
organisations has become a vital requirement. This increases the demand on both
data sharing and individual’s privacy. The presence of Personal Identifiable Information (PII) such as medical records, financial records and academic records have
been identified as a main barrier to data sharing. This limits sharing of the data for
diﬀerent purposes such as academic or commercial research, which are important
for supporting various activities in society such as improving public healthcare and
policy making.

The problem of how to eﬀectively and eﬃciently share this data without disclosing
PII is still a major challenge. A number of approaches, such as anonymisation, statistical database and encryption, emerged to solve the problem, but this is achieved
with substantial information loss. Therefore, there is a problem in sharing microdata while protecting the privacy of the data subjects. The main challenge when
disclosing information is to provide as much information as possible while guar-
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anteeing an individual’s privacy (Zhang et al., 2007; Zielinski, 2007). This means,
limiting disclosure of the shared data requires a careful consideration between the
data usefulness and individual’s privacy.

Research Questions
This research problem can be represented by using the following main research
questions:
1. How can data holders preserve an individual’s privacy with reduced information loss that renders data useful?
2. What are the causes of the information loss in the existing algorithms?
3. What approaches can be put in place in order to reduce the amount of information loss while still striving for the individual’s privacy?
4. How can anonymisation approaches be designed, developed, and implemented
in order to improve individual’s privacy and usefulness of the data beyond that
provided by a single approach?
This research is based on the idea that: Designing an anonymisation algorithm by
using more than one anonymisation approach can be an eﬀective and practical tool
for reducing the amount of information loss when ensuring an individual’s privacy.
The idea was originally presented by the author at the conference of the Healthcare
Information Society of Ireland (HISI) and thereafter published in the conference
journal as Tinabo et al. (2009b).

15
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1.5

Research Aim and Objectives

The aim of this research is to investigate the problem of anonymising data with
minimal information loss that renders data useful. Thus, the research attempts to
answer the question of how data holders, such as hospitals, private and government
agencies, can release data for diﬀerent purposes while preserving individual’s privacy. Based on these answers, the research proposes an anonymisation algorithm as
a solution to the problem. The algorithm is named kl-redInfo as it achieves the two
main privacy requirements, k-anonymity and l-diversity, with reduced information
loss. To accomplish this aim, the following research objectives will be addressed:
1. To establish state-of-the-art of the existing techniques
A Literature review was conducted in order to establish state-of-the-art of
the existing techniques. Most important is to identify characteristics of the
existing techniques and identify causes of the information loss. The identified
causes of the information loss contributed in proposing approaches that reduce
the information loss. Summary of the characteristics of the existing techniques
are discussed in Tinabo et al. (2009a).
2. To analyse and understand the data protection and data usefulness issues
Data protection and data usefulness are two conflicting ideas. Therefore, analysis and understanding of these two main issues in this research is important.
The problem starts by the need of sharing data for diﬀerent purposes, such as
research, analysis and public education. The presence of Personal Identifiable
Information (PII) which its disclosure may result in breach of individual’s
privacy, makes sharing diﬃcult. Several techniques have been proposed to
ensure privacy but this results in information loss which reduce usefulness of
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the data. Therefore, techniques that ensure individual’s privacy with reduced
information loss are important. The knowledge obtained from this analysis is
used to propose an algorithm which ensures individual’s privacy with reduced
information loss.
3. To design the proposed, kl-redInfo, anonymisation algorithm
The research designs the proposed algorithm, and names it kl-redInfo. The klredInfo achieves the main privacy requirements, k-anonymity and l-diversity,
with reduced information loss. The algorithm is designed by using the approaches of systematic incorporation of the remaining records, bucketisation
and cell-based generalisation together with sorting the records according to
quasi-identifier attributes approaches. Using all these approaches significant
reduce the amount of information loss.
4. To evaluate the algorithm
To evaluate the proposed kl-redInfo algorithm, the research compares the information loss resulting from the application of the kl-redInfo algorithm with
the widely used algorithms, l-mondrian and g-anatomy that proved to result
in lower information loss. In order to achieve this the analysis and understanding of the existing evaluation metrics is crucial. This results in selection of the three information loss metrics used in this research; Discernibility
Penalty (DP) (Bayardo and Agrawal, 2005), Normalised Certainty Penalty
(NCP) (Xu et al., 2006) and Kullback Leibler divergence (KL divergence)
(Kifer and Gehrke, 2006) .
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1.6

Research Methodology

This research adopts the design science research paradigm (March and Smith, 1995;
Hevner et al., 2004). Design science research relies on the methods used to answer research questions, test research hypotheses and the careful application of
these methods (Hevner et al., 2004; Peﬀers et al., 2007). Therefore, several research
methods were conducted in order to achieve the research aim and objectives. The
methods used to accomplish this research includes, literature review, data collection, algorithm design and development, implementation, evaluation and validation.

Literature Review
A literature review has been conducted in order to establish what is the state-ofthe-art and to draw from the existing theories and knowledge to devise a solution
to the defined problem. The literature review is based on the aim and objectives of
the research. This leads to the foundation of the detailed description of the existing anonymisation techniques and their limitations as discussed in Chapter 3; and
selection of criteria used to measure usefulness of the data as discussed in Chapter 5.

Data Collection
Even though every domain has a problem of ensuring an individual’s privacy when
sharing data, this research uses healthcare domain as a case study. This is due
to the sensitive nature of its data and its importance of sharing the data for secondary uses. Therefore, the process of getting real healthcare data for evaluation
purpose was done, but due to data protection issues the use of real data was not
possible, as discussed in Section 2.5.2. Thus, this research uses simulated patients’
medical dataset, named PatInfo, generated by using Data Generator software down-
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loaded from http://www.generatedata.com/#about. The schema of the dataset, as
discussed in Chatpter 5, is based on the schema of the Muhimbili National Hospital
(MNH) in Tanzania where the survey was done.

To show that the kl-redInfo algorithm also works in real datasets, as discussed
in Chapter 6 this research also used the real-world census dataset, called Adult
dataset, downloaded from UCI Machine Learning Repository at
http://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/Adult. This dataset was selected as it is one
of the widely used datasets in previous research, and it has most of the information
that can be found in any healthcare domain such as age, gender, marital status and
address.

Algorithm Design
The design of the proposed kl-redInfo algorithm is divided into two phases; the
high-level design phase and the detailed design phase. The high-level design phase
of the kl-redInfo algorithm involves outlining the key components required to form
a complete solution. The main outcome in this phase is the solution architecture presented in Section 4.5. The solution architecture represents key components
that form the complete solution. These components are a database component,
an algorithm engine component, and a user interface component. Generally, these
components aim at describing a holistic solution of the problem.

The detailed design phase involves consolidating the kl-redInfo algorithm and design
of the key components of the solution architecture. The detailed design algorithm
contains detailed steps suﬃcient for implementing an algorithm engine. These details include, clarification of entry and exit points for each approach employed in the
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algorithm, detailed steps for satisfying both k-anonymity and l-diversity privacy requirements, and their relationship. The main outcome of this phase is the proposed
anonymisation algorithm, named kl-redInfo. The detailed kl-redInfo algorithm is
discussed in Chapter 4.

Implementation
The solution architecture and all consolidated outcomes from the algorithm design
phase were used to form a complete testable solution. Tools used during implementation include; Mysql open source relational database management system for
back-end and Java programming language for front-end. The kl-redInfo algorithm
was implemented on the algorithm engine component. A complete working software was evaluated using three diﬀerent evaluation metrics including Discernibility
Penalty (DP), Normalised Certainty Penalty (NCP), and Kullback-Leibler divergence (KL-divergence) as discussed in Chapter 5.

Evaluation
An experimental approach was used to evaluate the kl-redInfo algorithm. The
comparison was done between the kl-redInfo and the widely used algorithms, lmondrian and g-anatomy that proved to result in lower information loss. The algorithm was evaluated by calculating the information loss using the three evaluation
metrics; Discernibility Penalty (DP), Normalised Certainty Penalty (NCP), and
Kullback-Leibler divergence (KL-divergence). The kl-redInfo algorithm provides an
anonymity table that achieves both k-anonymity and l-diversity with reduced information loss, as shown in Chapter 6. The lower information loss implies the lower
distortation of the original data, therefore the data remains useful.
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1.7

Research Contributions

This research contributes the following to the body of knowledge:
 The research proposes an anonymisation algorithm, named kl-redInfo that

ensures individual’s privacy with reduced information loss which renders data
useful.
 The research identifies causes of the information loss and proposes modified

approaches that can be used to reduce the amount of information loss.
 The research also quantifies the amount of information loss reduced by each

of the proposed modified approaches and algorithms.

1.8

Research Dissemination

As part of research dissemination, two conference papers, one journal article and
one extended abstract were published in relation to this research. The other three
publications are the collaborated work with other colleagues.
1. Tinabo, R.; Mtenzi, F.; O’Driscoll, C.; and O’Shea, B. (2010), “Multiple
Anonymisation Technique can Balance Data Usefulness and Protection of
Personal Identifiable Information (PII)”, The International Journal of Web
Application (IJWA), Volume 1, Issue 4.
2. Tinabo, R, Mtenzi, F.; O’Driscoll, C.; and O’Shea, B. (2010), “Anonymisation vs. Pseudonymisation: Which one is most Useful for both Privacy
Protection and Usefulness of E-healthcare Data”, The 4th International Conference for Internet Technology and Secured Transactions (ICITST), London,
United Kingdom.
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3. Tinabo, R, Mtenzi, F.; and O’Shea, B. (2009), “Solving the problem of Balancing Data Usefulness and Protection of Personal Identifiable Information
using Multiple Anonymisation Techniques”, The 1st International Conference
on Networked Digital Technologies (NDT), Ostrava, Czech.
4. Tinabo, R, Mtenzi, F.; and O’Shea, B. (2009), “Designing and Developing
A New Anonymisation Technique to be Used in E-healthcare”,The 14th Annual Conference of Healthcare Information Society of Ireland (HISI) , Dublin,
Ireland.
Other Publications
5. Lupiana, D.; Tinabo, R.; Mtenzi, F.; O’Driscoll, C.; and O’Shea, B. (2011)
Alphanumeric Data: Minimising Privacy Concerns in Smart Environments,
International Journal of Digital Society (IJDS), Volume 2, Issue 3.
6. Doyle, P.; Deegan, M.; Tinabo, R.; Masamila, B.; and Tracey, D. (2009),
Case Studies in Thin Client”, Ubiquitous Computing and Communication
Journal (UbiCC), Vol4 Special Issue on ICIT 2009 conference - Applied Computing: pp585-598.
7. Masamila, B.; Mtenzi, F.; Said, J. and Tinabo, R. (2010), A Secured Mobile Payment Model for Developing Markets, Networked Digital Technologies,
175182, Springer.
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1.9

Thesis Organisation

The remaining Chapters of this thesis are organised as follows:
 Chapter 2: The issue of protecting Personal Identifiable Information (PII)

when sharing data for diﬀerent purposes is a challenge in any domain where
data is collected. This research uses the healthcare domain as a case study.
Therefore, Chapter 2 provides an overview of the healthcare area mainly focusing on diﬀerent challenges and characteristics of e-healthcare data.
 Chapter 3: This chapter describes related works on the privacy-enhancing

approaches. It discusses strength and weaknesses of several existing privacy
models, anonymisation techniques and algorithms.
 Chapter 4: This chapter discusses the proposed algorithm, named kl-redInfo,

including its detailed design and the high level architecture.
 Chapter 5: This chapter discusses the experimental environment including

datasets and parameters used, evaluation metrics, and introduces the implemented algorithms for comparison purposes.
 Chapter 6: This chapter presents an experimental evaluation of the proposed

kl-redInfo algorithm and the comparison with the widely used algorithms.
This chapter clarifies the improvement achieved by the kl-redInfo algorithm.
Chapter 6 also presents other findings of the research including the impact of
the algorithms on the diﬀerent dataset size and on diﬀerent k and l parameter
values.
 Chapter 7: Conclusions and future work of this research is presented in Chap-

ter 7.
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HEALTHCARE DATA IN
INFORMATION SOCIETY

The challenge of issuring individuals’ privacy while sharing the data which is still
useful is the common challenge. This research uses the healthcare domain as a case
study. This chapter discusses diﬀerent characteristics of the healthcare domain, with
the main focus on e-healthcare data. The chapter discusses various characteristics of
the healthcare data in section 2.2. Section 2.3 describes drivers for the application of
diﬀerent technologies such as Information and Communication Technology (ICT) in
healthcare. Challenges for sharing data for secondary uses are presented in section
2.4. Data accessibility issues for this research and data protection laws are described
in section 2.5. Lastly, section 2.6 covers the chapter conclusion and summary.

2.1

Introduction

Application of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) in the healthcare domain, particularly in provision of the healthcare services is referred to as
e-health or e-healthcare (Mukherjee and McGinnis, 2007; Shoniregun et al., 2010).
These technologies transform the delivery of the healthcare service from paper-based
system to electronic or a hybrid. In comparison to a paper-based system, electronic
data is easily stored, retrieved, processed, and transmitted, making it a preferable
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choice for enhancing the quality of the healthcare service delivery. Examples of the
e-healthcare services include e-prescription, telemedicine, healthcare portals, and
electronic healthcare record systems.

The advancements of technology in other domains such as social networking, sales
and marketing, which lead to the existence of online information databases cause
electronic data to be more susceptible to malicious manipulation than paper based
data.

These databases include demographic and non-demographic information

which can easily be linked to identify the identity of individuals. The existence
of several online information databases increases the diﬃculty in protecting personal identifiable information (PII) when disclosing medical records for diﬀerent
purposes. Furthermore, advancement of the storage capacity and processing power
of the computing devices can be used maliciously to facilitate linking and mining
of the data for the purpose of breaching privacy.

2.2

Characteristics of Healthcare Data

Healthcare data is critical due to prevalence of characteristics which include sensitivity, complexity, volume, and usefulness. These characteristics make the healthcare
domain subject to stringent data control compared to other domains. Failure to
apply suﬃcient control on healthcare data can have catastrophic consequences to
all healthcare stakeholders. The four identified characteristics of healthcare data
are data sensitivity, data diversity, data volume and data usefulness.
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2.2.1

Data Sensitivity

Healthcare data is regarded as personal-specific and sensitive. This is because it
contains data attributes which when disclosed can aﬀect the data subject. Such
eﬀects include irrecoverable social stigma, economic threats, discrimination and
mental suﬀering (Appelbaum, 2003). Therefore, privacy is needed to build public
trust in order for people to participate eﬀectively in a particular activity.

There are concerns of privacy in diﬀerent societies for diﬀerent application domains.
For example, in the healthcare domain, privacy protection is important in order to
avoid harm to data subjects and to promote provisions of reliable and accurate data
for eﬀective and eﬃcient healthcare services. This is because healthcare information
relates to personal aspects of an individual’s life (Anderson et al., 2000).

The medical records of an individual may include identifying information, laboratory tests, medical diagnostics and physicians’ subjective comments. Also, it may
include individual’s genetics information, which can be used for inference about the
whole family (Mercuri, 2004). Lack of public trust on privacy can cause privacysensitive people to avoid healthcare treatment. Also, they may opt to disclose
less information to physicians, switch between physicians, or pay service treatment
claims from their own pocket. The repercussions for these outcomes are:

Diﬃcult to provide quality care to patients:
Patients have to provide detailed information to their physician during treatment.
Also, previous medical records are important for the physician to increase the probability of correct diagnosis and prescription. Lack of complete information can
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jeopardise the quality of treatment to the patient (Appelbaum, 2003).

Reduce the ability of physicians to diagnose and propose correct treatment:
A Physicians’ ability to diagnose and prescribe correct treatment depends on how
much information is available. Together with patients’ detailed explanations and
medical history, information about previous similar cases is important. Unless patients provide detailed and correct information, the reliability of information on
previous case will be susceptible. This will aﬀect not only privacy-sensitive patients
but also other members in the society.

Increase healthcare costs due to switching healthcare providers and late treatment:
Healthcare costs can be reduced if unnecessary duplications are avoided, such as
repeated laboratory tests. In the absence of a shared system such as centralised
databases or healthcare information networks, patients who constantly change their
healthcare providers are likely to incur additional healthcare costs (Anderson et al.,
2000). Also, late diagnosis increases treatment costs. In a narrow view these costs
may seem as personal cost, but in a broader view they aﬀect the overall cost of the
national healthcare.

Poor outcomes from research, public healthcare, and quality initiatives:
Quality of healthcare depends on continuous quality improvement, eﬀective healthcare administration and public healthcare. An important ingredient to these prime
functions is the availability of reliable and accessible healthcare data. When patients avoid care, or give less or false information the whole healthcare system is
jeopardised (El Emam et al., 2009).
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That said, public trust on privacy is crucial for any healthier society. Building this
trust requires eﬀective protection of all information collected from patients that can
be used either for primary or secondary use.

2.2.2

Data Diversity

Healthcare data is comprised of diﬀerent data structures. These data include free
form notes, structured and unstructured text and numeric, images, blood sample reports, codes, sounds, and videos (Grimson et al., 2000). This complicates protection
of the data, particularly in applying uniform algorithm across diﬀerent structures.
Therefore, this research aimed at anonymising structured/relational data.

2.2.3

Data Volume

Healthcare is an information-intensive domain generating large amounts of data
from diﬀerent areas, including hospitals, primary care surgeries, clinics, and laboratories (Safran et al., 2007). This is due to the prevalence of non interoperable
systems and the nomadic nature of patients in seeking treatment from diﬀerent
healthcare providers for diﬀerent reasons. Also, it is required that patient information be kept for the life time of an individual, that is, from cradle to grave plus
retention time (Grimson et al., 2000; Grimson, 2001). Unlike information from
other domains, the value of this information does not diminish with time. This
property makes its protection challenging.

2.2.4

Data Usefulness

The healthcare domain has several stakeholders, including patients, clinicians, healthcare organisations, public healthcare professionals, policy makers, employers, re-
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searchers, and insurers (Appari and Johnson, 2010). Each of these categories is
interested in medical records for diﬀerent reasons as summarised in Figure 2.1.

Figure 2.1: Stakeholders of the healthcare data (Appari and Johnson, 2010)

Patients are a primary source of this information. Primary provider need both
longitudinal and cross-section information to make evidence-based treatment. Researchers, public healthcare professionals, and policy makers need healthcare data
for learning and generating new knowledge and insights for planning and improving
healthcare services. Employers and insurers need this information for analysing
healthcare costs and to settle the associated bills. However, the same information
can be used for personal economic gains such as marketing for drug manufacturers,
lending decisions by banks, and employment decisions by employers. The latter two
uses can have direct negative impact to the individual patient concerned. In most
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countries release of medical data to employers or lenders requires explicit patient
consent (HIPAA, 1996; statute book, 2003).

The large number of stakeholders with an interest in medical records increases its
risk to privacy breaches on disclosed records. This is because medical records can
be used for diﬀerent purposes, thus elevating its usefulness. Thus healthcare data
needs stringent control because the number of people who access them is large
(Anderson, 1996).

2.3

Benefits of Using Healthcare Data

Despite with all complex characteristics of the healthcare data, the data is needed
for diﬀerent uses; primary and secondary uses. The primary use of the healthcare
data is to provide direct health care delivery. Such purposes typically include the
provision of adequate and appropriate medical care requested by the patient or
deemed necessary for the patient based on the record’s contents. These records
are necessary on this primary level in order to keep track of the important clinical
information that any future medical professional may find useful in encounters with
the same patient (Mukherjee and McGinnis, 2007).

In additional of the primary purpose of providing care to patients, there is an
increasing demand for the use and sharing of healthcare records. This is due to
the adoption of electronic medical and health records throughout the domain and
across all sectors of the healthcare system. Any use of the healthcare information
for any purpose not directly related to the care of individual patients who are the
subject of that information is known as secondary use. This includes activities
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such as analysis, research, quality and safety measurement, public health, payment,
provider certification or accreditation, marketing, and other business applications.
These activities enhance healthcare services by reducing medical errors, controlling
escalating healthcare costs, enhancement of quality care and accessibility of services,
and providing timely and relevant information to help physicians during treatment
(Safran et al., 2007; Shoniregun et al., 2010). These benefits are described next:

2.3.1

Reducing Medical Error

Medication errors are major concerns in the healthcare domain. Prescription errors
and misinterpretation of communications among physicians, nurses and pharmacists due to bad hand writing contribute to the problem (Bates, 2000). According
to Kohn et al. (2000), preventable medication errors cost the lives of 44,000 to
98,000 Americans yearly. It is believed that electronic medical records can substantially reduce medical errors (Anderson, 2007; Bates, 2001; Tang et al., 2006). The
problem is worldwide, thus it prompted several initiatives to embrace ICT.

2.3.2

Controlling Healthcare Costs

In recent years, there have been concerns on rising healthcare costs (Mukherjee and
McGinnis, 2007). Typically, this problem is associated with administration diﬃculties, lack of reusing the collected information, and shortage of medical professionals. Administration diﬃculties rise healthcare costs due to complexity in processing
medical claims that result in multiple claims for treatment and other fraud. Duplication of medical tests and inability to share the collected data also increases the
cost of healthcare (Goldschmidt, 2005).

Furthermore, the number of healthcare professionals with respect to the population
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they are serving may be relatively small, particularly in developing countries such as
Tanzania. This causes ineﬀective service delivery and thus increases costs. Therefore, the secondary use of the healthcare data is motivated to reduce escalating
healthcare costs.

2.3.3

Enhancing Quality and Accessibility of the Care Services

The desire to enhance quality and accessibility of healthcare services motivate the
secondary use of the healthcare data. Better management of healthcare information using electronic systems enhances eﬃciency and communication in the workplace and thus improves healthcare service quality (Mukherjee and McGinnis, 2007;
Tang et al., 2006). Also, the use of ICT increases channels through which patients
and physicians can interact for example, by using healthcare portals, patients have
access to healthcare information.

2.3.4

Provision of Information to Physicians

Physicians need suﬃcient information to help them to make correct decisions during treatment (Anderson, 2007). This information includes longitudinal and crosssection information for supporting evidence-based care delivery. It is easier and
more eﬀective for electronic medical records to serve this demand than its counterpart paper-based medical records. This, generally, improves quality of care.

Therefore, allowing healthcare data to be used for secondary purposes would boost
the quality of medical services and overall public health including areas of genetic
impacts, disease risk factors, possible interventions, drug side eﬀects, drug safety
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surveillance, treatment eﬀectiveness, decreased mortality rates, institutional performance tracking and clinical eﬃciency, could support the identification of disease
mechanisms and new discovery areas, accelerate the termination of unsuccessful
compounds, decrease patient recruitment cycle times for clinical trials, and improve drug safety surveillance through continuous monitoring (Tang et al., 2006).

In general, the secondary use of health information is a necessity and should be an
accepted part of any health system that supports the eﬀectiveness, eﬃciency and
sustainability of the health system and is an integral part of the cycle of research,
medical evidence, and accepted knowledge base through to the delivery of care.
Therefore, the gains expected from imaginative but responsible uses of healthcare
information accrue not only to various interest groups but also to populations in
general. Thus, the algorithm to be developed in this research promotes and enables
secondary uses while ensuring individual’s privacy. It equally ensures there are
adequate safeguards to maintain the balance between secondary use of healthcare
data and the data protection.

2.4

Challenges in Sharing Healthcare Data

A critical challenge associated with sharing data is the possibility that the data can
be disclosed and used for other purposes other than initially stated. Removing PII
from these records can not quarantee an individual’s privacy as there are possibilities to link the shared data with other data from diﬀerent databases to identify an
individual. Also, removing Personal Identifiable Information (PII) from the data
reveals less information and may render it less useful. This aﬀects accuracy and
hence quality of knowledge or insight generated from its use which is necessary for
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diﬀerent secondary purposes such as planning and improvement of public healthcare
in general (Shoniregun et al., 2010).

However, privacy of an individuals whose records are shared must also be protected.
Balancing these two conflicting requirements is a challenging problem. Current
practice of using contracts and laws (as discussed in section 2.5) cannot guarantee
that sensitive data will not be misplaced and end up in the wrong hands.

2.5

Data Protection Laws

This research has considered the use of real patient datasets for evaluation of the
developed algorithm. However, the challenge ascribed to patients’ privacy hinders
its utilisation in this research. This diﬃculty is due to the diﬀerence in data protection laws of the specific countries. While this research targets Tanzania as a case
study for supplying real datasets for the evaluation of the implemented algorithm,
importing this data to Ireland, is not a straight forward activity. Section 2.5.1 and
2.5.2 discuss in detail the data protection laws of these two countries; Ireland and
Tanzania respectively.

2.5.1

Data Protection Law in Ireland

The development and enforcement of European Union Directive 95/46/EC and its
interpretetion into laws by its member states, (Ireland in this case) is an indication
of how the region is sensitive on personal data privacy (DPC, 1995). In particular and of interest to this research are the directives and protocols that govern
trans-border data flow. The Act requires that, the transfer of the personal data
to a country or territory outside the European Economic Area (EEA) not to take
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place unless that country or territory ensures an adequate level of protection for
the privacy and the fundamental rights and freedoms of data subjects in relation to
the processing of personal data having regard to all the circumstances surrounding
the transfer.

The essential concern of the EU Directive, and Ireland Data Protection Laws in particular, is to ensure that their residents’ personal information is not transferred to
countries that do not adequately protect that information. The Directive says nothing about the information transferred from countries outside EU to EU countries.
The main key feature of the Ireland Data Protection Act of 2003 (statute book,
2003) is on the principle that organisations should be held accountable for the personal data that they gather and process. Such accountability is also expected to
organisations when they transfer personal data across national border.

The Dublin Institute of Technology (DIT) as an organisation ensures everyone in
the institute complies with the eight Data Protection Principles which are set out
in the Data Protection Acts. These principles are: information should be obtained
and processed fairly; data should be kept for the specified purpose(s) only; the data
should be used and disclosed according to the purpose(s); the data should be kept
safe and secure; the data should be kept accurate, complete and up-to-date; should
not collect excessive data; the data should be retained for a reasonable time; and a
copy of an individual’s data should be granted when requested.

2.5.2

Data Protection Law in Tanzania

Tanzania is one of the developing countries located in the Eastern part of Africa. As
most developing countries, Tanzania has immature data protection laws (Bord et al.,
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2009). The data holder is the one who has the mandate to grant data for secondary
use. From the survey done at The Muhimbili National Hospital (MNH), a commonly used approach of removing PII from medical records is used. This approach
is considerably weak for protection of data privacy due to linking attack.

There are several procedures that have to be followed in order for a researcher to access the healthcare data in Tanzania. The procedures includes: getting permission
from 1) The Ministry of Health and Social Welfare in Tanzania; 2) The National
Institute for Medical Research(NIMR) that oversees all research in healthcare domain in Tanzania; and 3) getting permission from the specific hospital that will
provide the data, in this research the hospital is called The Muhimbili National
Hospital (MNH). In all three institutes the research proposal that will be assessed
by the Ethical Committee of each institute, has to be written. The proposal is assessed by all three institutes in terms of its value of the contributions to the general
community, feasibility of the research process, and capability of the researcher to
undertake the proposed research.

The researcher followed the procedures and the permission was granted by all three
institutes. That allowed the DIT Research Ethics Committee also to grant the
researcher DIT Ethical Approval under the condition that the data should be
anonymised. The anonymisation technique applied to the data to be given was
to remove PII, which is not enough to ensure privacy of individual’s. This is due
to linking attack that might cause identification of an individual’s sensitive information due to growth of data volume and technology.

A consultation with the PhD supervision team and experts from the oﬃce of Data
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Protection Commissioner in Ireland was then made. The experts from the oﬃce of
Data Protection Commissioner in Ireland insist the need of getting consent from
the patients whose data would be given to researcher. This process is inpractical,
therefore the researcher concludes that, it is unethical to transfer the real medical records dataset from Tanzania for research purpose without consent from the
patients. Thus, the use of real dataset was not possible and the alternative of simulating data by using schema similar of the Muhimbili National Hospital (MNH)
was used.

2.6

Chapter Summary

In the ever increasing online databases and sophistication of technology, ensuring
an individual’s privacy while sharing data for diﬀerent purposes becomes diﬃcult
in every domain. This research uses the healthcare domain as a case study. This
is due to several characteristics of healthcare data such as, data sensitivity, data
diversity, data volume and data usefulness, which elevates the risk for data misuses.
However, the sharing of this data is necessary for eﬀective and eﬃcient management
of healthcare services and improvement of public healthcare. Recognising the need
for protecting privacy of data subjects, data protection laws have been enacted.
Guidelines and principles are stipulated either to restrict its use or enforce stringent measures. Of themselves, the problem cannot be fully addressed.

Chapter 2 discusses the characteristics, benefits and challenges associated with using healthcare data which set the foundation for analysing the existing techniques
for addressing the problem. This investigation was achieved through a literature
analysis and by a field study conducted at Muhimbili National Hospital (MNH) in
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Tanzania. Chapter 3 discusses diﬀerent privacy-preserving approaches that can be
used to ensure individual’s privacy.
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PRIVACY-ENHANCING APPROCHES

The problem of providing useful information while ensuring an individual’s privacy
is a long standing challenge. Researchers have addressed with limited success and
countinue to address the protection of PII when sharing data for diﬀerent purposes
(Sweeney, 1997; Samarati and Sweeney, 1998; Samarati, 2001; Aggarwal et al., 2005;
LeFevre et al., 2005; Anderson, 2007; Riedl et al., 2008). Diﬀerent techniques to
address this problem have been proposed, including ethical and legal frameworks,
policy and regulatory frameworks, and privacy-enhanced technologies such as statistical techniques, cryptographic techniques, and anonymisation techniques.

This chapter summarises and evaluates the diﬀerent existing privacy-enhancing approaches inlcuding ethical and legal frameworks (section 3.1 ), policy and regulatory
frameworks (Section 3.2), and privacy-enhancing technologies (section 3.3) including statistical techniques (Section 3.4), cryptographic techniques (Section 3.5) and
anonymisation techniques (Section 3.6), and Section 3.7 presents chapter summary
and conclusion.
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3.1

Ethical and Legal Frameworks

Historically, the Hippocratic Oath by physicians plays a fundamental role in the
healthcare domain (Agrawal et al., 2002). Physicians are obliged to maintain the
confidentiality of information they see or hear in the course of treatment or outside
(U.S. Congress, 1993). In the traditional healthcare system, ethical practices by
physicians play a substantial part in building trust on preserving privacy of individuals.

Recognising the importance of secondary use of healthcare information, and increasing use of ICT in the management and delivery of healthcare services implies that
the number of people who have legitimate access to medical records increases. The
majority of these users are not bound by the Hippocratic Oath. Therefore, when
healthcare information leaves healthcare professionals, reliance on ethical frameworks as a means to preserve privacy diminishes. This situation influences legal
intervention.

Legal systems establish laws to protect privacy of healthcare information disclosed
for secondary use. A typical example is the European Union, which established data
protection directives for its member states. Several countries have enacted laws for
protection of privacy (www.inf ormationshield.com/intprivacylaws.html). The
United States represent a significant eﬀort in this trend (HIPAA, 1996). This intervention is important to limit the risk of privacy breaches on the disclosed information. Thus, the legal frameworks play a vital role in limiting illegal information
disclosure and processing (statute book, 2003). However, they are not a panacea.
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3.2

Policy and Regulatory Frameworks

At organisation level, policy is defined as a set of rules to meet a particular goal
(Landwehr, 2001). Privacy policy stipulates rules through which a organisation
preserves privacy of information. For example, Anderson (1996) proposed a clinical policy model to help healthcare organisations to maintain the protection of the
healthcare information.

Also, regulatory frameworks must unify organisation privacy policies. This is important for ensuring consistent protection across diﬀerent stakeholders. In modern
times, compliance towards regulatory frameworks is considered important for assessing the extent of data protection. Thus, policy and regulatory frameworks form
another vital strand for data protection.

3.3

Privacy-enhancing Technologies (PETs)

The complexity of privacy issues requires several protection approaches to eﬀectively preserve the privacy of individuals. The practice of sharing data that relies
mainly on policies and guidelines as to what types of data can be shared and on
agreements on the use of the shared data, may lead to excessive data distortion
or insuﬃcient protection (Schneier, 2000; Fung et al., 2010). Researchers have proposed several technological solutions to address the problem. These solutions are
referred to as privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs). The PETs categories include
statistical techniques, encryption tools and anonymisation techniques. The summary of the strength and weaknesses of the existing PETs were originally published
in Tinabo et al. (2009a) and are further discussed in sections 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6.
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3.4

Statistical Techniques

Statistical techniques are the first privacy-enhancing technologies addressing the
need of protecting Personal Identifiable Information (PII) when sharing data for
secondary use. This is achieved by sharing aggregate/statistical results instead of
specific individual information (Muralidhar and Sarathy, 1999). Protecting confidential records and to provide useful information are the general goals of statistical
techniques (Benedetti and Franconi, 1998). Database administrators can use statistical techniques to allow users to access aggregate statistical information, rather
than information regarding a specific individual.

Even in statistical databases, PII associated with a particular individual can also
be infered through a clever choice of queries, leading to disclosure of PII of an individual (Adam and Worthmann, 1989). To solve this problem, statistical databases
often use random data perturbation which involves the addition of random noise
to confidential numerical attributes. Thus, even if a user manages to compromise
data and is able to isolate an individual value of a confidential attribute, the true
value is not disclosed (Muralidhar and Sarathy, 1999).

The existing statistical techniques can be classified into three categories: query
restriction, input perturbation, and output perturbation (Adam and Worthmann
1989).
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3.4.1

Query Restriction

In the query restriction approach, queries are required to comply with a special
structure, supposedly to prevent the querying adversary from gaining too much
information about specific database entries (Adam and Worthmann, 1989). Query
restriction provides exact answers to queries as long as the risk of exact disclosure
of individual’s PII is small (Nunez et al., 2007). The query restriction techniques
works for a relatively small number of queries (Dinur and Nissim, 2003).

Query auditing was introduced to reduce this problem (Chin and Ozsoyoglu, 1982),
where a log of the queries is kept, and every new query is checked for possible
compromise, allowing or disallowing the query accordingly. But query auditing
task is NP-hard (Kleinberg et al., 2000). Also, auditor refusals, in conjunction with
the answers to valid queries, may be used by the user who receives the data to
achieve a partial or total compromise of the database (Dinur and Nissim, 2003).

3.4.2

Input Perturbation

The Input/Data perturbation is another well known technique for privacy preserving of the data (Kabir et al., 2007). This technique deals with disturbing data
before the release. That is, the data is systematically changed to yield answers to
queries that are statistically similar to those that would have resulted from the original data (Nunez et al., 2007; Chawla et al., 2005). The Input/Data perturbation
approaches are often used to protect confidential, numerical data from unauthorised queries while providing maximum access and accurate information to genuine
queries (Muralidhar and Sarathy, 1999). Therefore, in the Input/Data perturbation approach queries are answered according to a disturbed database.
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There are several approaches used to achieve the Input/Data perturbation. These
approaches include swapping values, where portions of the data are replaced with
data taken from the same distribution (Reiss, 1984; Duncan et al., 2001; Samarati,
2001); and fixed perturbations, where a random perturbation is added to every data
entry (Agrawal and Srikant, 2000; Agrawal and Aggarwal, 2001).

Even though the Input/Data perturbation approaches guarantee a complete or exact disclosure (i.e., the disclosure of the true value of a confidential attribute), they
are vulnerable to partial disclosure. Partial disclosure occurs when the amount
of information that a user who manages to compromise data is able to obtain
about a confidential attribute through queries and statistical analysis, is more
than the amount that the database administrator planned to provide to users
(Adam and Worthmann, 1989).

3.4.3

Output Perturbation

The output perturbation approach uses query control mechanism to compute exact answers, but it returns disturbed or noisy answers as a response to the query
(Dinur and Nissim, 2003; Beck, 1980; Denning, 1980). Methods of output perturbation include varying output perturbations, where a random perturbation is added
to the query answer, with increasing variance as the query is repeated (Beck, 1980);
and rounding, either deterministic or probabilistic (Dinur and Nissim, 2003).
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3.5

Cryptographic Techniques

Cryptographic approaches are most often associated with the encryption process
that can be defined as the ability to convert readable text to unreadable text
(Mills et al., 2003). This security mechanism uses mathematical schemes and algorithms to encrypt data into unreadable text. The unreadable text can only be
decrypted by the party who possesses the associated key.

There are two types of encryption, known as single key and public key encryption.
Single key encryption uses the same key for encrypting and decrypting text while
in public key encryption, two keys are used, one for sharing (public) and one is kept
secret (private). There is a diﬀerence between traditional encryption and potentially truly anonymous procedures such as one-way hashing. By using traditional
encryption, data is encrypted but can be decrypted with the use of a key. Theoretically, encrypted data is diﬀerent from truly anonymous data as the underlying
data can be accessed by combining it with the key (and the key might be obtained
by applying brute computational force or otherwise) (Clarke, 1999).

It would seem that encryption is the most eﬀective way to preserve privacy of
information. Users wishing to access the data could be given keys, and this would
summarily solve all privacy issues. Unfortunately, this approach does not work in a
data publishing scenario, whose the primary goal is to secure access to confidential
information while at the same time sharing useful information.
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3.6

Anonymisation Techniques

Anonymisation is the process of making data anonymous. Anonymous data is
the data that cannot be manipulated or linked in order to identify an individual.
Data can be made anonymous by either suppressing personal-specific data, or by
generalising them, or replacing real identifiers with false identifiers. This is done by
developing algorithms that fullfill privacy requirements of certain privacy models.
The common privacy models are discussed in section 3.6.1 and some of the widely
used algorithms are discussed in section 3.6.3.

3.6.1

Privacy Models

There are several privacy models that have to be achieved for the data to be considered protected. Fung et al. (2010) classify them in two categories based on their
attack principles, informative principle and uninformative principle. The first category includes identity disclosure, attribute disclosure and table disclosure. These
depend on the privacy threat that occurs when a user who receives the data is
able to link an individual’s record to a record in the shared data, or to a sensitive
attribute in the shared data or to the shared data itself.

The identity disclosure occurs when an individual is linked to a particular record
in the shared table. Attribute disclosure occurs when new information about some
individuals is revealed, i.e., the shared data makes it possible to infer the characteristics of an individual more accurately than it would be possible before the data
is shared. The identity disclosure often leads to attribute disclosure. Once there
is identity disclosure, an individual is re-identified and the corresponding sensitive
values are revealed. The attribute disclosure can occur with or without identity
46

Anonymisation Techniques
disclosure. In table disclosure an identity disclosure occurs when an individual
record is determined to be presence or absence in the shared table. A data table
is considered to be privacy-preserving if it can eﬀectively prevent the successfully
performing of these disclosures (Xiao and Tao, 2006a; Li et al., 2007).

The second category aims in achieving the uninformative principle, which requires
that the shared data should provide the user who receives the data with little
additional information beyond the background knowledge (Machanavajjhala et al.,
2007).Probabilistic disclosure occurs when the user who receives the data has a large
variation between the prior and posterior knowledge. The two categories may overlap since, many privacy models in the category do not explicitly classify attributes
in a data into quasi-identifiers and sensitive attributes, but some of them could
also thwart the sensitive disclosure in the first category. Table 3.1 summarises the
common used privacy models and the privacy threat that they address.
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Table 3.1: Privacy Models (Fung et al., 2010)

Privacy Threat
Privacy Models

k -anonymity
l -diversity

Record

Attribute

Table

Probabilistic

Disclosure
√

Disclosure

Disclosure

Disclosure

√

√
√

t-closeness
(X,Y)-anonymity

√

(α, k )-anonymity

√
√

(k, e)-anonymity
MultiR k -anonymity

√
√

√
√

(ϵ, m)-anonymity

√

Confidence bounding

√

Personalised privacy

√

δ-presence
(c, t)-isolation

√

√

√

ϵ-diﬀerential privacy
(d, γ)-privacy
Distributional privacy

√

√

√

√

√

√

The k-anonymity Privacy Model
The k -anonymisation is a privacy model used to provide privacy protection by ensuring that data cannot be traced to an individual with respect to quasi-identifier
attributes (Samarati, 2001). The shared data hold k-anonymity privacy requirement, if each shared record has at least (k-1 ) other records in the release whose
quasi-identifier values are indistinguishable from each other (Sweeney, 2002). The
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group of records with the same quasi-identifier attributes (QIDs) is known as an
equivalence class.

Therefore, k-anonymity provides privacy protection by guaranteeing that each equivalence class consists of at least k records. Thus, even if the records are directly linked
or matched to external information there will be no association between an individual and the record. Also known as identity disclosure. Table 3.3 is an example
of the 2-anonymous table of the Patients’ Information Table 3.2. Table 3.3 was obtained by generalising QIDs so that there is at least two records with the same QIDs

Table 3.2: Patients’ Information Table
No.

Date of birth

Gender

P.O. Box

Disease

1

1981/07

M

12386

Cancer

2

1978/02

F

12362

Obesity

3

1962/05

M

12337

Obesity

4

1978/02

F

12395

Malaria

5

1978/10

F

12381

HIV

6

1981/09

M

12352

Obesity

7

1978/10

F

12381

HIV

8

1962/08

F

12394

Cancer

9

1981/04

M

12380

Malaria
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Table 3.3: 2-Anonymous Table
No.

Date of birth

Gender

P.O. Box

Disease

3

1962

*

123**

Obesity

8

1962

*

123**

Cancer

2

1978/02

F

123**

Obesity

4

1978/02

F

123**

Malaria

5

1978/10

F

123**

HIV

7

1978/10

F

123**

HIV

1

1981

M

123**

Cancer

6

1981

M

123**

Obesity

9

1981

M

123**

Malaria

As it can be seen from Table 3.3 there are at least two records which are indistinguishable from each other. That is why is known as 2-anonymous table.

Since Samarati and Sweeney introduced the k-anonymity privacy model, several
algorithms have been proposed for implementing the k-anonymity privacy model
via generalisation and suppression methods. Samarati (2001) proposed the binary search algorithm for full-domain generalisation; Sweeney (2002) proposed
a heuristic algorithm for cell generalisation. Meyerson and Williams (2004) and
Aggarwal et al. (2005) describe approximation algorithms for the cell-suppression
flavor of k -anonymisation. Bayardo and Agrawal (2005) described an optimal searchbased algorithm for single-dimensional recoding.
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The l-diversity Privacy Model
As recognised by several researchers, k-anonymity can only prevent association between individuals and records (identity disclosure), but it cannot prevent the association between individuals and sensitive values (attribute disclosure) (Xiao and Tao,
2006a; Li et al., 2007; Machanavajjhala et al., 2007). Therefore, a user who receives
the data can discover the values of sensitive attributes when there is little diversity
in those sensitive attributes.

For example, Table 3.3 is a 2-anonymous table of the original Table 3.2 but a user
can conclude that a certain woman whose information is in the original table with
P.O. Box 12381 and born in October 1978, (1978/10) has HIV disease since all the
records with these quasi-identifiable information has HIV disease. This problem is
known as homogeneity problem (Machanavajjhala et al., 2007). Machanavajjhala
proposes an l-diversity privacy model to address this problem of k-anonymity privacy model.

The l-diversity model requires that each equivalence class has at least l -well-represented
values for each sensitive attribute (Machanavajjhala et al., 2007). Machanavajjhala et al.
(2007) defines well represented as Distinct l-diversity, Entropy l-diversity and Recursive (c,l)-diversity. Since all the definitions of well represented result in almost
similar results, this research adopts the simple distinct l-diversity definition.
1. Distinct l-diversity (also known as p-sensitive k -anonymity (Truta and Vinay,
2006)). This definition ensures that there are at least l distinct values of the
sensitive attribute in each equivalence class ei .
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2. Entropy l-diversity. A table is said to satisfy entropy l-diversity if for every
equivalence class ei

Entropy(ei ) = −

∑

P (ei , s) ∗ log(P (ei , s)) ≥ log(l)

(3.6.1)

s∈S

where P (ei ,s) denotes the proportion of each sensitive value s in an equivalence class.
3. Recursive (c,l)-diversity. The recursive (c,l)-diversity makes sure that the
most frequent value does not appear too frequently, and that the less frequent
values do not appear too rarely. A table satisfies recursive (c,l)-diversity if
every equivalence class satisfies recursive (c,l)-diversity. The equivalence class
satisfies recursive (c,l)-diversity if r1 < c(ri + ri+1 + ... + rm ); where c is the
constant and ri denotes the number of times the ith most frequent sensitive
value appears in that equivalence class.
An algorithm for l-diversity can be created by changing an algorithm for the kanonymity, and make the algorithm to check for l-diversity every time when a
table is tested for k-anonymity. To make k -anonymous table l -diverse, equivalence
classes that are not l -diverse are either suppressed or combined together until they
are diverse. This results in unneccesary information loss. By using the 2-anonymous
Table 3.3, the 2-diversity table is presented on Table 3.4. Now a user can not identify
the diseases of a woman whose information is in the table with P.O. Box 12381 and
born in 1978 since there are three diﬀerent diseases with these quasi-identifiable
information. This was achieved by combining together the second and the third
equivalence classes and generalising their date of birth by sharing year only.
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Table 3.4: 2-diversity Table
No.

Date of birth

Gender

P.O Box

Disease

3

1962

*

123**

Obesity

8

1962

*

123**

Cancer

2

1978

F

123**

Obesity

4

1978

F

123**

Malaria

5

1978

F

123**

HIV

7

1978

F

123**

HIV

1

1981

M

123**

Cancer

6

1981

M

123**

Obesity

9

1981

M

123**

Malaria

After the development of this main privacy model; k-anonymity, l-diversity, several
other privacy models have been proposed to address diﬀerent scenarios that were
not considered by the privacy models. Some of the proposed privacy models are
discussed next:

The t-closenesss Privacy Model
Li et al. (2007) observed that when the overall distribution of a sensitive attribute
is skewed, preventing attribute linkage attacks by using l-diversity privacy model
results in high information loss. For example, consider a data table containing data
of 1000 patients on some quasi-identifier attributes (QIDs) and a single sensitive
attribute HIV with two possible values, Yes or No. Assume that there are only 5
patients with HIV = Yes in the table. To achieve k-anonymity with k=l, at least
one patient with HIV is needed in each equivalence class; therefore, at most 5 equivalence classes can be formed. Enforcing k-anonymity with k=l may lead to high
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information loss in this case.

To prevent skewness attack, Li et al. (2007) proposed a privacy model, called tcloseness, which requires the distribution of a sensitive attribute in any group on
QID to be close to the distribution of the attribute in the overall table. To measure the closeness between two distributions of sensitive values t-closeness uses the
Earth Mover Distance (EMD) function. The closeness requires to be lower than t.

There are several limitations and weaknesses of t-closeness privacy model. First,
it lacks the flexibility of specifying diﬀerent protection levels for diﬀerent sensitive
values. Second, the EMD function is not suitable for preventing attribute linkage on
numerical sensitive attributes (Li and Li, 2009). Third, enforcing t-closeness would
greatly degrade the data usefulness because it requires the distribution of sensitive
values to be the same in all equivalence classes. This would significantly damage
the correlation between QID and sensitive attributes.

The (X,Y)-anonymity
The (X,Y)-anonymity model was proposed to address the assumption that each
record represents a distinct individual, assumed by the k-anonymity model (Wang
and Fung, 2006). Thus if several records in a table represent the same individual,
a group of k records may represent fewer than k individuals, and the individual’s
information may be identified.

The (X,Y)-anonymity specifies that each value on X is linked to at least k distinct
values on Y, where X and Y are disjoint sets of attributes. The k-anonymity is the
special case of the (X,Y)-anonymity where X is the QID and Y is a sensitive at-
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tribute in the table T that uniquely identifies an individual. The (X,Y)-anonymity
provides a uniform and flexible way to specify diﬀerent types of privacy requirements. If each value on X describes a group of individuals (e.g., X = Address,
Gender, Age) and Y represents the sensitive attribute (e.g., Y = Disease), this
means that each group is associated with a diverse set of sensitive values, making
it diﬃcult to infer a specific sensitive value.

The (k, e)-anonymity Privacy Model
Most work on k-anonymity and its extensions assumes categorical sensitive attributes. Zhang et al. (2007) proposed the notion of (k, e)-anonymity to address
numerical sensitive attributes such as salary. The general idea is to partition the
records into groups so that each group contains at least k diﬀerent sensitive values
with a range of at least e.

The MultiRelational k-anonymity Privacy Model .
Instead of anonymising a single data table, the MultiRelational k-anonymity was
proposed to ensure k-anonymity on multiple relational tables (Nergiz et al., 2007).
The MultiRelational k-anonymity assumes that a relational database contains a
person-specific table T and a set of tables T1 ,..., Tn , where T contains a person
identifier Pid and some sensitive attributes, and Ti , for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, contains some
foreign keys, some attributes in QID, and sensitive attributes.

The general privacy notion is to ensure that for each record r contained in the join
of all tables T ⋊
⋉ T1 ⋊
⋉,..., ⋊
⋉ Tn , there exists at least k-1 other individual’s records
who share the same QID with r. The MultiRelational k-anonymity applies the kanonymisation at the group of individual’s record level, not at the record level as in
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traditional k-anonymity. This idea is similar to (X,Y)-anonymity, where X = QID
and Y = Pid.

The Personalised Privacy Model
In many applications, diﬀerent subjects have diﬀerent requirements for privacy. For
example, a brokerage customer with a very large account would likely have a much
higher level of privacy-protection than a customer with a lower level of privacy
protection. In such a case, it is necessary to personalise the privacy-protection
algorithm. In personalised privacy-preservation, anonymisations of the data such
that diﬀerent records have a diﬀerent level of privacy are constructed.

Two examples of personalised privacy-preservation approaches are discussed in
Aggarwal and Philip (2005); Xiao and Tao (2006a). The approach in Aggarwal and
Philip (2005) uses a condensation approach for personalised anonymisation, while
the approach in Xiao and Tao (2006a) uses a more conventional generalisation approach for anonymisation that allows each data subject to specify an individual
privacy level. This model assumes that each sensitive attribute has a taxonomy
tree and that each data subject specifies a guarding node in this tree. The data
subject’s privacy is violated if an attacker is able to infer any domain sensitive value
within the subtree of the guarding node with a probability, called breach probability, greater than a certain threshold.

In the personalised privacy approach, a guarding node is specified for each record
by its owner. The advantage is that each data subject may specify a guarding node
according to their own tolerance on sensitivity. Experiments show that this personalised privacy requirement could result in lower information loss than the universal

56

Anonymisation Techniques
privacy requirement (Xiao and Tao, 2006a). In practice, however, it is unclear how
individual data subjects would set their guarding node. Often, a reasonable guarding node depends on the distribution of sensitive values in the whole table or in a
group. For example, a woman knowing that her disease is very common, may set a
more special (lower privacy protected) guarding node for her record. Nonetheless,
the data subjects usually have no access to the distribution of sensitive values in
their QID group or in the whole table before the data is published. Without such
information, the tendency is to play safe by setting a more general (higher privacy
protected) guarding node, which may negatively aﬀect the utility of data.

An anonymised table is considered adequately protected, if it satisfies a privacy
model. The privacy models achieve diﬀerent types of privacy protection; therefore,
the choice of a privacy model depends on the needs of the underlying application.
The table that does not satisfy the specified privacy requirements must be modified
before being shared. The modification is done by applying to the data a sequence
of anonymisation approaches. Section 3.6.2 discusses the existing anonymisation
approaches.

3.6.2

Anonymisation Approaches

Anonymisation approaches are the approaches used to achieve anonymity. These
approaches include, generalisation, suppression, pseudonymisation, and anatomisation. Generalisation approaches replace specific quasi-identifier values with less
specific values. Suppression is the highest level of generalisation where values are
not shared at all. Pseudonymisation distorts the data by adding noise, aggregating values, swapping values, or generating synthetic data. Anatomisation approach
removes the relationship between quasi-identifier and sensitive attributes by group57
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ing and shuﬄing sensitive values in an equivalence class. These anonymisation
approaches are discussed next:

Generalisation
Generalisation approach replaces specific values with less specific values. For example, in Figure 3.1, the parent node “Been-married” is more general than the
child nodes “Married”, “Divorced”, and “Widowed”. For a numerical attribute,
exact values can be replaced with an interval that covers exact values. The root
node, “Any status”, represents the most general value of an attribute, which is also
known as suppression. A suppression approach replaces some values with a missing
value, indicating that the replaced values are not disclosed. The reverse approach
of suppression is called disclosure while the reverse approach of generalisation is
called specialisation.

Figure 3.1: Generalisation hierarchy of the Marital status attribute (Samarati,
2001)

The Bottom-up and top-down are the main search strategies used to traverse along
the generalisation hierarchies. By bottom-up search strategy, the algorithm starts
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at the original table, and attribute values are replaced using upper attribute values checking to determine, whether the given anonymity requirement has been
achieved. The generalisation process terminates when anonymity requirement has
been achieved (Wang et al., 2004). By top-down approach, a table is specialised
from the most generalisation state where all attribute values have the most generalised values of their generalisation hierarchies. At each step, the most generalised values are replaced with less general values making checks to determine if
anonymity requirement has been violated. The specialisation process terminates
when no specialisation can be performed without violating anonymity requirement
(Bayardo and Agrawal, 2005).

This research uses a bottom-up search strategy approach as it results in a lower
value of the information loss metric compared to top-down search strategy. This is
because the top-down search strategy starts from the most general value and stops
when anonymity requirement is violated, it may stop at the point where the data is
more generalised thus increasing the information loss. This is unlike a bottom-up
search strategy that stops at the point where the data is more specific and also
achieves the anonymity requirement.

Generalisation can be applied at the cell or attribute level. Most of the solutions
proposed in the literature, adopt attribute-based generalisation. This is because
the cell-based generalisation produces a table where the values in the cells of the
same column may be non homogeneous, since they belong to diﬀerent domains (e.g.,
some records report the complete date of birth, while other records only report the
year of birth), which cause diﬃculties in analysis. On the other hand, cell-based
generalisation significantly reduces information loss when compared to attribute-
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based generalisation as it will be discussed further in section 6.2.2, which is the
main interest of this research.

Suppression
Any table can be transformed to an anonymised table by using generalisation approach. But sometimes more generalisation may result in more information loss
than suppressing the records that are not anonymous. To avoid this weakness, suppression approach is used instead of generalisation.

Suppression is an approach that involves removing data so that it is not disclosed at
all. It replaces one or more unique values of an attribute in a record with a missing
value. The aim of the approach is to reduce identification of the attributes values.
For example, suppose the combination “Marital status=Widow; Age=20” is unique
in the dataset. If the Age information is suppressed, the combination “Marital status=Widow; Age=missing ” will not be identifying anymore. Alternatively, if that
still identifies an individual, one can suppress the information on Marital status as
well.

As in generalisation, suppression can be done at the record or cell level. Record suppression scheme refers to suppressing an entire record (Iyengar, 2002; LeFevre et al.,
2005; Samarati, 2001). Therefore, records suppression scheme suppresses every instance of a given cell in a table (Wang et al., 2005, 2007). Cell suppression (or
local suppression) refers to suppressing some instances of a given cell in a table
(Meyerson and Williams, 2004). Thus, this research uses the cell suppression not
the record suppression.
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Pseudonymisation
Pseudonymisation is the approach used to replace the true identities of an individual
by false-identities that cannot be linked directly to their corresponding identities
(De Moor et al., 2003). Unlike previously discussed approaches, pseudonymised
data does not corresponds to the real-world individuals represented by the original
data. Therefore, even if a user is able to identify an individual it is not possible to
perform the sensitive linkages or recover sensitive information from the shared data.

A pseudonymisation approach masks identities of individuals so that information
relating to those individuals can be handled without knowing to whom the information relates (Riedl et al., 2008; Claerhout and DeMoor, 2005). Only the statistical
properties explicitly selected by the data holder are preserved. In contrast, generalisation and suppression make the data less precise but are semantically consistent
with the raw data, and hence preserve the truthfulness of the data.

Generalisation, suppression and pseudonymisation approaches cause information
loss that may reduce usefulness of the data for the tasks that require detailed insights. Anatomisation approaches were proposed to reduce the problem.

Anatomisation
Unlike generalisation, suppression and pseudonymisation, anatomisation does not
modify the quasi-identifier or the sensitive attribute, but it removes the relationship between the two. This is done by partitioning the records according to distinct
sensitive attributes, by the process known as bucketisation and then separates the
sensitive attributes from the quasi-idientifiers. Therefore, the data is released in
two separate tables; one contains quasi-identifier attributes (QIT), and the other
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contains sensitive attributes (ST). Both QIT and ST have one common attribute,
GroupID, for group linking.

The anatomisation approach starts by grouping the records according to their sensitive attributes values. For example, let Gi denote the ith greatest group, S = {G1 ,
G2 ,..., Gm } denotes the set of groups and l denotes the required number of sensitive
values in each group. In each iteration of selection, one record is removed from each
of the l largest groups to form a new bucket. Note that after every iteration, the size
of some groups will be changed. So in the beginning of every iteration, the groups
are sorted according to their sizes, this ensures the formed l-records groups are as
many as possible. Also, by bucketisation the remaining records are sequentially
incorporated from the first bucket.

Then, the anatomisation approach creates QIT that contain all records from the
original table, but replaces the sensitive values by the GroupIDs, and create ST
that contain the count of each sensitive value for each quasi-identifier group. For
example, by using Patients’ Information Table 3.2, Table 3.6 illustrates the two
tables QIT and ST obtained by partitioning the records in the Table 3.2 in groups
that satisfy 2-diversity privacy requirement.
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Table 3.6: QIT and ST
No.

DOB

Gender

P.O. Box

GroupID

3

1962/05

M

12337

1

8

1962/08

F

12394

1

2

1978/02

F

12362

2

4

1978/02

F

12395

2

6

1981/09

M

12352

3

1

1981/07

M

12386

3

9

1981/04

M

12380

4

5

1978/10

F

12381

4

7

1978/10

F

12381

4

GroupID

Disease

Count

1

Obesity

1

1

Cancer

1

2

Obesity

1

2

Malaria

1

3

Obesity

1

3

Cancer

1

4

Malaria

1

4

HIV

2

This research adopts the bucketisation part of the anatomisation approach and uses
a cell-based generalisation approach to achieve k-anonymity privacy requirement,
rather than separating the table into two parts; QIT and ST tables. The formal
approach used in this research is defined as follows; Given a table T, the records
are partitioned into buckets (i.e., horizontally partition the table T according to
l -distinct sensitive attribute). This ensures that each bucket contains exactly l distinct sensitive values. The remaining records are incorporated in the bucket
that results in a lower value of the information loss metric when the record is incorporated. Then cell-based generalisation is applied within each bucket to achieve
k-anonymity privacy requirements. The resulting set of buckets, can then be shared
for diﬀerent purposes.

The two approaches are used together since, by using the bucketisation alone a user
can be able to identify an individual if their quasi-identifiers are diﬀerent. There-
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fore, cell-based generalisation approach is applied in each bucket to make them
indistinguishable from each other. Also, the application of the cell-based generalisation approach depending on the need of the bucket, rather than depending on
the need of all attribute values, reduces the amount of information loss, as will be
justified in Chapter 6. For example, by using our Patients’ information Table 3.2,
Table 3.7 depicts a table that is a 2-anonymous and 2-diverse version of the Table
3.2.

Table 3.7: Buckets of the distinct sensitive attributes
No.

Date of birth

Gender

P.O. Box

Disease

3

1962

*

123**

Obesity

8

1962

*

123**

Cancer

2

1978

F

123**

Obesity

4

1978

F

123**

Malaria

5

*

*

1238*

HIV

1

*

*

1238*

Cancer

7

*

*

1238*

HIV

6

1981

M

123**

Obesity

9

1981

M

123**

Malaria
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3.6.3

Anonymisation Algorithms

There are several anonymisation algorithms that use the approaches discussed in
section 3.6.2 to anonymise data. This section discusses the commonly used anonymisation algorithms with their characteristics. The algorithms are summarised in
Table 3.8.
Table 3.8: Characteristics of the Existing Algorithms (Author, 2013)
Algorithm

Methods
used

Type of
generalisation
Cellsuppression

Characteristics
Privacy
Strengths
Models
k -anonymity

Low information
loss

Full-domain
generalisation

k -anonymity

Generalisation and
Suppression

Full-domain
generalisation

k -anonymity

Generalisation
is guaranteed to
be k -anonymous
(LeFevre et al.,
2005)
Protects against
identity disclosure

Generalisation

Full-domain
generalisation

k -anonymity
and
l -diversity

Generalisation and
Suppression

Multidimensional
generalisation
Not using
generalisation

k -anonymity

µ-Argus
(Hundepool
and Willenborg, 1996)
Datafly
(Sweeney,
1997)

Generalisation and
Suppression
Generalisation and
Suppression

Incognito
with k anonymity
(LeFevre,
2005)
Incognito
with l diversity
(Machanavajjhala, 2007)
Mondrian
(LeFevre,
2006)
Anatomy
(Xiao and
Tao, 2006)

Anatomisation

l -diversity
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Weaknesesses

The results are not
always guaranteed
to be k -anonymous
(LeFevre et al., 2005)
It can over-generalise
data (Sweeney, 2002)

Cannot resist homogeneity and background attacks
(Han and Yu, 2008)

Resist homogeneity and background attacks
(LeFevre et al.,
2005)
It is more flexible
(LeFevre, 2006)

It results in high information loss (Li et al.,
2007)

Results in unmodified data
(Fung et al., 2010)

It does not achieve
k-anonymity privacy requirement
(Xiao and Tao, 2006b)

It is less scalable due
to the increased search
space (Xu et al., 2006)
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µ-argus and DataFly Algorithm
The µ-argus and Datafly are the first algorithms that seek to provide k-anonymity
protection by using generalisation and suppression approaches (Sweeney, 2002).
The µ-argus algorithm, developed by Hundepool and Willenborg, computes the frequency of all 3-value combinations of domain values, then greedily applies generalisations and cell suppressions to achieve k-anonymity (Hundepool and Willenborg,
1996). Since the approach limits the size of the attribute combination, the resulting
data may not be k -anonymous when more than 3 attributes are considered.

Sweeney’s Datafly system was the first k -anonymisation algorithm scalable to handle real-life large datasets (Sweeney, 1997). It achieves k -anonymisation by generating an array of quasi-identifier group sizes and greedily generalising those combinations with less than k occurrences based on a heuristic search metric that selects the
attribute having the largest number of distinct values. Datafly employs full-domain
generalisation and record suppression schemes. Sweeney (2002) shows that µ-argus
can fail to provide adequate protection while Datafly can overdistort the data.

Incognito Algorithm
Samarati (2001) proposed a binary search algorithm that first identifies all minimal
generalisations (MinGen), and then finds the optimal generalisation. Enumerating
all minimal generalisations is a time consuming operation and, therefore, not scalable for large datasets. LeFevre et al. (2005) observe the problem and propose a
suite of bottom-up generalisation algorithms, called Incognito.

The Incognito approach has been proposed for computing a k -minimal generalisation with the use of bottom-up aggregation along domain generalisation hierarchies.
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The Incognito approach uses a bottom-up breadth-first search of the domain generalisation hierarchy, in which it generates all the possible minimal k -anonymous
tables for an original table. First, it checks k-anonymity for each single attribute,
and removes all those generalisations which do not satisfy k-anonymity. Then, it
computes generalisations in pairs, again pruning those pairs which do not satisfy
the k-anonymity constraints. This approach is continued until, no further pairs can
be constructed, or all possible dimensions have been exhausted.

Although Incognito significantly outperforms the binary search in eﬃciency, the
complexity of all three algorithms; MinGen, binary search and Incognito increases
exponentially with the size of quasi-identifier (LeFevre, 2006). Also, the Incognito algorithm with k-anonymity privacy model cannot ensure diversity of the
sensitive attributes, so a generated output table cannot resist homogeneity and
background knowledge attacks. Based on this weakness, Incognito with l-diversity
was proposed by Machanavajjhala to ensure diversity of the sensitive attributes
(Machanavajjhala et al., 2007).

Mondrian Multi-dimensional k-anonymity Algorithm
To address the inflexibility problem of Incognito algorithm, LeFevre (2006) presented a greedy top-down specialisation algorithm for finding a minimal k anonymisation by using the multi-dimensional generalisation approach. The Mondrian performs a specialisation on one quasi-identifier group if each of its specialised quasiidentifier groups contains at least k records. Due to such a relaxed constraint,
multi-dimensional generalisation usually results in anonymous data that has a better quality than when using single generalisation.
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The trade-oﬀ is that multi-dimensional generalisation is less scalable than other
types of generalisation due to the increased search space (Fung et al., 2010). Xu et al.
(2006) showed that employing cell generalisation could further improve the data
quality.

Anatomy Algorithm
The anatomy is a group-based approach addressing the issue of guaranteeing ldiversity privacy requirement of the shared data without using generalisation approach (Xiao and Tao, 2006b). It removes the relationship between the quasiidentifier and sensitive attribute by puting the data in two separate tables; one
contains quasi-identifier attributes (QIT), and the other contains sensitive attributes
(ST).

The anatomy algorithm starts by partitioning the original records into quasi-identifier
groups so that, in each group, at most 1/l of the records contain the same sensitive
value. This process involves selecting l -records of a diﬀerent sensitive attribute and
sequentially incorporating the remaining records. Then, it creates a QIT table that
contains all records from the original table, but replaces the sensitive values by the
GroupIDs, and then creates ST table containing the count of each sensitive value for
each quasi-identifier group. The anatomy algorithm is further explained in section
4.1.

Even though the anatomy algorithm results in unmodified data in both the QIT
and ST tables, it does not achieve the basic k-anonymity privacy requirement. So
taking into account the importance of both individual’s privacy and data usefulness,
this research proposed an algorithm, named kl-redInfo, which improves the anatomy
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algorithm. This is done by introducing approaches of systematic incorporation of
the remaining records, cell-based generalisation instead of separating the table into
two parts, and sorting the records according to their quasi-identifiers in order to
reduce the amount of information loss.

3.7

Chapter Summary

The problem of providing useful information while ensuring an individual’s privacy
is a long standing challenge. Researchers have addressed with limited success and
countinue to address the protection of Personal Identifiable Information (PII) when
sharing data for diﬀerent purposes. Diﬀerent techniques to address this problem
have been proposed, including ethical and legal frameworks, policy and regulatory
frameworks, and privacy-enhanced technologies such as statistical techniques, cryptographic techniques, and anonymisation techniques, as discussed in Chapter 3.
Most of the existing techniques emphasise on ensuring an individual’s privacy while
the usefulness of such data has not been well-considered.

While identifying the strengths and weaknesses of the existing privacy-enhancing
approaches, this research is based on anonymisation techniques. This is due to
the fact that unlike other techniques that aim to ensure an individual’s privacy
from unauthorised user, anonymisation techniques ensures an individual’s privacy
from both unauthorised and authorised users. The anonymisation algorithms are
developed to achieve privacy requirements determined by privacy models by using several approaches including generalisation, suppression, pseudonymisation and
bucketisation. Most of the existing anonymisation approaches result in substantial
information loss. This is the main motivation of conducting this research.

69

Chapter 4
THE DESIGN OF THE kl-redInfo
ALGORITHM

In order to reduce the amount of information loss caused by most of the existing approaches disscussed in Chapter 3, this research proposes anonymisation algorithm,
named kl-redInfo, that adopts bucket-creation part of the anatomisation approach
from an Anatomy algorithm, but instead of sequentially incorporating the remaining
records, as is done in the Anatomy algorithm explained in Section 4.1, the kl-redInfo
algorithm incorporates the remaining records to an equivalence class that results
in lower information loss. Also, instead of spliting the table into two parts, the
cell-based generalisation approach is added in order to achieve k-anonymity privacy
requirement, which is not achieved by Anatomy algorithm. Furthermore, a sorting approach is added in order to consider distribution of quasi-identifier attributes.

This chapter presents the proposed kl-redInfo algorithm, and discusses key features
of the algorithm. The kl-redInfo algorithm adopts a bucketisation evolution from
the Anatomy algorithm discussed in section 4.1. Section 4.2 describes the kl-redInfo
algorithm. The algorithm walkthrough is described in section 4.3 and key features of
the kl-redInfo algorithm are discussed in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 describes the high
level architecture of the kl-redInfo solution, and lastly a summary of this chapter.
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4.1

Anatomy Algorithm

Anatomy is a group-based approach addressing the issue of guaranteeing l-diversity
privacy requirement of the anonymised dataset without using generalisation approach (Xiao and Tao, 2006b). The Anatomy algorithm is presented in Algorithm
1.
Algorithm 1: Anatomy algorithm (Xiao and Tao, 2006b)

1
2
3

4

5
6

7
8
9

10
11
12
13
14

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

Data: Original table T
Result: QIT and ST
QIT = ∅; ST = ∅; gcnt = 0 ;
Group the records in T by their sensitive values (each group per sensitive value)
/* The bucket-creation step */
while there are at least l non-empty groups do
gcnt = gcnt + 1; QIgcnt = ∅
S = the set of l largest groups;
for each group in S do
remove an arbitrary record r from the group to form a bucket
QIgcnt = QIgcnt ∪ { r }
end
end
/* The remaining-incorporation step */
for each non-empty group do
r’ = the remaining record of the group;
S’ = the set of buckets produced from the previous step;
sequentially assign r’ to a bucket in S’ ;
end
/* Populate QIT and ST */
for j = 1 to gcnt do
for each record r ∈ QIj do
insert record (r’1 , ...,r’d , j ) into QIT
end
for each distinct sensitive value v in QIj do
cj (v) = the number of records in QIj with As value v
insert record (j, v, cj (v)) into ST
end
return QIT and ST
end
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The algorithm first computes an l -diverse partition of the original table T (Lines
1-13), and then, splits the table into two parts; the table of quasi-identifiers (QIT)
and the table of sensitive attributes (ST) (Lines 14-20). The l -diverse partition
process involves group-creation and incorporation of the remaining records.

The bucket-creation step is performed in iterations, and continues until when there
is less than l non-empty groups (Line 3). Each iteration results in a new quasiidentifier group QIgcnt (Line 4). In order to ensure the formed l -records buckets are
as many as possible, the Anatomy first selects a set of groups S consisting of the l
groups that currently have the largest number of records (Line 4). Then, from each
group in S (Line 5), a record is sequentially selected and added to a bucket QIgcnt
(Line 6). Therefore, QIgcnt contains l records with diﬀerent sensitive attributes values, named bucket.

To incorporate each of the remaining records r, the Anatomy selects a set S’ of
buckets (produced from the bucket-creation step), which does not have the same
records as r (Lines 9-11). Then, in line 12, r is assigned to an arbitrary bucket in S’.

In order to split the table into two parts, the table of quasi-identifier (QIT) and
the table of sensitive attributes (ST) (Lines 14-20), each group in S’ is then associated with a unique group identifier. For each record, both in QIT and ST, notify
the identifier of the group to which it belongs. For simplicity, each group in the
ST has a record for each sensitive value appearing in the group, and notifies the
frequency with which the value is represented in the group. Line 21 returns the
formed anonymised QIT and ST tables.
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The Anatomy algorithm result in unmodified quasi-identifier and sensitive values
in two separate tables; QIT and ST table. The exact quasi-identifiers indicates the
presence of a particular individual in the dataset. Therefore, Anatomy does not
achieves the k-anonymity privacy requirement, which is important for controlling
identity disclosure. Also, Anatomy algorithm does not consider the distribution
of quasi-identifiers, and the remaining records are sequentially incorporated, which
may result in records that are very diﬀerent to be in the same QI-group, hence
making them indistinguishable from each other may results in high information
loss.

4.2

The Proposed kl-redInfo Algorithm

The kl-redInfo algorithm is the set of procedures that ensure an individual’s privacy
with reduced information loss. The algorithm is named kl-redInfo as it achieves kanonymity and l-diversity privacy requirements with reduced amount of information
loss. The individual’s privacy is ensured by achieving the two main privacy requirements, k-anonymity and l-diversity. The information loss is reduced by
 Incorporating the remaining records to the group that results in a lower value

of the information loss metric compared to when the records are incorporated
to other groups
 Using both bucketisation and cell-based generalisation approaches
 Sorting the records according to the attributes that can be linked to identify

an individual, also known as quasi-identifiers (QIDs).
The problem of ensuring an individual’s privacy when sharing data is serious due
to the increasing pressure of data sharing as a result of technology growth. In par73
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ticular, the growth of social networks websites such as Facebook and Tweet that
simplify the linking attack, as the information becomes available on a websites can
be linked with other information to identify an individual’s sensitive information
such as disease. In addition the wide use of mobile storage devices such as laptops
and external disks, which are easily stolen and misplaced, increases the need for
anonymised data. These cause diﬃculty for data holders to use and share data for
various useful purposes such as research, analysis, and public education. Most of
the existing techniques may not ensure an individual’s privacy or results in substantial information loss.

The kl-redInfo will be used by data holders to anonymise data that can be used
for diﬀerent purposes without identifying an individual. The data holders will use
the algorithm to anonymise the data before giving them to data recipients such as
researchers, analysts and policy makers. The data holders will enter the dataset to
be anonymised and the values of parameter k and l, and the algorithm will provide
the anonymised dataset.

Specifically, the kl-redInfo algorithm adopts bucketisation part of the Anatomy, ldiversity-specific algorithm. Then systematically incorporates the remaining records
in a group that results in a lower value of the information loss metric instead of
sequential incorporation, as is done in the Anatomy algorithm.

Second, instead of splitting the table into two parts, the kl-redInfo applies cellbased generalisation approach in every group in order to make the quasi-identifiers
indistinguishable from each other. Also, the records are sorted according to the
quasi-identifiers in order to consider their distributions. The kl-redInfo algorithm
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can be used by any domain, but its implementation may need to be customised
depending on the quasi-identifiers to be anonymised. The available implementation
uses the commonly used quasi-identifier attributes including date of birth, address,
gender, and marital status. Algorithm 2 presents the kl-redInfo algorithm.
Algorithm 2: The proposed kl-redInfo algorithm (Author, 2013)

1
2

3

4
5

6
7
8

9

10
11
12
13

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

Data: Original table T
Result: Anonymised table T*
gcnt = 0 ;
Sort the records in T according to their quasi-identifiers (QIDs)
Group the records in T by their sensitive values (each group per sensitive value)
/* The bucket-creation step */
while there are at least l non-empty groups do
gcnt = gcnt + 1; QIgcnt = ∅
S = the set of l largest groups;
for each group G in S do
remove an arbitrary record r from the group to form a bucket B
B = QIgcnt ∪ { r }
end
end
/* Generalisation step */
for each bucket B do
check if QID values are the same
if they are not the same then
generalise the values
end
end
/* The Incorporation step */
r = the remaining record;
B = the set of buckets produced from the generalisation step;
while there exists groups G’ such that |G’| <l do
for each remaining record r in G do
Calculate information loss(B∪r )
end
Incorporate r in B with lower information loss
Insert B into T*
end
return T*
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The algorithm starts by sorting the original table T according to quasi-identifiers
(Line 2) in order to take under consideration the distribution of the quasi-identifiers.
Then, the algorithm adopts bucket-creation part from Anatomy algorithm (Line
3-9) to form buckets with l distinct sensitive values. Thereafter, the kl-redInfo algorithm applies the cell-based generalisation approach within each bucket (local
generalisation) to form equivalence classes (Line 10-14).

Instead of the remaining records being sequentially incorporated, the kl-redInfo algorithm calculates the resulting information loss before each remaining record is
incorporated in an equivalence class (Line 15-20). Then the remaining record is
incorporated into the equivalence class that results in a lower value of the information loss metric (Line 21). Lastly, the bucket is inserted in the anonymised table
T* and returned (Line 23).

4.3

Algorithm Walkthrough

The algorithm first sorts the records according to their QID values, then groups the
records according to their sensitive attribute values, thereafter recursively selecting
l records from l distinct groups to form buckets. Then each bucket is generalised to
form equivalence classes. When the number of groups are less than l, the information
loss resulting from the application of incorporating each of the remaining records
in equivalence classes is calculated. The remaining record is incorporated into an
equivalence class that results in lower information loss.
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Table 4.1: Patients’ Information Table
No.

Date of birth

Gender

P.O. Box

Disease

1

1981/07

M

12386

Cancer

2

1978/02

F

12362

Obesity

3

1962/05

M

12337

Obesity

4

1978/02

F

12395

Malaria

5

1978/10

F

12381

HIV

6

1981/09

M

12352

Obesity

7

1978/10

F

12381

HIV

8

1962/08

F

12394

Cancer

9

1981/04

M

12380

Malaria

For example, for the Patients’ Information Table 4.1 to satisfy 2-diversity, first,
records are sorted according to their QID values; DOB, Gender and Address, as
shown in Table 4.2.
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Table 4.2: Records sorted according to QID values
Record

Date of birth

Gender

P.O. Box

Disease

r3

1962/05

M

12337

Obesity

r8

1962/08

F

12394

Cancer

r2

1978/02

F

12362

Obesity

r4

1978/02

F

12395

Malaria

r5

1978/10

F

12381

HIV

r7

1978/10

F

12381

HIV

r9

1981/04

M

12370

Malaria

r1

1981/07

M

12386

Cancer

r6

1981/09

M

12352

Obesity

Then records are grouped according to the Disease sensitive attribute, and four
groups are formed and sorted according to the number of records, highest to smallest: G1 = {r3 , r2 , r6 }, G2 = {r8 , r1 }, G3 = { r4 , r9 }, G4 = {r5 , r7 }, where ri
denotes the ith record in the table as shown in Table 4.3.
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Table 4.3: Records grouped according to Sensitive attribute
Record

Date of birth

Gender

P.O. Box

Disease

r3

1962/05

M

12337

Obesity

r2

1978/02

F

12362

Obesity

r6

1981/09

M

12352

Obesity

r8

1962/08

F

12394

Cancer

r1

1981/07

M

12386

Cancer

r4

1978/02

F

12395

Malaria

r9

1981/04

M

12370

Malaria

r5

1978/10

F

12381

HIV

r7

1978/10

F

12381

HIV

Second, r3 and r8 are selected from G1 and G2 and bucketised. This forms the first
bucket. This process continues until when the number of groups are less than l
(in this case l =2). Table 4.4 shows buckets formed with respect to this example.
Records are continuously selected from l -distinct groups and bucketised. Then cellgeneralisation is applied in each bucket to form an equivalence class.
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Table 4.4: The First Bucket
Record

Date of birth

Gender

P.O. Box

Disease

r3

1962/05

M

12337

Obesity

r8

1962/08

F

12394

Cancer

r2

1978/02

F

12362

Obesity

r4

1978/02

F

12395

Malaria

r5

1978/10

F

12381

HIV

r1

1981/07

M

12386

Cancer

r6

1981/09

M

12352

Obesity

r9

1981/04

M

12370

Malaria

The information loss resulting from the application of incorporating the remaining
record r7 in each bucket is then calculated. Any of the information loss metrics can
be used to calculate the information loss, as discussed in Section 5.4. This research
uses Normalised Certainty Penalty (NCP) due to the fact that it is a metric that
considers the eﬀect of the generalisation process which is the main cause of the
information loss when anonymising data. Since incorporating record r7 in bucket
2 results in a lower value of the information loss metric compared to when it is
incorporated in other buckets, the record r7 is incorporated into bucket 2. The final
shared table is created as shown in Table 4.5.
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Table 4.5: Anonymised records as a result of kl-redInfo algorithm

4.4

Record

Date of birth

Gender

P.O. Box

Disease

r3

1962

*

123**

Obesity

r8

1962

*

123**

Cancer

r2

1978

F

123**

Obesity

r4

1978

F

123**

Malaria

r7

1978

F

123**

HIV

r5

*

*

1238*

HIV

r1

*

*

1238*

Cancer

r6

1981

M

123**

Obesity

r9

1981

M

123**

Malaria

Key Features of the kl-redInfo algorithm

The proposed kl-redInfo algorithm has key unique features compared to the existing
algorithms. These features are: systematic incorporation of the remaining records,
using both bucketisation and cell-based generalisation approaches, and considering
the distribution of the quasi-identifier attributes. These key features cause the klredInfo to result in significant lower information loss compared to the widely used
algorithms. These features are discussed in section 4.4.1, 4.4.2, and 4.4.3, and their
significance in reducing the information loss will be evaluated in Chapter 6.

4.4.1

Systematic Incorporation of the Remaining Records

Rather than sequentially incorporating the remaining records, the kl-redInfo algorithm incorporates the remaining records to the equivalence class that results in a
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lower value of the information loss metric (systematically). This helps to reduce
the amount of information loss as will be discussed in Chapter 6.

The incorporation process starts if the number of the remaining groups is less than
the required l-value, therefore the bucket with l-distinct sensitive values cannot be
formed. In each iteration, the remaining record is incorporated with the bucket such
that the formed bucket has the smallest weighted Normalised Certainty Penalty
(NCP). The iteration continues until every remaining record is incorporated in the
appropriate bucket.

The weighted NCP was used as it measures the information loss in terms of the
generalisation applied instead of the size of equivalence classes measured by the
Discernibility Penalty (DP). Therefore, since the size of the equivalence classes is
almost equal due to the bucketisation process, DP results in no diﬀerence when
a remaining record is incorporated. The KL-divergence measures the similarity
between the original and the anonymised dataset and not between the groups. The
weight was assigned depending on the number of distinct values, the higher the
number of distinct values the higher the weight, as that shows the high possibility
of identifying an individual. By default, the weighting of each attribute used in the
evaluation of information loss is equal to 1/|QID|, where |QID| is the QID size.

4.4.2

Using both bucketisation and cell-based generalisation approaches

Since the implementation of l-diversity largely relies on the distribution of sensitive attributes values, a new inspiration is to first, bucketise the records according
to their sensitive attributes values, and then recursively selecting l records from l
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distinct buckets and groups them into an equivalence class. As for the remaining
records, incorporating each of them into an equivalence class results in lower information loss. Cell-based generalisation approach is then applied in each group in
order to achieve k-anonymity privacy requirement. The resulting table will satisfy
both k-anonymity and l-diversity privacy requirement with lower information loss,
as will be justified in Chapter 6.

4.4.3

Considers Distribution of the Quasi-identifiers

The kl-redInfo algorithm takes under consideration the distribution of the quasiidentifiers by sorting the records according to quasi-identifier attributes. This approach reduces the possibility of the records that have very diﬀerent quasi-identifiers
being in the same group. This approach seeks to reduce the amount of information
loss but its contribution is not significant. This is because the records were again
grouped according to the sensitive attribute. These results will be discussed in
Chapter 6.
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Characteristics of the existing algorithms compared with the proposed kl-redInfo
are summarised in Table 4.6.
Table 4.6: Characteristics of the Existing Algorithms compared to the Proposed (Author, 2013)

Algorithm

Methods
used

µ-Argus
(Hundepool
and Willenborg, 1996)
Datafly
(Sweeney,
1997)

Generalisation and
Suppression
Generalisation and
Suppression

Incognito
with k anonymity
(LeFevre,
2005)
Incognito
with l diversity
(Machanavajjhala, 2007)
Mondrian
(LeFevre,
2006)
Anatomy
(Xiao and
Tao, 2006)

Anatomisation

kl-redInfo
(Author,
2013)

Bucketsation
and Generalisation

Type of
generalisation
Cellsuppression

Characteristics
Privacy
Strengths
Models
k -anonymity

Low information
loss

Full-domain
generalisation

k -anonymity

Generalisation and
Suppression

Full-domain
generalisation

k -anonymity

Generalisation
is guaranteed to
be k -anonymous
(LeFevre et al.,
2005)
Protects against
identity disclosure

Generalisation

Full-domain
generalisation

k -anonymity
and
l -diversity

Generalisation and
Suppression

Multidimensional
generalisation
Not using
generalisation

k -anonymity

l -diversity

Results in unmodified data
(Fung et al., 2010)

Cell- generalisation

kAnonymity
and l Diversity

An adequate level
of privacy with reduced information
loss
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Resist homogeneity and background attacks
(LeFevre et al.,
2005)
It is more flexible
(LeFevre, 2006)

Weaknesesses

The results are not
always guaranteed
to be k -anonymous
(LeFevre et al., 2005)
It can over-generalise
data (Sweeney, 2002)

Cannot resist homogeneity and background attacks
(Han and Yu, 2008)
It results in high
information loss
(Li et al., 2007)

It is less scalable
due to the increased search space
(Xu et al., 2006)
It does not achieve
k-anonymity privacy requirement
(Xiao and Tao, 2006b)
Values might be
anonymised in different generalisation
levels

A solution Architecture

4.5

A solution Architecture

In Figure 4.1 the high level representation architecture of the proposed algorithm,
kl-redInfo is represented. The main components and the relationships between
them are identified. These components are databases, algorithm engine, and user
interface. The database components are the data storage for original data and
anonymised data. The algorithm engine comprises all algorithms designed, and
facilitates communication between all components. The user interface component
provides interface through which users interact with the system.

Figure 4.1: A Solution Architecture (Author, 2013)
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4.6

Chapter Summary

The kl-redInfo algorithm achieves both k-anonymity and l-diversity privacy requirements. Both privacy requirements are necessary for eﬀective privacy protection.
k-anonymity ensures that an individual’s data cannot be distinguishable by linking
the quasi-identifier attributes, also known as identity disclosure. l-diversity eliminates a possibility to associate an individual with sensitive attributes. Also known
as attribute disclosure.

Most of the existing approaches results in substantial information loss or the anonymisation level achieved may still results in the identification of the individual’s sensitive information. Therefore, the proposed kl-redInfo algorithm uses systematic
incorporation of the remaining records bucketisation and cell-based generalisation
approaches, and sorting the records according to quasi-identifier attributes. The
combination in this approach generates the anonymisation dataset that satisfies
both k-anonymity and l-diversity privacy requirements with lower information loss.
Thus, it maintains the usefulness of the data being shared. The bucketisation
approach was used to achieve l-diversity privacy requirement while cell-based generalisation approach was used to achieve k-anonymity privacy requirement. The
significance of each feature will be discussed in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 5
EXPERIMENTAL ENVIRONMENT
AND SETUP

This chapter discusses the environment used to evaluate and validate the implemented algorithms, kl-redInfo l-mondrian, and g-anatomy. This environment
includes the datasets and the parameters used, and these are discussed in section 5.2. The algorithms used for comparison, l-mondrian, g-anatomy, are discussed in section 5.3. Three information loss metrics, Discernibility Penalty (DP)
(Bayardo and Agrawal, 2005), Normalised Certainty Penalty (NCP) (Xu et al., 2006)
and Kullback Leibler divergence (KL divergence) (Kifer and Gehrke, 2006), used by
this research to calculate the amount of information loss of the implemented algorithms are discussed in Section 5.4 and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test statistics used
for analysis is discussed in section 5.6.

5.1

Experiment Setup

The proposed kl-redInfo algorithm was experimentally evaluated and compared with
the widely used algorithms, l-mondrian and g-anatomy. The algorithms used are
implemented in Java and uses MySQL open source database to store the datasets.
All experiments were implemented in Linux (Ubuntu 10.04 LTS- the Lucid Lynx)
on a computer with a 2.26 GHz Intel(R) Core(TM)2 Duo CPU and 1 GB RAM.
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The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) was used for analysis purpose.

Java is one of the most widely used programming languages and MySQL is the
world’s most popular open source database management system (Arnold et al.,
2000; Flanagan, 2005). In order for the two technologies, Java and MySQL database
to work, they have to be connected. MySQL Connector/J driver was used to connect the two technologies. MySQL Connector/J is a native Java driver that converts JDBC (Java Database Connectivity) requests into the network protocol used
by the MySQL database. It is the oﬃcial JDBC driver for MySQL, which can be
downloaded from http://dev.mysql.com/downloads/connector/j/. The JDBC is an
interface for accessing relational databases from Java and is used to maintain the
databases connection, issues database queries and updates and receives the results.

A Java Development Kit (JDK) called Eclipse, was installed for compiling and
running Java programs. The results from the Java programs were then copied to the
SPSS software for graphical represention (histograms) and comparison was done by
using a paired diﬀerence non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test statistics. This
is due to the fact that, the number of the information loss to be evaluate is small
and the values are not normally distributed. Therefore, the use of parametric test
is not appropriate.

5.2

Datasets and Parameters

The experiments were executed on two diﬀerent datasets; the generated patient
information dataset and the Adult dataset. The generated patient information
dataset, (for the purposes ot this research it is named PatInfo), has 30,200 records
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and eight attributes with seven quasi-identifiers and one sensitive attribute. The
research used simulated dataset since the use of real data was not possible, as
discussed in section 2.5.2. The schema of the PatInfo dataset is based on the
schema of the Muhimbili National Hospital (MNH) in Tanzania where the survey
was completed. Table 5.1 provides a description of the PatInfo dataset including
the attributes, the number of distinct values for each attribute, and the height of
the generalisation hierarchy for each attribute.
Table 5.1: The PatInfo dataset schema

Attribute

Domain size

Height

1

Date of Birth

880

3

2

Gender

2

1

3

Address

33

3

4

Marital Status

7

2

5

Admission Date

876

3

6

Discharge Date

879

3

7

Discharge Status

3

1

8

Disease

14

Sensitive attribute

The PatInfo dataset was generated by using Data Generator software downloaded
from http://www.generatedata.com/#about. The software was installed in the computer where the experiments are implemented. After filling in the possible values of
the attributes, the Data Generator software generates Structured Query Language
(SQL) syntax for creating a table and randomly inserting the attribute values. The
SQL syntax was then copied to the MySQL database where the tables are stored
for the experiments.
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To show that the kl-redInfo algorithm also works in other datasets, this research
also used the real-world census dataset, called Adult dataset, downloaded from UCI
Machine Learning Repository at
http://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/Adult. The dataset was downloaded from
the repository and stored in MySQL database. After removing records with missing values, the dataset remained with 30,162 records and eight attributes with seven
quasi-identifiers and one sensitive attribute.

The Adult dataset was selected as it is the most widely used as a benchmark dataset
in previous research, therefore it is stable and trusted dataset. In additional to that,
Adult dataset has most of the information that can be found in any healthcare domain such as age, gender, marital status and address (Samarati, 2001; Sweeney,
2002; LeFevre et al., 2005; Machanavajjhala et al., 2007). Table 5.2 provides a description of the Adult datasets including the attributes, the number of distinct
values for each attribute, and the height of the generalisation hierarchy for each
attribute.
Table 5.2: The Adult dataset schema

Attribute

Domain size

Height

1

Age

72

4

2

Gender

2

1

3

Marital Status

7

2

4

Race

5

1

5

Education

16

3

6

Native Country

41

2

7

Work class

7

2

8

Occupation

14

Sensitive attribute
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This research uses the commonly used generalisation hierarchies such as Date, Gender and Marital status, as presented in Figure 5.1 (Samarati, 2001; Sweeney, 2002;
LeFevre et al., 2005).

Figure 5.1: Generalisation hierarchies of the QIDs used in this research
(LeFevre et al., 2005)

The k and l are the main parameter values in the experiments. These parameters
have two diﬀerent domains: the k-value parameter controls the number of records
with the same quasi-identifiers, also known as equivalence class (EC) , while the
l-value parameter controls the number of sensitive values within each equivalence
class. Thus, let n be the total number of records, m be the total number of sensitive
values existing in a table, then the k-value can vary from 1 to the total number of
records ( 1≤k ≤n) while l-value varys from 1 to the total number of sensitive values
existing in the table ( 1≤l ≤m).
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In order to equally consider the identity disclosure, represented by k value, and the
attribute disclosure, represented by l value, this research sets the values of k = l.
The l-diversity privacy requirement is defined as for every equivalence class there
should be at least l well-represented sensitive values. This indicates that the value
of l cannot be greater than the value of k, that is, l ≤ k.

When l < k, the implemented algorithms show no changes on the values of the
information loss metrics compared to when k = l was used. This shows that values
of l have no eﬀect on the values of the information loss metrics since l-diverse table
is automatically l-anonymous. The eﬀect of l values will be on the individual’s
privacy, since the lower the values of l the lower distinct sensitive values in the
equivalence class, thus more possibility of the attribute disclosure.

The k and l values can not be greater than the number of sensitive values in the
table (k ≤ m and l ≤ m), 14 in the PatInfo dataset and 14 in the Adult dataset.
Hence, there is no table which can be more than 14-diverse for any reasonable
definition of l-diversity privacy requirement. In practice, a minimal value of k and
l = 3 is sometimes recommended, but more often a value of k and l = 5 is used
(Machanavajjhala et al., 2007; Fung et al., 2010). To ensure a reasonable amount
of variation in our analysis this research uses all possible values of k and l, that is,
all values between 2 and 14 inclusive.
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5.3

Implemented Algorithms

When choosing algorithms with which to compare with the proposed kl-redInfo algorithm, the following criteria were considered. First, in order to be free from the
errors that might be due to the implementation, eﬀort was made to get access to the
source code from developers of the algorithms. The source-code of the l-diversity
version of Incognito was obtained. Second, consideration was not made in comparing against any algorithm that had already been shown to produce lower quality
anonymisations than the state-of-the-art k-anonymity algorithm, called Mondrian.
This eliminated the Incognito algorithm from being used.

Also, since the kl-redInfo algorithm achieves l-diversity privacy requirement, which
is the enhancement of k-anonymity privacy requirement, consideration was not
made in comparing against algorithms that do not achieve l-diversity privacy requirement. The l-diversity privacy requirement can be achieved either by extending
k-anonymity algorithms (Machanavajjhala et al., 2007), or creating a new algorithm that specifically designed to achieve l-diversity privacy requirement, such as
Anatomy algorithm (Xiao and Tao, 2006a). Even though the Anatomy algorithm
is designed to achieve l-diversity privacy requirement, it is not achieving the basic
k-anonymity privacy requirement.

Therefore, this research adds the required criteria in order for the algorithms to
achieve both k-anonymity and l-diversity privacy requirements. Thus, the l-diversity
criteria was added on the Mondrian algorithm to achieve l-diversity privacy requirement, for the purposes of this research this algorithm is named l-mondrian. Also, the
k-anonymity criteria was added on the Anatomy algorithm to achieve k-anonymity
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privacy requirement, this research named the algorithm as g-anatomy. Therefore,
the l-mondrian algorithm extended from Mondrian multidimensional k-anonymity,
and g-anatomy algorithm extended from Anatomy algorithm, were implemented for
comparison purposes, and they are further discussed in Section 5.3.1 and 5.3.2.

5.3.1

The l-mondrian Algorithm

The l-mondrian is an algorithm which achieves l-diversity privacy requirement by
extending the Mondrian multidimensional k-anonymity algorithm (LeFevre, 2006;
Xu et al., 2006; Ghinita et al., 2009). The Mondrian algorithm was originally proposed in LeFevre (2006) for k-anonymity. The algorithm is extended to achieve
l-diversity by checking for l-diversity in addition, every time when the algorithm is
checking for k-anonymity privacy requirement (Machanavajjhala et al., 2007).

The Mondrian algorithm uses a greedy top-down approach to recursively partition the (multidimensional) quasi-identifier domain space. It uses a search strategy
which recursively splits a group of records at the median value of a chosen attribute,
until the partitions created by the split contain at least k but no more than 2k-1
records. In order for each group to have approximately uniform partition, the attribute with the largest normalised range of values is used to split the group. This
is because the larger the spread/range, the easier the good split point can be found
and more likely the data can be further split.

For continuous or ordinal attributes the data is partitioned around the median
value of the split attribute. This process is repeated until no allowable split remains, meaning that a particular group cannot be further divided without violating
the privacy requirements. Algorithm 3 presents l-mondrian algorithm.
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Algorithm 3: l-mondrian algorithm (LeFevre et al., 2008)

1

2
3
4
5

6

7
8
9
10

11

12
13
14

Data: Original table T
Result: Anonymised records
Anonymise(records, attrs)
if no allowable split for records then
return ϕ : r ∈ records → bounding region(records)
end
else
best ← Choose Attribute(attrs, records)
if continuous(best) or ordinal(best) then
threshold ← Choose Threshold(best)
lhs ← {r ∈ records : r.best ≤ threshold}
rhs ← {r ∈ records : r.best > threshold}
return Anonymise(rhs,attrs) ∪ Anonymise(lhs,attrs)
end
end
else
if nominal(best)
recodings ← { }
for each child vi of root(best.hierarchy) do
recordsi ← {r ∈ records : r.best vi }
attrs ← replace root(best.hierarchy) with vi in attrs
recodings ← recodings ∪ Anonymise(recordsi , attrs )
end
return recodings
end

5.3.2

The (g-anatomy) Algorithm

As the Anatomy algorithm does not prevent identity disclosure, this research updates Anatomy algorithm, presented in Figure 4.1, by adding generalisation approach (Line 14-19) instead of separating the table in two diﬀerent tables (QIT
and ST). This research names this algorithm g-anatomy. Algorithm 4 presents
the g-anatomy algorithm updated from Anatomy algorithm discussed in Section
4.1 presented in Algorithm 1. The added lines 14-19, in Algorithm 4, enables the
g-anatomy algorithm to achieve the basic k-anonymity privacy requirement which
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prevents identity disclosure.
Algorithm 4: g-anatomy algorithm (Xiao and Tao, 2006b)

1
2

3

4
5

6
7
8

9
10
11
12
13

14
15

16

17
18
19
20
21
22

Data: Original table T
Result: Anonymised table T*
gcnt = 0 ;
Group the records in T by their sensitive values (each group per sensitive value)
/* The bucket-creation step */
while there are at least l non-empty groups do
gcnt = gcnt + 1; QIgcnt = ∅
S = the set of l largest buckets;
for each group in S do
remove an arbitrary record r from the group to form a bucket
QIgcnt = QIgcnt ∪ { r }
end
end
/* The remaining-assignment step */
for each non-empty group do
r’ = the remaining record of the group;
S’ = the set of buckets produced from the previous step;
assign r’ to a bucket in S’ sequentially;
end
/* Generalisation step */
for j = 1 to gcnt do
for each bucket B do
check if QID values are the same
if they are not the same then
generalise the values
else
Insert QIgcnt into T*
end
end
end
end
return T*
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Characteristics of the implemented algorithms are summarised in Table 5.3
Table 5.3: Characteristics of the Implemented Algorithms
Algorithm
l-mondrian

g-anatomy

kl-redInfo

Methods used
- Generalisation
- Sequential incorporation
of ECs
- Bucketisation and Generalisation
-Sequential incorporation
of records
-Sorting
- Bucketisation and Generalisation
-Systematic incorporation
of records

Characteristics
Privacy
Strengths
Models
k -Anonymity An adequate
and
l - level of priDiversity
vacy
k -Anonymity An adequate
and
l - level of priDiversity
vacy

k -Anonymity
and
lDiversity

An adequate
level of privacy with reduced information loss

Weaknesesses
Substantial
information loss
Substantial
information
loss, the results
might be nonhomogeneous
Values
might
be anonymised
in
diﬀerent
generalisation
levels

The information loss resulting from the application of these two algorithms, lmondrian and g-anatomy, were compared to the information loss resulting from
the application of the proposed kl-redInfo algorithm, to indicate its improvements.
The following section discusses the evaluation metrics used in this research.

5.4

Evaluation Metrics

Anonymisation approach has two main aspects; privacy preserving aspect and
information retention aspect so that the shared data remains useful. Quantifying the notion of information loss is one of the key challenges in the privacypreserving data publishing domain (Machanavajjhala et al., 2007; Xu et al., 2006;
Kifer and Gehrke, 2006). The information loss of a dataset can be measured based
on diﬀerent characteristics, such as number of records that are indistinguishable
from each other, number of generalisation steps, and average group size of the
equivalence classes, which results in the existence of several information loss metrics.
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This research uses three widely used information loss metrics, Discernibility Penalty
(DP) (Bayardo and Agrawal, 2005), Normalised Certainty Penalty (NCP) (Xu et al.,
2006) and Kullback-Leibler divergence (KL-divergence) (Kifer and Gehrke, 2006).
These three metrics have been acknowledged as appropriate representative metrics
in the data anonymisation literature (Ghinita et al., 2007; Machanavajjhala et al.,
2007; El Emam et al., 2009). Therefore, these metrics are good indicators of the
information loss of the anonymised datasets.

The DP measures the information loss based on the size of the equivalence classes,
but it does not measure how much the generalised records approximate the original
records. The NCP is used because it takes into account both the size of the equivalence classes and the generalisation process used. Neither the NCP, nor the DP take
the data distribution into account, thus this research also uses the KL-divergence
which takes into account the data distribution. Therefore, the use of these three
metrics has a good spread of the indicators of information loss. These metrics are
further discussed in section 5.4.1, 5.4.2, and 5.4.3.

5.4.1

Discernibility Penalty (DP)

The Discernibility Penalty is the measure of information loss based on the number
of records that are indistinguishable from each other, also known as equivalence
classes. The idea behind the Discernibility Penalty (DP) metric is that, the more
records are indistinguishable from each other the more the information loss. This is
because more generalisation is required to make the records indistinguishable from
each other. Therefore, the ideal algorithm should reduce the Discernibility Penalty
(DP) by reducing the size of the equivalence classes. The smaller the size of the
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equivalence classes results in lower DP which implies the lower information loss.

The Discernibility Penalty (DP) is calculated by assigning a cost to information
loss to each record based on how many other records are indistinguishable from it
(Bayardo and Agrawal, 2005). If a record is suppressed, its cost to information loss
is the number of records in the original dataset |T|. This is due to the fact that
a suppressed record cannot be anonymised without anonymising all records in the
dataset. If a record is not suppressed, its cost to information loss is the number of
records in its anonymised group, also known as equivalence class |E|.

Therefore, the Discernibility Penalty is the sum of the squares of the equivalence
class sizes plus the number of records in the original dataset times the number of
suppressed records |R|, as shown in equation (5.4.1), where m is the number of the
equivalence classes.
DP (T ) =

m
∑

| Ei |2 + | T || R |

(5.4.1)

i=1

When the record suppression approach is not used, the Discernibility Penalty (DP)
is equivalent to the sum of the squares of the sizes of the equivalence classes, mathematically represented as shown in equation (5.4.2), where m is the number of the
equivalence classes.
DP (T ) =

m
∑

| Ei |2

(5.4.2)

i=1

5.4.2

The Normalised Certainty Penalty (NCP)

The Normalised Certainty Penalty (NCP) is the measure of information loss that
measures the importance of the attributes by considering the eﬀect of the generalisation approach (Xu et al., 2006). The Normalised Certainty Penalty for a numeric
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attribute value measures its normalised interval size after generalisation, while for
a categorical attribute value, the NCP measures its normalised number of descendants in the hierarchy tree after generalisation.

By considering the case of numeric attributes, let T be a dataset table with N number of records and n number of quasi-identifiers (A1 ,. . . ,An ), where all attributes
are numeric. Suppose a record r1 = (x1i ,. . . ,x1n ) is generalised to record
r1 ∗ = ([y11 , z11 ],. . . ,[y1n , z1n ]) such that yij ≤ xij ≤ zij (1 ≤ i ≤ n) (1 ≤ j ≤ N). On
attribute Ai and weight wi , the NCP is defined as shown in equation (5.4.3), where
|Ai | = maxr∈T {r.Ai } - minr∈T {r.Ai } is the range of all records on attribute Ai .

N CPnum (T ) =

N ∑
n
∑

(wi ∗

j=1 i=1

zij − yij
)
| Ai |

(5.4.3)

A weight is assigned to each attribute to reflect its importance in the analysis on the
anonymised data. In this research the weight is assigned depending on the number
of the quasi-identifier attributes (QID). That is the weight of each attribute used in
the evaluation of information loss is equal to 1/|QID|, where |QID| is the number
of quasi-identifier attributes.

For categorical attribute, suppose a record r1 has the value v1j on a categorical attribute A1 . When it is generalised in anonymisation, the value v1j will be replaced
by a set of values v1j ,. . . ,vnj , where v1j ,. . . ,vnj are the values of records on the attribute that is generalised to the same value uij . The Normalised Certainty Penalty
of T with categorical attributes (NCPcat (T)) is defined as shown in equation (5.4.4),
where |Ai | is the number of distinct values on attribute Ai .
N CPcat (T ) =

N ∑
n
∑
j=1 i=1

100

(wi ∗

size(uij )
)
| Ai |

(5.4.4)
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5.4.3

Kullback-Leibler divergence (KL-divergence)

The Kullback-Leibler divergence (KL-divergence) is the measure of information loss
based on the similarity between the values in the original dataset and the values
in the anonymised dataset. The KL-divergence is modeled as the diﬀerence between
two probability distributions (Kifer and Gehrke, 2006; Machanavajjhala et al., 2007).
In this research, the two distributions are the original dataset distribution and the
anonymised dataset distribution. The KL-divergence is a non-negative metric and
is 0 only when the two distributions are identical.

Let (A1 ,. . . ,An ) be the quasi-identifiers of a table T with values ( xij , i= 1,. . . ,n;
j = 1,. . . ,N ). Let pi
and let pi

(2)

(1)

be the probability of Ai according to the distribution F1

be the probability according to distribution F2 , where a probability

distribution F1 associated with the original data, and a probability distribution F2
associated with the anonymised data. The KL-divergence between F1 and F2 is
defined as shown in equation (5.4.5) (Kifer and Gehrke, 2006).

KL-divergence =

n
∑

(1)

|

(1)
pi

log10 (

i=1

where pi =

pi

(2)

pi

)|

Number of occurrences of i
Total number of values

(5.4.5)
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5.5

Software Verification

To ensure the correctness of the software implementation of the algorithms and
accuracy in computing the relative information loss metrics, the computational of
the three information loss metris, DP, NCP, and KL-divergence of a 10 records
dataset were computed by hand. The results computed by hand are the same with
the results of the implemented algorithm, as shown in this section. The research
uses table shown in Figure 5.2 as the original table that needs to be anonymised.

Figure 5.2: Screenshot of the 10 records PatInfo dataset to be anonymised

5.5.1

Verification of kl-redInfo

When the data shown in Figure 5.2 is applied to the software implementation of
the kl-redInfo algorithm, results to the anonymised table shown at the top of Figure 5.3. The research uses the formulas discussed in Section 5.4 and generalisation
hierarchies presented in Figure 5.1. The Discernibility Penalty (DP), Normalised
Certainty Penalty (NCP) and Kullback-Leibler divergence (KL-divergence) calculated by the kl-redInfo implemented software when k=l=2 are summarised at the
bottom of Figure 5.3 and are calculated next:
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Figure 5.3: Screenshot of the values of the information loss metric resulting
from the application of the kl-redInfo algorithm on 10 records PatInfo dataset

 The Discernibility Penalty (DP) is:

Dp(T ) =

m
∑

| Ei |2

i=1

where | Ei | = Number of records in the equivalence classes

= 22 + 22 + 32 + 32
=4+4+9+9
= 26
(5.5.1)
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 The Normalised Certainty Penalty (NCP) using the generalisation hierarchies

presented in Figure 5.1.
NCP(T) =

N
∑

N CP (Ej ) where N = Number of equivalence classes

j=1

and N CP (Ej ) =

n
∑
i=1

wi

size(uij )
| Ai |

where size(uij ) = The number of leaf nodes that are descendants of uij
and | Ai |= The number of distinct values on attribute Ai

1
where | QIDs |= Number of QIDs
| QIDs |
2
6
1 2 3
+ )
N CP (E1 ) = 2 ∗ ( + +
4 2 4 10 6

and wi =

= 1.475
1 2 3
5
6
N CP (E2 ) = 2 ∗ ( + +
+ )
4 2 4 10 6
= 1.625
1 2 3
3
6
N CP (E3 ) = 3 ∗ ( + +
+ )
4 2 4 10 6
= 2.2875
1 2 0
5
6
N CP (E4 ) = 3 ∗ ( + +
+ )
4 2 4 10 6
= 1.875
NCP(T) = 1.475 + 1.625 + 2.2875 + 1.875
= 7.2625
(5.5.2)
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KL-divergence =

n
∑

(1)

(1)

| pi log10 (

i=1

where pi =

pi

(2)

pi

)|

Number of occurrences of i
Total number of occurrences

For example KL-divergenceF emale→AnyGender =| 0.5 log10 (

0.5
)|
1

0.5
0.5
0.3
) | + | 0.5 log10 ( ) | + | 0.3 log10 ( ) | +
1
1
0.7
0.3
0.2
0.2
| 0.3 log10 ( ) | + | 0.2 log10 ( ) | + | 0.2 log10 ( ) | +
0.3
0.7
0.7
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
| 0.1 log10 ( ) | + | 0.1 log10 ( ) | + | 0.1 log10 ( ) | + | 0.1 log10 ( ) |
0.2
0.5
0.3
1

KL-divergenceT able =| 0.5 log10 (

= 0.1505+0.1505+0.1104+0+0.1088+0.1088+0.0301+0.0699+0.0477+0.1
= 0.8767
(5.5.3)

Therefore, the values of the information loss metrics measured by the three information loss metrics, DP, NCP, and KL-divergence, calculated by hand are the same
as that calculated by the kl-redInfo algorithm as shown at the bottom of Figure
5.3. This shows that the implementation of the kl-redInfo algorithm is correct.

5.5.2

Verification of l-mondrian

When the data shown in Figure 5.2 is applied to the software implementation of
the l-mondrian algorithm, results to the anonymised table shown at the top of Figure 5.4. The research uses the formulas discussed in Section 5.4 and generalisation
hierarchies presented in Figure 5.1. The Discernibility Penalty (DP), Normalised
Certainty Penalty (NCP) and Kullback-Leibler divergence (KL-divergence) calculated by the l-mondrian implemented software when k=l=2 are summarised at the
bottom of Figure 5.4 and are calculated next:
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Figure 5.4: Screenshot of the values of the information loss metric resulting from the application of the l-mondrian algorithm on 10 records PatInfo
dataset

 The Discernibility Penalty (DP) is:

Dp(T ) =

m
∑

| Ei |2

i=1

where | Ei | = Number of records in the equivalence classes

= 22 + 52 + 32
= 4 + 25 + 9
= 38
(5.5.4)
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 The Normalised Certainty Penalty (NCP) using the generalisation hierarchies

presented in Figure 5.1.
NCP(T) =

N
∑

N CP (Ej ) where N = Number of equivalence classes

j=1

and N CP (Ej ) =

n
∑
i=1

wi

size(uij )
| Ai |

where size(uij ) = The number of leaf nodes that are descendants of uij
and | Ai |= The number of distinct values on attribute Ai

1
where | QIDs |= Number of QIDs
| QIDs |
2
6
1 2 4
+ )
N CP (E1 ) = 2 ∗ ( + +
4 2 4 10 6

and wi =

= 1.6
1 2 4
5
6
N CP (E2 ) = 5 ∗ ( + +
+ )
4 2 4 10 6
= 4.375
1 2 4
3
6
N CP (E3 ) = 3 ∗ ( + +
+ )
4 2 4 10 6
= 2.475
NCP(T) = 1.6 + 4.375 + 2.475
= 8.45
(5.5.5)
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 The Kullback-Leibler divergence (KL-divergence)

KL-divergence =

n
∑

(1)

(1)

| pi log10 (

i=1

where pi =

pi

(2)

pi

)|

Number of occurrences of i
Total number of occurrences

0.5
0.5
0.3
) | + | 0.5 log10 ( ) | + | 0.3 log10 ( ) | +
1
1
1
0.3
0.2
0.2
| 0.3 log10 ( ) | + | 0.2 log10 ( ) | + | 0.2 log10 ( ) | +
1
1
1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
| 0.1 log10 ( ) | + | 0.1 log10 ( ) | + | 0.1 log10 ( ) | + | 0.1 log10 ( ) |
0.2
0.5
0.3
1

KL-divergenceT able =| 0.5 log10 (

= 0.1505+0.1505+0.1569+0.1569+0.1398+0.1398+0.0301+0.0699+0.0206+0.1
= 1.1150
(5.5.6)

Therefore, the values of the information loss metrics measured by the three information loss metrics, DP, NCP, and KL-divergence, calculated by hand are the same
as that calculated by the l-mondrian algorithm as shown at the bottom of Figure
5.4. This shows that the implementation of l-mondrian algorithm is correct.

5.5.3

Verification of g-anatomy

When the data shown in Figure 5.2 is applied to the software implementation of
the g-anatomy algorithm, results to the anonymised table shown at the top of Figure 5.5. The research uses the formulas discussed in Section 5.4 and generalisation
hierarchies presented in Figure 5.1. The Discernibility Penalty (DP), Normalised
Certainty Penalty (NCP) and Kullback-Leibler divergence (KL-divergence) calculated by the g-anatomy implemented software when k=l=2 are summarised at the
bottom of Figure 5.5 and are calculated next:
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Figure 5.5: Screenshot of the values of the information loss metric resulting
from the application of the g-anatomy algorithm on 10 records PatInfo dataset

 The Discernibility Penalty (DP) is:

Dp(T ) =

m
∑

| Ei |2

i=1

where | Ei | = Number of records in the equivalence classes

= 22 + 22 + 32 + 32
=4+4+9+9
= 26
(5.5.7)
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 The Normalised Certainty Penalty (NCP) using the generalisation hierarchies

presented in Figure 5.1.
NCP(T) =

N
∑

N CP (Ej ) where N = Number of equivalence classes

j=1

and N CP (Ej ) =

n
∑
i=1

wi

size(uij )
| Ai |

where size(uij ) = The number of leaf nodes that are descendants of uij
and | Ai |= The number of distinct values on attribute Ai

1
where | QIDs |= Number of QIDs
| QIDs |
2
6
1 2 3
+ )
N CP (E1 ) = 2 ∗ ( + +
4 2 4 10 6

and wi =

= 1.475
1 2 3
5
6
N CP (E2 ) = 2 ∗ ( + +
+ )
4 2 4 10 6
= 1.625
1 2 3
3
6
N CP (E3 ) = 3 ∗ ( + +
+ )
4 2 4 10 6
= 2.2875
1 2 1
5
6
N CP (E4 ) = 3 ∗ ( + +
+ )
4 2 4 10 6
= 2.4723
NCP(T) = 1.475 + 1.625 + 2.2875 + 2.4723
= 7.8598
(5.5.8)
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 The Kullback-Leibler divergence (KL-divergence)

KL-divergence =

n
∑

(1)

(1)

| pi log10 (

i=1

where pi =

pi

(2)

pi

)|

Number of occurrences of i
Total number of occurrences

0.5
0.5
0.3
KL-divergenceT able =| 0.5 log10 ( ) | + | 0.5 log10 ( ) | + | 0.3 log10 ( ) | +
1
1
0.7
0.3
0.2
0.2
| 0.3 log10 ( ) | + | 0.2 log10 ( ) | + | 0.2 log10 ( ) | +
0.3
0.7
0.7
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
| 0.1 log10 ( ) | + | 0.1 log10 ( ) | + | 0.1 log10 ( ) | + | 0.1 log10 ( ) |
0.2
0.5
0.3
1
= 0.1505+0.1505+0.1104+0.0886+0.1088+0.1088+0.0301+0.0699+0.0477+0.1
= 0.9653
(5.5.9)

Therefore, the values of the information loss metrics measured by the three information loss metrics, DP, NCP, and KL-divergence, calculated by hand are the same
as that calculated by the g-anatomy algorithm as shown at the bottom of Figure
5.5. This shows that the implementation of g-anatomy algorithm is correct.

5.6

Wilcoxon signed-rank test

After studying the computed values of the information loss metrics from the implemented algorithms, next step was to quantify the impact of each of the proposed
modified approaches and the proposed algorithm. This research uses Wilcoxon
signed-rank test statistics to analyse the significance of each of the proposed approaches and algorithm. The Wilcoxon signed-rank test is one of the most commonly used non-parametric statistical test that determines if two datasets diﬀer
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significantly (Wilcoxon, 1945). The advantage of non-parametric tests over parametric tests is that the parameters are determined from the data and are flexible,
not fixed in advance as done by parametric tests (Siegel, 1957). Therefore, nonparametric tests are also called distribution free tests.

The Wilcoxon signed-rank test is the appropriate test statistics due to the reason
that, the computed values of the information loss metrics are not normally distributed and the sample sizes are small (13 observation from each algorithm, as a
result of 13 values of the information loss metrics resulting from the application of
13 values of k and l (2≥k≤14 ) where k =l ). Therefore, the use of the distribution
free test statistic such as Wilcoxon signed-rank test is more appropriate than a
parametric test such as t-test statistic (Siegel, 1957).

The logic behind the Wilcoxon test is based solely on the order in which the observations from the two samples fall. The data are ranked to produce two rank
totals, one for each condition. If there is a systematic diﬀerence between the two
conditions, then most of the high ranks will belong to one condition and most of
the low ranks will belong to the other one. As a result, the rank totals will be quite
diﬀerent and one of the rank totals will be quite small. On the other hand, if the
two conditions are similar, then high and low ranks will be distributed fairly evenly
between the two conditions and the rank totals will be fairly similar and quite large.

The comparison results using the Wilcoxon signed-rank test results from the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) are presented in the form of the tables
as shown in Table 5.4. The output is divided into three tables. Initially, descriptive
data like the number of participants in each group, group averages, their standard
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deviation, and the minimal and maximal values, appear. Thereafter, the test results
appear in two distinct tables. In the first table, between the values of the Ranks,
the Mean Rank and the Sum of Ranks given, the N corresponds to the number of
observations or participants.

Table 5.4: The example of the Wilcoxon signed-rank test results tables

In addition, in the second table, the tests results appear. The SPSS returns the
Z value and the asymptotic significance or the level of significance based on the
normal distribution of the statistical test: Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed). To evaluate
the significance of the diﬀerences, the risk level probability (called the alpha level)
has to be set (Trochim, 2006). As internationally accepted, the risk level of 0.05
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was chosen as the threshold to determine if the diﬀerence between two datasets
is statistically significant or otherwise. Therefore, the diﬀerence is considered to
be significant if the p-value (labeled as Sig.(2-tailed)) is lower than 0.05. Thus,
the results in Table 5.4 show significance diﬀerence between the DP of l-mondrian
and DP of kl-redInfo algorithm. This is due to the fact that the p-value, 0.004≤0.05.

The asymptotic significance is based on the assumption that the data sample is
large (N≥40). If the data sample is small or not normally distributed, such as
the data used in this research, the asymptotic significance is not in general a good
indication of the significance. In this case, the level of significance based on the
exact distribution of a statistical test labeled as Exact Sig. (2-tailed) corresponds
to the statistic of decision. Consequently, studies should use this value when the
sample is small, sparse, contains many ties, is badly balanced or does not seem
to be normally distributed. Note that Exact Sig. (2-tailed): represents level of
significance for a two-tailed test, and Exact Sig. (1-tailed): represents level of
significance for a one-tailed test.

5.7

Chapter Summary

This chapter presents the experimental environment and setup including datasets,
algorithms used for comparison and information loss metrics. The research uses
simulated dataset named PatInfo and real-world Adult dataset downloaded from
UCI repository. The two widely used algorithms, l-mondrian and g-anatomy, are
used for comparison purpose. The two algorithms are appropriate as each of the algorithm is well established and proved to result in a lower value of the information
loss metric from the two ways of achieving l-diversity privacy requirement. The
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l-mondrian is the l-diversity algorithm extended from Mondrian k-anonymisation
algorithm while g-anatomy is a modified version of the Anatomy algorithm, which
is the l-diversity specific algorithm.

Ensuring an individual’s privacy is one aspect of the anonymisation approach, the
other aspect is the retention of information so that the shared data remains useful.
There are several metrics that can be used to measure the information loss as discussed in Section 5.4. This research uses three well established metrics, Discernibility Penalty (DP), Normalised Certainty Penalty (NCP), and Kullback-Leibler
divergence (KL-divergence). These three metrics have been used because each of
them has diﬀerent characteristics that are useful to the research. In order to investigate if the impact of the proposed modified approaches was statistically significant,
the Wilcoxon signed-rank non-parametric test is used, as discussed in Section 5.6.
This test was used as the sample datasets are small (13 values of the information
loss metrics as a result of the values of (2≥k≤14 ) where k =l ) and the values are
not normally distributed.
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EVALUATION of the kl-redInfo

This research performs a set of experiments in order to evaluate the proposed klredInfo algorithm. The algorithm is evaluated based on it’s ability to preserve the
quality of the data, by reducing the amount of information loss, while achieving both
k-anonymity and l-diversity privacy requirements. The information loss is indicated
by the three information loss metrics, Discernibility Penalty (DP), Normalised Certainty Penalty (NCP), and Kullback-Leibler divergence (KL-divergence), discussed
in Section 5.4. The metrics are unitless, therefore there is no general accepted absolute benchmarks for their interpretation (El Emam et al., 2009).

The research first quantifies the impact of each of the proposed modified approaches
in reducing the values of the information loss metrics that indicate the reduction
in information loss. The values of the information loss metrics resulting from the
application of the kl-redInfo algorithm is compared with the modified versions of the
widely used Mondrian and Anatomy algorithms, that achieved both k-anonymity
and l-diversity privacy requirements, as discussed in Section 5.3.1 and 5.3.2.

The values of the information loss metrics resulting from the application of the
implemented algorithms are presented as histograms. The y-axis of the histograms
represents the information loss measured in terms of the three metrics, DP, NCP,
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and KL-divergence. The Discernibility Penalty (DP) indicates the information loss
based on how many other records are indistinguishable from each other with respect
to quasi-identifiers. The NCP indicates the values of the information loss resulting
from the application of the generalisation approach. The KL-divergence indicates
the probability deviation of the anonymised dataset from the original dataset. The
smaller the value of the information loss metric, the better it approximates the
original dataset, therefore the lower the information loss.

The x-axis of the histograms represent the values of parameter k and l, which control the level of the privacy provided by the algorithm. The higher the values of k
and l indicates the higher level of the privacy. The value of k controls the identity
disclosure while the value of l controls the attribute disclosure. In order to ensure
equal protection of both identity disclosure and attribute disclosure, this research
uses the values of k = l.

When the values of l <k was used, the values of the information loss metrics was
the same as when values of k = l was used. This shows that values of l have no
eﬀect on the values of the information loss metrics. The eﬀect of l values are on
the individual’s privacy, since the lower the value of l the lower distinct sensitive
values are in the equivalence class thus more possibility of the attribute disclosure.
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6.1

The Information loss Metrics of the Algorithms without the Proposed Modifications

In order to investigate the impact of the proposed modified approaches, the values
of the information loss metrics resulting from the application of the proposed klredInfo algorithm with the existing approaches, and the l-mondrian and g-anatomy
algorithms, was calculated by using the PatInfo and Adult datasets. The simulated
PatInfo dataset has 30,200 records and eight attributes with four quasi-identifiers
and disease as a sensitive attribute. The real-world Adult dataset was downloaded
from UCI repository and it has 30,162 records and eight attributes with seven quasiidentifiers and occupation as a sensitive attribute, as disscussed in Section 5.2.

The research identifies three existing approaches that increase the values of the
information loss metrics and proposes modified approaches that can be used to
reduce the values of the information loss metrics. These causes are;
 sequential incorporation of the remaining records after forming the groups of

records with distinct sensitive attributes.
 the use of either bucketisation or cell-based generalisation approaches.
 not taking under consideration the distribution of quasi-identifier attributes.

The values of the information loss metrics resulting from the application of the
proposed kl-redInfo algorithm without the proposed modified approaches, the lmondrian, and g-anatomy algorithms are presented in Figure 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3.
The information loss is based on the three information loss metrics; Discernibility
Penalty (DP), Normalised Certainty Penalty (NCP), and Kullback-Leibler divergence (KL-divergence), further disscussed in section 5.4.
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Figure 6.1: DP resulting from the application of the l-mondrian, g-anatomy,
and kl-redInfo algorithm without the proposed modifications on the PatInfo
dataset
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Figure 6.2: NCP resulting from the application of the l-mondrian, g-anatomy,
and kl-redInfo algorithm without the proposed modifications on the PatInfo
dataset
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Figure 6.3: KL-divergence resulting from the application of the l-mondrian,
g-anatomy, and kl-redInfo algorithm without the proposed modifications on
the PatInfo dataset

As it can be seen in Figure 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3, the l-mondrian algorithm results in
higher values of the information loss metrics compared to g-anatomy and kl-redInfo
algorithm without the proposed modified approaches in all three information loss
metrics. This is due to the fact that the l-mondrian algorithm incorporates an
equivalence class, instead of a record as g-anatomy and kl-redInfo do.

The values of the information loss metrics resulting from the application of the klredInfo without the proposed modified approaches is relatively lower compared to
the g-anatomy. This is due to the order in which the approaches are applied. The kl121
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redInfo does generalisation approach before incorporation approach and more generalisation is applied after incorporation approach only if the incorporated record
needs to be generalised to make it indistinguishable from other records. The ganatomy algorithm does the generalisation approach after incorporation approach.
This causes the g-anatomy algorithm to has large number of records that need to
be indistinguishable from each other, thus increases the value of the information
loss metrics which indicates the increase of information loss. Therefore, the order
in which the approaches are applied contributes in the reduction of information loss.

As discussed in Section 5.6, identifying significance of the diﬀerences between the
algorithms cannot be achieved without examining the statistical significance of the
results. The Wilcoxon signed-rank non-parametric test statistic is an appropriate
statistical test as the collected data are of small size (13 observations in each algorithm, as a result of the values of the information loss metrics resulting from
the application of 13 values of k and l (2≤k ≤14) where k =l ) and the data are
not normally distributed. This also shows that the level of significance should be
based on the exact distribution of a statistical test (labeled as Exact Sig.(2-tailed)
on the table of Wilcoxon signed-rank test) rather than asmptotic significance which
assumes the data samples are large and are normally distributed.

Even though the proposed kl-redInfo algorithm without the proposed modified approaches results in reduced values of the information loss metrics compared to lmondrian and g-anatomy algorithms, the diﬀerence is significant when the kl-redInfo
is compared to l-mondrian, but the diﬀerence is not significant when kl-redInfo
is compared to g-anatomy algorithm, as shown by the Wilcoxon signed-rank test
statistics. This is due to the feature of l-mondrian algorithm to incorporate equiva-
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lence classes rather than individual records as g-anatomy and kl-redInfo algorithms
do.

The diﬀerence between the algorithms can also be evaluated by using the diﬀerence percentages of their values of the information loss metrics. The higher the
percentage diﬀerence the higher the diﬀerence between the compared algorithms,
hence significance diﬀerence. Table 6.1 summarises the values of the information
loss metrics, the diﬀerence (presented as Diﬀ ), and the percentage of the diﬀerence of the values of the information loss metrics resulting from the application of
the kl-redInfo without the proposed approaches with respect to the values of the
information loss metrics resulting from the application of the existing l-mondrian
algorithm (presented in the brackets). The comparison of the results by using the
Wilcoxon signed-rank test statistics are presented in Table 6.2.

As it can be seen in Table 6.1, the values of the information loss metrics resulting
from the application of the kl-redInfo without the proposed modified approaches
are reduced by an average of 21% of DP, 18% of NCP and 25% of KL-divergence
when compared to the values of the information loss metrics resulting from the
application of the l-mondrian algorithm. This indicates that there is a reduction
in information loss resulting from the application of the kl-redInfo without the
proposed modified approaches compared to the l-mondrian algorithm, as indicated
by the three information loss metrics.
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Table 6.1: The values of the information loss metrics resulting from the application of the kl-redInfo without the proposed modifications and l-mondrian
on the PatInfo dataset
Information loss Metrics
k,l

DP
l-

kl-

mondrian

without

2

91473

84252

3

114821

4

NCP
l-

kl-

l-

kl-

mondrian

without

mondrian

without

7221(8)

20341

19070

1271(6)

4.4483

3.4643

0.984(22)

105756

9065(8)

25533

23937

1596(6)

4.4483

3.4643

0.984(22)

141843

128527

13316(9)

31542

29091

2451(8)

5.115

3.4643

1.6507(32)

5

216855

157932

58923(27)

50461

48382

2079(4)

5.4483

3.5893

1.859(34)

6

275847

202354

73493(27)

83579

68436

15143(18)

6.115

4.7143

1.4007(23)

7

537525

376379

161146(30)

119532

85191

34341(29)

9.115

6.5893

2.5257(28)

8

653152

443040

210112(32)

145244

100280

44964(31)

9.115

6.5893

2.5257(28)

9

725257

492152

233105(32)

161279

111396

49883(31)

10.2817

6.5893

3.6924(36)

10

761364

499002

262362(34)

169307

112946

56361(33)

10.2817

7.2143

3.0674(30)

11

786277

524681

261596(33)

174848

118759

56089(32)

10.2817

7.8393

2.4424(24)

12

789857

788735

1122(0)

195644

178526

17118(9)

14.115

12.2143

1.9007(13)

13

1083205

921970

161235(15)

240877

208683

32194(13)

14.115

12.2143

1.9007(13)

14

1083205

921970

161235(15)

240877

208683

32194(13)

14.115

12.2143

1.9007(13)

Average

Diﬀ (%)

KL-divergence

21%

Diﬀ (%)

18%

Table 6.2: The comparison results for the values of the information loss metrics resulting from the application of the kl-redInfo without the proposed
modifications and l-mondrian on the PatInfo dataset

The comparison results shown in Table 6.2 shows that, there is a significant dif-
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ference when comparing kl-redInfo algorithm without the proposed modified approaches by the l-mondrian algorithm. This is due to the p-values, 0.00171 for DP,
0.00024 for NCP, and 0.00024 for KL-divergence, being lower than the acceptance
risk level of 0.05.

Table 6.3: The values of the information loss metrics resulting from the application of the kl-redInfo without the proposed modifications and the g-anatomy
on the PatInfo dataset
Information loss Metrics
k,l

DP
g-

kl-

anatomy

without

2

86659

84252

3

108778

4

NCP
g-

kl-

g-

kl-

anatomy

without

anatomy

without

2407(3)

19371

19070

301(2)

3.63

3.4643

0.1677(5)

105756

3022(3)

24323

23937

386(2)

3.632

3.4643

0.1677(5)

132199

128527

3672(3)

29560

29091

469(2)

3.632

3.4643

0.1677(5)

5

165302

157932

7370(4)

49321

48382

939(2)

3.9653

3.5893

0.376(9)

6

210993

202354

8639(4)

69538

68436

1102(2)

4.9653

4.7143

0.251(5)

7

387133

376379

10754(3)

86563

85191

1372(2)

6.9653

6.5893

0.376(5)

8

455699

443040

12659(3)

101894

100280

1614(2)

6.9653

6.5893

0.376(5)

9

506214

492152

14062(3)

113189

111396

1793(2)

6.9653

6.5893

0.376(5)

10

513259

499002

14257(3)

114765

112946

1819(2)

7.632

7.2143

0.4177(5)

11

539672

524681

14991(3)

120671

118759

1912(2)

8.2986

7.8393

0.4593(6)

12

811271

788735

22536(3)

181400

178526

2874(2)

12.9653

12.2143

0.751(6)

13

948312

921970

26342(3)

212042

208683

3359(2)

12.9653

12.2143

0.751(6)

14

948312

921970

26342(3)

212042

208683

3359(2)

12.9653

12.2143

0.751(6)

Average

Diﬀ (%)

KL

3%

Diﬀ (%)

2%

The values of the information loss metrics resulting from the application of the
kl-redInfo algorithm without the proposed modified approaches are reduced by an
average of 3% of DP, 2% of NCP and 6% of KL-divergence when compared to
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the values of the information loss metrics resulting from the application of the ganatomy, as shown in Table 6.3. Table 6.4 shows that, even though the information
loss metrics, shown in Figure 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3, show reduction in the values of the
information loss metris resulting from the application of the kl-redInfo algorithm
without the proposed modified approaches when compared to g-anatomy algorithm,
the comparison results show that the diﬀerence is not significant. This is due to the
p-values, 0.106 for DP, 0.529 for NCP, and 0.263 for KL-divergence, being greater
than the acceptance risk level of 0. 05.

Table 6.4: The comparison results for the values of the information loss metrics resulting from the application of the kl-redInfo without the proposed
modified approaches and g-anatomy on the PatInfo dataset

To study the impact of the implemented algorithms on diﬀerent and independent
datasets, the three implemented algorithms, the proposed kl-redInfo algorithm without the proposed modified approaches, l-mondrian, and g-anatomy, were applied to
the real-world Adult dataset downloaded from UCI repository (Asuncion and Newman,
2007). The values of the three information loss metrics; DP, NCP, and KL-divergence,
were calculated and the results are summarised in Appendix C.

The results show that, even in this real-world Adult dataset, the proposed kl-redInfo
algorithm without the proposed modified approaches, results in reduced values of
the information loss metrics compared to the existing, l-mondrian and g-anatomy
algorithms. The diﬀerence is significant when kl-redInfo is compared to l-mondrian
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algorithm, but the diﬀerence is not significant when kl-redInfo is compared to ganatomy algorithm.

Section 6.2 discusses the causes of the information loss and the proposed modified
approaches that can be used to reduce the values of the information loss metrics
that indicate reduction in information loss. The proposed modified approaches were
then used to design the proposed kl-redInfo algorithm.

6.2

Proposed Modifications

This research proposes three approaches that can be used to reduce the values of
the information loss metrics that indicate reduction in information loss. These
approaches are:
 Systematic incorporation of the remaining records in the equivalence class

that results in lower value of the information loss metric.
 Using both bucketisation and cell-based generalisation approaches.
 Sorting the records according to the quasi-identifier attributes in order to take

under consideration their distribution.
These approaches and their significance in reducing the values of the information
loss metrics are discussed in detail in Section 6.2.1, 6.2.2 and 6.2.3 respectively.

6.2.1

Systematic Incorporation of the Remaining records in
the equivalence classes

Achieving the l-diversity privacy requirement involves incorporation of the remaining records that do not achieve the privacy requirement to the group of records that
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satisfy the privacy requirements. This research studies the eﬀects resulting from the
way the remaining records are incorporated on the created equivalence classes. Sequential incorporation of the remaining records, as done by the existing algorithms,
may result in increase of the values of the information loss metrics. This is because
a record may be incorporated in an equivalence class that has very diﬀerent QIDs,
thus more generalisation is needed to make them indistinguishable from each other,
which results in high values of the information loss metrics.

This research uses the approach of incorporating the remaining records in the equivalence classes that results in lower value of information loss metric compared to other
equivalence classes. This is done by calculating the value of information loss metric
before the record is incorporated in an equivalence class. This research named the
approach as systematic incorporation approach.

Figure 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6 show the values of the information loss metrics resulting from
the application of the kl-redInfo when remaining records are sequential incorporated,
represented as kl-redInfosequencial, and when remaining records are systematically
incorporated, represented as kl-redInfosystematic, on simulated PatInfo dataset.
The values of the information loss metrics resulting from the application of the
algorithms on the real-world Adult dataset are presented in Appendix D.

128

Proposed Modifications

Figure 6.4: DP resulting from the application of the kl-redInfo with sequential
and systematic incorporation approaches on the PatInfo dataset
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Figure 6.5: NCP resulting from the application of the kl-redInfo with sequential and systematic incorporation approaches on the PatInfo dataset
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Figure 6.6: KL-divergence resulting from the application of the kl-redInfo with
sequential and systematic incorporation approaches on the PatInfo dataset

As it can be seen from Figure 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6, the values of the information loss
metrics resulting from the application of the kl-redInfo algorithm when records
are systematically incorporated is lower than the values of the information loss
metrics resulting from the application of the kl-redInfo algorithm when records are
sequentially incorporated in all three information loss metrics, DP, NCP, and KLdivergence. Therefore, this indicates that the approach of systematic incorporation
of the remaining records reduces the values of the information loss metrics that
indicate reduction in the information loss. Similar results were drawn when Adult
dataset was used, refer to Appendix D for the Adult dataset results.

131

Proposed Modifications
Table 6.5 shows the comparison results of the kl-redInfo when records are sequentially incorporated and when records are systematically incorporated, measured by
the three information loss metrics, DP, NCP, and KL-divergence. Observing the
comparison test results table, the p-values are 0.002 for DP, 0.006 for NCP and
0.003 for KL-divergence.

Table 6.5: The comparison results for the values of the information loss metrics resulting from the application of the kl-redInfo with sequential and systematic incorporation approaches on the PatInfo dataset

Since the p-values are lower than the acceptable risk level of 0.05, this indicates
that there is a significant diﬀerence on the values of the information loss metrics
resulting from the application of the kl-redInfo when remaining records are sequentially incorporated and when they are systematically incorporated. Therefore, this
research concludes that there is a significant evidence on the reduction in the values
of information loss metrics when the remaining records are systematically incorporated compared to when they are sequentially incorporated at the risk level of 0.05.

The values of the information loss metrics when Adult dataset was used also shows
that there is a significant evidence on the reduction in the values of information loss
when remaining records are systematically incorporated compared to when they are
sequentially incorporated at the risk level of 0.05. This is due to the fact that the
p-values are lower than the acceptable risk level of 0.05. The p-values are 0.033 for
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DP, 0.033 for NCP, and 0.019 for KL-divergence, as shown in Appendix D Table
D.2.

6.2.2

Using both bucketisation and cell-based generalisation approaches

Most of the solutions proposed in the literature use bucketisation or generalisation
approach to achieve privacy requirements. For example, Mondrian algorithm uses
generalisation approach but not bucketisation approach, which results in substantial
information loss, and Anatomy algorithm uses bucketisation but not generalisation
approach, which result in violation of an individual’s privacy.

Therefore, this research proposes the use of both bucketisation and cell-based generalisation approaches. These approaches reduce the values of the information loss
metrics while ensuring an individual’s privacy. The values of the information loss
metrics are reduced by the use of generalisation approach depending on the need
of the group and not all values of the attribute, also known as cell-generalisation.

On the other hand, these approaches produce results that may be non homogeneous
as generalisation is applied depending on the need of the group of records and not
all records. Therefore, records of each group might be anonymised in diﬀerent levels
of the generalisation hierarchy. This makes the analysis process diﬃcult (e.g., some
records report the complete date of birth, while other records only report the year
of birth). But this approach reduces the values of the information loss metrics when
compared to bucketisation and generalisation approaches when are used separate,
which is the aim of this research. Thus, this research uses both bucketisation and
cell-based generalisation approaches in order to reduce the values of the information
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loss metric that indicate reduction in information loss and still ensures an individual’s privacy.

Figure 6.7, 6.8 and 6.9 show the values of the information loss metrics resulting from
the application of the kl-redInfo when only generalisation approach is used, named
kl-redInfoCell, and the kl-redInfo when bucketisation and cell-based generalisation
approaches are used, named kl-redInfoBucketCell. The information loss is measured
in terms of DP, NCP, and KL-divergence metrics.

Figure 6.7: DP resulting from the application of the kl-redInfo with generalisation and with both bucketisation and cell-based generalisation on the
PatInfo dataset
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Figure 6.8: NCP resulting from the application of the kl-redInfo with generalisation and with both bucketisation and cell-based generalisation on the
PatInfo dataset
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Figure 6.9: KL-divergence resulting from the application of the kl-redInfo
with generalisation and with both bucketisation and cell-based generalisation
on the PatInfo dataset

Observing Figure 6.7, 6.8 and 6.9, the values of the information loss metrics resulting from the application of the kl-redInfo algorithm when using both bucketisation
and cell-based generalisation approaches are lower than the values of the information loss metrics resulting from the application of the kl-redInfo algorithm when
using generalisation approach in all three information loss metrics. Therefore, this
research concludes that the approach of using both bucketisation and cell-based
generalisation approaches reduces the values of the information loss metrics that
indicate reduction in the information loss.
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Table 6.6 shows the Wilcoxon signed-rank test statistics results between the klredInfo with generalisation and the kl-redInfo with both bucketisation and cellbased generalisation approaches, measured by the three information loss metrics,
DP, NCP, and KL-divergence. Observing the comparison results, the p-values are
0.063 for DP, 0.056 for NCP, and 0.063 for KL-divergence. These results indicate that there is not a significant diﬀerence between the values of the information
loss metrics, since the p-values are greater than the acceptable risk level of 0.05.
Therefore this indicates that, there is not a significant diﬀerence on the values of
the information loss metrics resulting from the application of the kl-redInfo with
generalisation and kl-redInfo with both bucketisation and cell-based generalisation
approaches.

Table 6.6: The comparison results from the application of the kl-redInfo with
generalisation and with both bucketisation and cell-based generalisation approaches on the PatInfo dataset

When the Adult dataset is used, the results also show there is not significant evidence of the reduction in the values of information loss metrics when using both
the bucketisation and cell-based generalisation approaches compared to when using
generalisation approach only at the risk level of 0.05. This is due to the p-value
shown in Appendix E Table E.2 being 0.127 for DP, 0.244 for NCP, and 0.213 for
KL-divergence, which are greater than the risk level of 0.05. Refer to Appendix E
for the results when Adult dataset is used.
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6.2.3

Sorting records according to Quasi-identifiers

The research also studies the eﬀect of the distribution of quasi-identifier attributes
(QIDs). This was done by sorting the records according to quasi-identifier attributes
before anonymising them. The sorting approach reduces the possibility of the record
values that are very diﬀerent to be in the same equivalence class, which forces the
need for high generalisation level to make them indistinguishable from each other
in order to achieve k-anonymity privacy requirement.

The values of the information loss metrics resulting from the application of the
algorithm when the records are sorted according to quasi-identifier attributes were
calculated using the three information loss metrics; DP, NCP, and KL-divergence.
The results were compared with the values of the information loss metrics resulting
from the application of the algorithm without sorting the records. The values of
the information loss metrics resulting from the application of the kl-redInfo without
sorting the records, named kl-redInfoNotSorted, and when the records are sorted
according to quasi-identifier attributes, named kl-redInfoSorted, are presented in
Figure 6.10, 6.11, and 6.12. Refer to Appendix F for the results when Adult dataset
is used.

138

Proposed Modifications

Figure 6.10: DP resulting from the application of the kl-redInfo without and
with sorting approach on the PatInfo dataset
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Figure 6.11: NCP resulting from the application of the kl-redInfo without
and with sorting approach on the PatInfo dataset
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Figure 6.12: KL-divergence resulting from the application of the kl-redInfo
without and with sorting approach on the PatInfo dataset

As shown in Figure 6.10, 6.11 and 6.12, the values of the information loss metrics
resulting from the application of the kl-redInfo algorithm when records are sorted
according to QIDs is lower than the values of the information loss metrics resulting
from the application of the kl-redInfo algorithm when records are not sorted in all
three information loss metrics. Therefore, this research concludes that the approach
of sorting the records according to QIDs reduces the values of the information loss
metrics that indicate reduction in information loss.

The significance of the diﬀerence of the values of the information loss metrics when
the records are not sorted and when the records are sorted according to the quasi141
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identifiers attributes, were calculated by the Wilcoxon signed-rank test statistic. Table 6.7 shows the comparison results between the kl-redInfo algorithm when records
are not sorted according to QIDs and when records are sorted according to QIDs.
The table shows that the p-values are 0.125 for DP, 0.127 for NCP, and 0.453 for
KL-divergence metric.

Table 6.7: The comparison results from the application of the kl-redInfo without and with sorting approach on PatInfo dataset

Thus, the p-values are greater than the acceptable risk level of 0.05. This indicates
that, even though by looking to the histograms the values of the information loss
metrics was reduced, the Wilcoxon signed-rank test statistics indicate that there is
not enough evidence to conclude that there is a significant diﬀerence in the values
of the information loss metrics. The diﬀerence is not significant due to the fact that
the records were later grouped according to distinct sensitive attributes to achieve
l-diversity privacy requirement, thus decreasing the usefulness of sorting the records
according to QIDs. Therefore, this research concludes that there is not significant
evidence on the reduction in the values of information loss metrics between the klredInfo algorithm when records are not sorted according to QIDs and when records
are sorted at the risk level of 0.05.
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Refer to Appendix F for the results of the values of the information loss metrics of
the algorithm on the Adult dataset. The p-values are also higher that 0.05, 0.497
for DP, 0.455 for NCP, and 0.364 for KL-divergence, as shown in Appendix F Table
F.2. Therefore, even when the Adult dataset is used the conclusion of not having
significant evidence on the reduction in the values of information loss metrics when
records are sorted and when records are not sorted in kl-redInfo algorithm is drawn.

The values of the information loss metrics resulting from the kl-redInfo algorithm
when a pair of two approaches is used was also studied. The pairs are: systematic
incorporation and the use of both bucketisation and cell-based generalisation, systematic incorporation and sorting, and the use of both bucketisation and cell-based
generalisation approach and sorting. The results show that, the values of the information loss metrics resulting from the application of the algorithms with a pair
of two approaches are further reduced compared to when the approaches are used
separate.

Also, the results show that there is more reduction in the values of the information loss metrics every time when the approach of systematic incorporation of the
remaining records was used. This indicates that the approach of systematic incorporation of the remaining records has more eﬀect in reducing the values of the
information loss metrics that indicate reduction in information loss. Section 6.3
discusses further the impact of the proposed approaches.
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6.3

The Significance of the Proposed Modifications

Each of the proposed approaches contributes in reducing the value of information
loss metrics that indicate reduction in information loss, but their impacts are not
the same. This is indicated by not only the p-values of the Wilcoxon signed-rank
test statistics, presented in their respectively sections, but also based on the percentage diﬀerence of the value of information loss metrics when the approaches are
not used compared to when the approaches are used. The higher the percentage
diﬀerence of the information loss metric indicates the more impact of the approach
in reducing the values of the information loss metrics.

Table 6.8, 6.9 and 6.10 summarise the values of the information loss metrics, the
diﬀerence of the information loss metrics (Diﬀ), and the percentage diﬀerence of the
information loss metrics with respect to the values of the information loss metrics
resulting from the application of the existing approach on the PatInfo dataset.
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Table 6.8: The values of the information loss metrics resulting from the application of the kl-redInfo algorithm when records sequentially and systematically incorporated on the PatInfo dataset
Information loss Metrics
k,l

DP
kl-

kl-

NCP
Diﬀ (%)

sequential systematic

kl-

kl-

KL
Diﬀ (%)

sequential systematic

kl-

kl-

Diﬀ (%)

sequential systematic

2

84252

72216

12036(14)

19070

17735

1335(7)

3.4643

2.8891

0.5752(17)

3

105756

90648

15108(14)

23937

22262

1675(7)

3.4643

2.8891

0.5752(17)

4

128527

110166

18361(14)

29091

27055

2036(7)

3.4643

2.8891

0.5752(17)

5

157932

121085

36847(23)

48382

44295

4087(8)

3.5893

3.27

6

202354

159161

43193(21)

68436

63646

4790(7)

4.7143

3.8414

0.8729(19)

7

376379

322611

53768(14)

95191

79229

15962(17)

6.5893

5.27

1.3193(20)

8

443040

379749

63291(14)

100280

93261

7019(7)

6.5893

5.27

1.3193(20)

9

492152

421845

70307(14)

111396

103599

7797(7)

6.5893

5.27

1.3193(20)

10

499002

427716

71286(14)

112946

105041

7905(7)

7.2143

5.7462

1.4681(20)

11

524681

449727

74954(14)

128759

110446

18313(14)

7.8393

6.2224

1.6169(21)

12

788735

676059

112676(14)

178526

166030

12496(7)

12.2143

9.557

2.6573(22)

13

921970

790260

131710(14)

208683

194076

14607(7)

12.2143

9.557

2.6573(22)

14

921970

790260

131710(14)

208683

194076

14607(7)

12.2143

9.557

2.6573(22)

Average

16%

8%

Table 6.8 shows that, the values of the information loss metrics resulting from the
application of the kl-redInfo with the systematic incorporation of the remaining
records approach is reduced by an average of 16% of DP, 8% of NCP, and 19% of
KL-divergence metrics when compared with the values of the information loss metrics resulting from the application of the kl-redInfo with sequential incorporation
of the remaining records approach. This indicates that, there is a reduction in the
amount of information loss resulting from the application of the approach of systematic incorporation of the remaining records when compared with the approach
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of sequential incorporation of the remaining records .

Table 6.9: The values of the information loss metrics resulting from the application of the kl-redInfo algorithm with generalisation and with both bucketisation and cell-generalisation approaches on the PatInfo dataset
Information loss Metrics
k,l

DP
kl-cell

kl-

NCP
Diﬀ (%)

kl-cell

BucketCell

kl-

KL
Diﬀ (%)

kl-cell

BucketCell

kl-

Diﬀ (%)

BucketCell

2

84252

78956

5296(6)

19070

17800

1270(7)

3.4643

3.3272

0.1371(3)

3

105756

99108

6648(6)

23937

22344

1593(7)

3.4643

3.3272

0.1371(3)

4

128527

120448

8079(6)

29091

27155

1936(7)

3.4643

3.3272

0.1371(3)

5

157932

141720

16212(10)

48382

44496

3886(8)

3.5893

3.5284

0.0609(3)

6

202354

193349

9005(4)

68436

63882

4554(7)

4.7143

4.5037

0.2106(4)

7

376379

352721

23658(6)

95191

79522

15669(16)

6.5893

6.2684

0.3209(6)

8

443040

415192

27848(6)

100280

93606

6674(7)

6.5893

6.2684

0.3209(6)

9

492152

461217

30935(6)

111396

103982

7414(7)

6.5893

6.2684

0.3209(6)

10

499002

467636

31366(6)

112946

105429

7517(7)

7.2143

6.8567

0.3576(6)

11

524681

491702

32979(6)

128759

120855

7904(6)

7.8393

7.4449

0.3944(7)

12

788735

749157

39578(5)

178526

166644

11882(7)

12.2143

11.5625

0.6518(11)

13

921970

864018

57952(6)

208683

194794

13889(7)

12.2143

11.5625

0.6518(11)

14

921970

864018

57952(6)

208683

194794

13889(7)

12.2143

11.5625

0.6518(11)

Average

6%

7%

As shown in Table 6.9, the values of the information loss resulting from the application of the kl-redInfo with the bucketisation and cell-based generalisation approach
is reduced by an average of 6% of DP, 7% of NCP, and 6% of KL-divergence metrics when compared with the values of the information loss metrics resulting from
the application of the approach of generalisation only. This indicates that, there is
reduction in the amount of the information loss resulting from the application of
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the bucketisation and cell-based generalisation approach when compared with the
generalisation approach only.

Table 6.10: The values of the information loss metrics resulting from the
application of the kl-redInfo algorithm without and with sorting approach on
the PatInfo dataset
Information loss Metrics
k,l

DP

NCP

kl-NoSort

kl-sort

Diﬀ (%)

2

84252

80641

3

105756

4

KL

kl-NoSort

kl-sort

Diﬀ (%)

kl-NoSort

kl-sort

Diﬀ (%)

3611(4)

19070

17893

1177(6)

3.4643

3.3885

0.0758(2)

101223

4533(4)

23937

22460

1477(6)

3.4643

3.3885

0.0758(2)

128527

123019

5508(4)

29091

27297

1794(6)

3.4643

3.3885

0.0758(2)

5

157932

146878

11054(7)

48382

44780

3602(7)

3.5893

3.4188

0.1705(5)

6

202354

189396

12958(6)

68436

64214

4222(6)

4.7143

4.6007

0.1136(2)

7

376379

360249

16130(4)

95191

89935

5256(6)

6.5893

6.4188

0.1705(3)

8

443040

424053

18987(4)

100280

94093

6187(6)

6.5893

6.4188

0.1705(3)

9

492152

471060

21092(4)

111396

104523

6873(6)

6.5893

6.4188

0.1705(3)

10

499002

477616

21386(4)

112946

105978

6968(6)

7.2143

7.0249

0.1894(3)

11

524681

502195

22486(4)

128759

121432

7327(6)

7.8393

7.631

0.2083(3)

12

788735

754932

33803(4)

178526

167511

11015(6)

12.2143

11.8734

0.3409(3)

13

921970

882457

39513(4)

208683

195808

12875(6)

12.2143

11.8734

0.3409(3)

14

921970

882457

39513(4)

208683

195808

12875(6)

12.2143

11.8734

0.3409(3)

Average

5%

6%

The values of the information loss metrics resulting from the application of the
kl-redInfo with sorting approach is redured by an average of 5% of DP, 6% of NCP,
and 3% of KL-divergence, when compared with the values of the information loss
metrics resulting from the application of the kl-redInfo without sorting the records,
as shown in Table 6.10. This indicates that, there is reduction in the amount of
the information loss resulting from the application of the sorting approach when
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compared with the amount of the information loss when the records are not sorted.

As it can be seen in Table 6.8, 6.9 and 6.10, the approach of systematic incorporation of the remaining records has higher percentage diﬀerence of the values of the
information loss metrics compared with the approach of using bucketisation and
cell-based generalisation, and the approach of sorting the records according to their
quasi-identifier attributes (QIDs). This is due to the reason that the approach of
systematic incorporation of the remaining records ensures that records are incorporated in an equivalence class that results to lower values of the information loss
metrics.

The research find that the values of the information loss metrics resulting from the
application of an individual approach does not results in significant reduction in the
values of information loss metrics, as shown in their respective sections. Therefore,
the research proposed the use of all modified approaches that significantly reduce
the values of the information loss metrics that indicate reduction in information
loss, as shown in Table 6.11 and confirmed by Wilcoxon signed-rank test results
presented in Table 6.12.

The average of the percentage diﬀerence of the values of the information loss metrics resulting from the application of the kl-redInfo algorithm with the proposed
modified approaches is 23% lower than the DP of the kl-redInfo algorithm without
the proposed modified approaches, and is 10% lower than the NCP of the kl-redInfo
algorithm without the proposed modified approaches, and 40% lower than the KLdivergence of the kl-redInfo algorithm without the proposed modified approaches,
as shown by Diﬀ(%) column. This indicates reduction in the information loss.
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Table 6.11: The values of the information loss metrics resulting from the application of the kl-redInfo without and with the proposed modified approaches
on the PatInfo dataset
Information loss Metrics
k,l

DP
kl-

kl-with

NCP
Diﬀ (%)

without

kl-

kl-with

KL
Diﬀ (%)

without

kl-

kl-with

Diﬀ (%)

without

2

84252

62587

21665(26)

19070

17482

1588(8)

3.4643

2.0888

1.3755(40)

3

105756

78562

27194(26)

23937

21944

1993(8)

3.4643

2.0888

1.3755(40)

4

128527

95477

33050(26)

29091

26669

2422(8)

3.4643

2.0888

1.3755(40)

5

157932

151607

6325(4)

48382

43521

4861(10)

3.5893

3.0604

0.5289(15)

6

202354

184606

17748(9)

68436

62738

5698(8)

4.7143

3.4969

1.2174(26)

7

376379

279596

96783(26)

95191

78099

17092(18)

6.5893

3.604

2.9853(45)

8

443040

329116

113924(26)

100280

91931

8349(8)

6.5893

3.604

2.9853(45)

9

492152

365599

126553(26)

111396

102121

9275(8)

6.5893

3.604

2.9853(45)

10

499002

370687

128315(26)

112946

103543

9403(8)

7.2143

3.907

3.3073(46)

11

524681

389763

134918(26)

128759

108871

19888(15)

7.8393

5.21

2.6293(34)

12

788735

585918

202817(26)

178526

153662

24864(14)

12.2143

6.3312

5.8831(48)

13

921970

684892

237078(26)

208683

191308

17375(8)

12.2143

6.3312

5.8831(48)

14

921970

684892

237078(26)

208683

191308

17375(8)

12.2143

6.3312

5.8831(48)

Average

23%

10%

Table 6.12: The comparison results from the application of the kl-redInfo
without and with the proposed modified approaches on the PatInfo dataset
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These conclusions are also drawn when Adult dataset is used, refer to Appendix D,
E and F for the results on the Adult dataset. The values of the information loss
metrics resulting from the application of the approach of systematic incorporation
of the remaining records is reduced by an average of 17% of DP, 18% of NCP, and
24% of KL-divergence metrics when compared with the values of the information
loss resulting from the application of the approach of sequential incorporation of
the remaining records. The values of the information loss metrics resulting from
the application of the approach of bucketisation and cell-based generalisation is reduced by an average of 8% of DP, 10% of NCP, and 9% of KL-divergence metrics
when compared with the values of the information loss metrics resulting from the
application of the approach of generalisation. The values of the information loss
metrics resulting from the application of the sorting approach is reduced by an average of 5% of DP, 4% of NCP, and 8% of KL-divergence metrics when compared
with the values of the information loss metrics when the records are not sorted.
Therefore, this indicates that the approach of systematic incorporation of the remaining records has most impact in reducing the values of the information loss
metrics compared to other approaches.

The results that compare the values of the information loss metrics of kl-redInfo with
the proposed modified approaches and without proposed modified approaches on
the Adult dataset are presented in Appendix G. The values of the information loss
metrics resulting from the application of the kl-redInfo algorithm with the proposed
modified approaches is reduced by an average of 34% of DP, 31% of NCP, and 40%
of KL-divergence when compared with the values of the information loss metrics
resulting from the application of the kl-redInfo algorithm without the proposed
modified approaches. The results show a significance diﬀerence of the values of the
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information loss metrics when the proposed modified approaches are used compared
to when they are not used. This is due to the values of p-value being 0.00342 for
DP, 0.03271 for NCP, and 0.00024 for KL-divergence, as shown in Appendix G
Table G.2, which are lower than the acceptable risk level of 0.05.

6.4

Comparison of kl-redInfo with the Existing
Algorithms

In order to evaluate the improvement achieved by the proposed kl-redInfo algorithm, a comparison with the widely used algorithms, l-mondrian and g-anatomy,
was studied. This was done by comparing the values of the information loss metrics
resulting from the application of the kl-redInfo algorithm with the three proposed
approaches and the values of the information loss metrics resulting from the application of the l-mondrian and g-anatomy algorithms. Figure 6.13, 6.14 and 6.15
show the information loss metrics resulting from the application of the kl-redInfo
with the proposed modifications, l-mondrian and g-anatomy algorithms.

151

Comparison of kl-redInfo with the Existing Algorithms

Figure 6.13: DP of the l-mondrian, g-anatomy, and the kl-redInfo algorithm
with the proposed modified approaches on the PatInfo dataset
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Figure 6.14: NCP of the l-mondrian, g-anatomy, and the kl-redInfo algorithm
with the proposed modified approaches on the PatInfo dataset
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Figure 6.15: KL-divergence of the l-mondrian, g-anatomy, and the kl-redInfo
algorithm with the proposed modified approaches on the PatInfo dataset

As shown in Figure 6.13, 6.14 and 6.15 the proposed kl-redInfo algorithm results in
lower values of the information loss compared to l-mondrian and g-anatomy algorithms. The values of the information loss metrics resulting from the application
of the l-mondrian is high compared with the values of the information loss metrics
resulting from the application of the g-anatomy and kl-redInfo algorithms. This is
due to the fact that the l-mondrian algorithm incorporates equivalence classes that
do not achieve the privacy requirement rather than a record, as g-anatomy and
kl-redInfo do. This increases the size of the equivalence class and hence increases
the values of the information loss metrics when transforming them to be indistinguishable from each other.
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The diﬀerences between the algorithms were also evaluated by using percentages
diﬀerence of their values of the information loss metrics. The percentage diﬀerence
of the values of the information loss metrics between the kl-redInfo algorithm and
g-anatomy, and kl-redInfo and l-mondrian, are summarised in Table 6.13 and 6.14.

As it can be seen in Table 6.13, the results show that the average of the percentage
diﬀerence of the values of the information loss metrics resulting from the application of the kl-redInfo algorithm with the proposed modified approaches is 39% lower
than the DP of the l-mondrian algorithm, and it is 24% lower than the NCP of the
l-mondrian algorithm, and 55% lower than the KL-divergence of the l-mondrian
algorithm, as shown by Diﬀ (%) column. This indicates the reduction in the information loss resulting from the application of the kl-redInfo when compared with
l-mondrian measured in terms of DP, NCP, and KL-divergence metrics.
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Table 6.13: The values of the information loss metrics resulting from the
application of the kl-redInfo with the proposed modified approaches and lmondrian on the PatInfo dataset
Information loss Metrics
k,l

DP
l-

kl-

mondrian

redInfo

2

91473

62587

3

114821

4

NCP
l-

kl-

l-

kl-

mondrian

redInfo

mondrian

redInfo

28886(32)

20341

17482

2859(14)

4.4483

2.0888

2.3595(53)

78562

36259(32)

25533

21944

3589(14)

4.4483

2.0888

2.3595(53)

141843

95477

46366(33)

31542

26669

4873(15)

5.115

2.0888

3.0262(59)

5

216855

151607

65248(30)

50461

43521

6940(14)

5.4483

3.0604

2.3879(44)

6

275847

184606

46366(33)

83579

62738

20841(25)

6.115

3.4969

2.6181(43)

7

537525

279596

257929(48)

119532

78099

41433(35)

9.115

3.604

5.511(60)

8

653152

329116

324036(50)

145244

91931

53313(37)

9.115

3.604

5.511(60)

9

725257

365599

359658(50)

161279

102121

59158(37)

10.2817

3.604

6.6777(65)

10

761364

370687

390677(51)

169307

103543

65764(39)

10.2817

3.907

6.3747(62)

11

786277

389763

396514(50)

174848

108871

65977(38)

10.2817

5.21

5.0717(49)

12

789857

585918

203939(26)

175644

163662

11982(7)

14.115

6.3312

7.7838(55)

13

1083205

684892

398313(37)

240877

191308

49569(21)

14.115

6.3312

7.7838(55)

14

1083205

684892

398313(37)

240877

191308

49569(21)

14.115

6.3312

7.7838(55)

Average

Diﬀ (%)

KL

39%

Diﬀ (%)

24%

The results in Table 6.14, show that the average of the percentage diﬀerence of the
values of the information loss metrics resulting from the application of the kl-redInfo
algorithm with the proposed modified approaches is 25% lower than the DP of the
g-anatomy algorithm, and it is 10% lower than the NCP of the g-anatomy algorithm, and 43% lower than the KL-divergence of the g-anatomy algorithm, as shown
by Diﬀ (%) column. This indicates the reduction in the information loss resulting
from the application of the kl-redInfo when compared with g-anatomy measured in
terms of DP, NCP, and KL-divergence metrics.
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Table 6.14: The values of the information loss metrics resulting from the
application of the kl-redInfo with the proposed modified approaches and ganatomy on the PatInfo dataset
Information loss Metrics
k,l

DP
g-

kl-

anatomy

redInfo

2

86659

62587

3

108778

4

NCP
g-

kl-

g-

kl-

anatomy

redInfo

anatomy

redInfo

24072(28)

19371

17482

1889(10)

3.632

2.0888

1.5432(42)

78562

30216(28)

24323

21944

2379(10)

3.632

2.0888

1.5432(42)

132199

95477

36722(28)

29560

26669

2891(10)

3.632

2.0888

1.5432(42)

5

165302

151607

13695(8)

49321

43521

5800(12)

3.9653

3.0604

0.9049(23)

6

210993

184606

26387(13)

69538

62738

6800(10)

4.9653

3.4969

1.4684(30)

7

387133

279596

107537(28)

86563

78099

8464(10)

6.9653

3.604

3.3613(48)

8

455699

329116

126583(28)

101894

91931

9963(10)

6.9653

3.604

3.3613(48)

9

506214

365599

140615(28)

113189

102121

11068(10)

6.9653

3.604

3.3613(48)

10

513259

370687

142572(28)

114765

103543

11222(10)

7.632

3.907

3.725(49)

11

539672

389763

149909(28)

120671

108871

11800(10)

8.2986

5.21

3.0886(37)

12

811271

585918

225353(28)

181400

163662

17738(10)

12.9653

6.3312

6.6341(51)

13

948312

684892

263420(28)

212042

191308

20734(10)

12.9653

6.3312

6.6341(51)

14

948312

684892

263420(28)

212042

191308

20734(10)

12.9653

6.3312

6.6341(51)

Average

Diﬀ (%)

KL

25%

Diﬀ (%)

10%

Table 6.13 and 6.14 show significant reduction in the values of the information loss
metrics resulting from the application of the proposed kl-redInfo algorithm with the
proposed modified approaches when compared with the l-mondrian and g-anatomy
algorithms. This is due to the use of the proposed modified approaches. The values
of the information loss metrics are much higher when kl-redInfo algorithm with the
proposed modified approaches is compared with l-mondrian algorithm. This is due
to the fact that l-mondrian incorporates equivalence class rather than a record as
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done by g-anatomy and kl-redInfo algorithms. This forces l-mondrian to have large
number of the records that have to be indistinguishable from each other in order to
form an equivalence class.

The significance of the diﬀerence of information loss metrics between the kl-redInfo
algorithm with the proposed modified approaches and the widely used l-mondrian,
g-anatomy algorithms, were evaluated by the Wilcoxon signed-rank test statistics.
The results are presented in Table 6.15, and 6.16.

Table 6.15: The comparison results from the application of the l-mondrian
and kl-redInfo with the proposed modified approaches on the PatInfo dataset

The p-values in Table 6.15 are 0.00122 for DP, 0.00244 for NCP, and 0.00024 for KLdivergence. Since the p-values are lower than the acceptable risk level of 0.05, this
implies that there is enough evidence to conclude that there is significant diﬀerence
between the values of the information loss metrics resulting from the application
of the kl-redInfo and the values of the information loss metrics resulting from the
application of the l-mondrian algorithm. This indicates that there is significant
reduction in information loss resulting from the application of the kl-redInfo when
compared with the l-mondrian algorithm, measured in terms of DP, NCP, and KLdivergence metrics.
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Table 6.16: The comparison results from the application of the g-anatomy
and kl-redInfo with the proposed modified approaches on the PatInfo dataset

Table 6.16 shows the comparison results for the values of the information loss metrics resulting from the application of the kl-redInfo and g-anatomy algorithms on
the PatInfo dataset. The p-values are 0.038 for DP, 0.010 for NCP, and 0.001 for
KL-divergence. This shows that, there is enough evidence to conclude that there is
statistically significant diﬀerence between the values of the information loss metrics
caused kl-redInfo and g-anatomy algorithm at the risk level of 0.05. This is indicated by the p-values which are lower than the acceptable risk level of 0.05. This
also indicates that there is significant reduction in information loss resulting from
the application of the kl-redInfo when compared with the g-anatomy algorithms,
measured in terms of DP, NCP, and KL-divergence metrics.

The results on real-world Adult dataset also show enough evidence in the reduction of the values of the information loss metrics resulting from the application of
the kl-redInfo algorithm with the proposed modified approaches compared with the
l-mondrian and g-anatomy algorithms. The values of the information loss metrics resulting from the application of the kl-redInfo with the proposed modified
approaches is reduced by an average of 43% of DP, 39% of NCP and 50% of KLdivergence when compared with the values of the information loss metrics resulting
from the application of l-mondrian. The values of the information loss metrics resulting from the application of the kl-redInfo with the proposed modified approaches
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is reduced by an average of 35% of DP, 28% of NCP and 46% of KL-divergence
when compared with the values of the information loss metrics resulting from the
application of the g-anatomy. Refer to Appendix H for detailed comparison results
of the kl-redInfo algorithm with the proposed modified approaches compared with
the l-mondrian and g-anatomy algorithms on Adult dataset.

6.5

Other Experiments and Findings

In addition to the evaluation experiments, this research also investigates the impact
of diﬀerent characteristics on the implemented algorithms, kl-redInfo, l-mondrian
and g-anatomy. These characteristics include; diﬀerent dataset size considered in
Section 6.5.1, diﬀerent parameter values k and l considered in Section 6.5.2, and
the performance speed of the algorithms considered in Section 6.5.3.

6.5.1

Impact of the diﬀerent datasets size

The research investigates the impact of the diﬀerent size of the datasets on the
implemented algorithms, kl-redInfo, l-mondrian and g-anatomy. This was done by
calculating the three information loss metrics on randomly selected sets of 5,000,
10,000, 15,000, 20,000, 25,000, and 30,000 records of both the PatInfo and Adult
datasets. Figure 6.16, 6.17, and 6.18 represent the information loss metrics resulting from the application of the proposed kl-redInfo algorithm, on the 5,000, 10,000,
15,000, 20,000, 25,000, and 30,000 records of the PatInfo dataset when k = l = 6.
The information loss is measured by the three information loss metrics, Discernibility Penalty (DP), Normalised Certainty Penalty (NCP), and Kullback-Leibler
divergence (KL-divergence) respectively. Refer to Appendix I for the values of the
information loss metrics resulting from the application of the proposed kl-redInfo
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algorithm on diﬀerent size of the Adult dataset.

Figure 6.16: DP resulting from the application of the kl-redInfo algorithm on
diﬀerent size of the PatInfo dataset when k = l = 6
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Figure 6.17: NCP resulting from the application of the kl-redInfo algorithm
on diﬀerent size of the PatInfo dataset when k = l = 6
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Figure 6.18: KL-divergence resulting from the application of the kl-redInfo
algorithm on diﬀerent size of the PatInfo dataset when k = l = 6

Figure 6.16 and 6.17 show that there is a linear relationship between the values of
the information loss metrics and the size of the dataset. The KL-divergence metrics
shown in Figure 6.18 shows similarity of the information loss when diﬀerent size of
the datasets are used. This shows that the probability deviation of the anonymised
datasets from the original dataset mostly depends on the values of the parameter
k and l, not on the dataset size. The results was also shown when diﬀerent size of
the Adult dataset are used, refer to Appendix I for the results.

In general, as in the literature, when the number of records increases, the values of
the information loss metrics also increase, which indicates a increase in the amount
of information loss. This is due to the fact that when the number of records in163
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creases the size or number of the equivalence classes also increases and hence more
generalisation needs to be applied in order to make them indistinguishable from
each other.

6.5.2

Impact of the diﬀerent Parameter values

This research also studied the tradeoﬀ between the level of privacy and the values
of the information loss metrics. The level of privacy is indicated by the parameter
values of the k and l, when the values increase the level of privacy also increases.
The results show that when the values of the parameter k and l increase, the values
of the information loss metrics also increases. This is due to the fact that when
the values of the parameter k and l increase, the number of records required to be
indistinguishable from each other also increases, thus more generalisation should be
applied to make them indistinguishable from each other which increase the values
of the information loss metric.

As shown in most of the histograms in previous sections, when the value of k and
l are greater than 6 there is a steep increase in the values of the information loss
metrics. Therefore, even though there is no one value of the parameter k and l that
fits all requirements, this research proposes k and l = 6 to be the most appropriate
value of the parameter k and l when anonymising the data. Thus, data holders
can start from this value on deciding the appropriate values depending on the other
characteristics such as the amount of data required, purposes and the users of the
anonymised dataset. This comes at the expense of increasing the values of the
information loss metrics when the value of k = l > 6 or decreasing an individual’s
privacy when the value of k = l < 6.
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6.5.3

Algorithms Perfomance

Even though the main interest of this research is to reduce the amount of information loss, the research also evaluated the perfomance speed of each of the implemented algorithms based on the same hardware configurations and datasets. The
results show that the l-mondrian algorithm performs faster (Average of 55 seconds
on the 30200 records of the PatInfo dataset) than g-anatomy (Average of 62 seconds
on the 30200 records of the PatInfo dataset) and the kl-redInfo algorithm (Average
of 65 seconds on the 30200 records of the PatInfo dataset).

This is due to the fact that the l-mondrian incorporates the group of the records
(equivalence class) that does not achieve l-diversity privacy requirement instead of
incorporating each remaining record as it is done by g-anatomy and the kl-redInfo
algorithms. The g-anatomy also performs slightly better than the kl-redInfo algorithm due to the fact that g-anatomy incorporates records sequentially rather than
systematically as kl-redInfo does.

In general, most of the characteristics show that the kl-redInfo algorithm reduces
the values of the information loss metrics that indicate a reduction in information
loss. This shows that the kl-redInfo with the proposed modifications is better than
the widely used l-mondrian and g-anatomy algorithms.
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6.6

Chapter Summary

There are several approaches that can be used to achieve the privacy models, including generalisation, suppression, pseudonymisation and bucketisation. Most of the
existing anonymisation approaches result in substantial information loss. To reduce
this weakness, this research proposes a systematic incorporation of the remaining
records, the use of both bucketisation and cell-based generalisation approaches, and
sorting the records according to their quasi-identifiers. The use of these three approaches results in lower values of the information loss metrics that indicates a
reduction in the information loss. The approach of systematic incorporation of the
remaining records shows most impact in reducing the amount of the information
loss compared to other approaches.

The research also found that, the proposed kl-redInfo algorithm results in significant
reduction in the values of the information loss metrics compared with the widely
used l-mondrian and g-anatomy algorithms. The values of the information loss
metrics were more reduced when kl-redInfo was compared with l-mondrian than
when kl-redInfo is compared with g-anatomy algorithm. This is due to the fact
that the l-mondrian incorporates equivalence classes that do not achieve l-diversity
instead of individual records as g-anatomy and kl-redInfo do.
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The use and sharing of the collected data is limited due to the presence of Personal
Identifiable Information (PII), whose sharing may breach an individual’s privacy.
The diﬃculties in sharing the data arise mainly from the fact that ensuring an
individual’s privacy results in information loss that renders data less useful. The
challenge of ensuring an individual’s privacy while providing useful information
makes Privacy-Preserving Data Publishing (PPDP) a challenging domain. Most of
the existing solutions result in a substantial information loss that renders data less
useful.

7.1

Conclusions

This research designed an anonymisation algorithm, named kl-redInfo, which results in a reduced amount of information loss compared to the widely used and
well-established l-mondrian and g-anatomy algorithms. The reduction in the information loss is indicated by the lower values of the information loss metrics,
disscussed in Chapter 6. This is due to the fact that the three information loss
metrics, Discernibility Penalty (DP), Normalised Certainty Penalty (NCP), and
Kullback-Leibler divergence (KL-divergence), have useful characteristics that indicate a reduction in information loss.
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The DP measures the information loss based on the size of the equivalence classes.
The larger the size of the equivalence classes, the higher the level of the generalisation hierarchy that is required to make the records indistinguishable from each
other. Not only the size of the equivalence classes that indicates the amount of the
information loss, but also the generalisation process used. The NCP metric was
used as it takes into account both the size of the equivalence classes and the generalisation process used. Neither the DP, nor the NCP take the data distribution into
account, thus this research also used the KL-divergence which takes into account
the data distribution. Therefore, the use of these three metrics has a good spread
of the indicators of the information loss.

The kl-redInfo algorithm was evaluated by comparing the values of the three information loss metrics resulting from the application of the kl-redInfo with the
l-diversity versions of the well-established and widely used Mondrian and Anatomy
algorithms. The results shows that, there is a significant reduction in the values of
all three information loss metrics, DP, NCP, and KL-divergence, resulting from the
application of the kl-redInfo compared to l-mondrian and g-anatomy algorithms.
This implies that there is a significant reduction in information loss when kl-redInfo
was used compared to when l-mondrian and g-anatomy algorithms were used. The
reduction in information loss is due to the use of the three proposed modifications
approaches:
1. Systematic incorporation of the remaining records in the equivalence class
that results in a lower value of the information loss metric
2. Using both bucketisation and cell-based generalisation approaches
3. Sorting the records according to the quasi-identifier attributes in order to take
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under consideration their distribution
Each of the proposed modified approach contributes in reducing the values of the
information loss metrics that indicate a reduction in information loss. The approach
of systematic incorporation of the remaining records in the equivalence class that
results in a lower value of the information loss metric has more impact in reducing
the amount of the information loss compared to the approach of using both bucketisation and cell-based generalisation approach, and the approach of sorting the
records according to the quasi-identifier attributes.

The research also found that, the combined use of all three proposed modified
approaches results in a significant reduction in the values of the information loss
metrics compared to when an individual approach is used. Therefore, this research
uses all three approaches to design the proposed kl-redInfo algorithm that significantly reduces the values of the information loss metrics, that indicate a reduction in
the information loss, compared to the well-established and widely used l-mondrian
and g-anatomy algorithms.

7.2

Research Contributions

The main contribution of this research is the designed kl-redInfo anonymisation
algorithm that ensure’s an individual’s privacy with a reduced amount of the information loss. An individual’s privacy is ensured by achieving the two main privacy
requirements, k-anonymity and l-diversity. The two privacy requirements ensure
individual’s privacy against the two main disclosures, identity and attribute disclosures. The information loss is reduced by the use of the proposed modified
approaches that are used to design the proposed kl-redInfo algorithm. These ap169
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proaches are:
 Systematic incorporation of the remaining records in the equivalence classes

that result in a lower value of the information loss metric
 Using both bucketisation and cell-based generalisation approaches
 Sorting the records according to the quasi-identifier attributes in order to take

under consideration their distribution
The proposed modifications are further discussed next:
 Systematic Incorporation approach

A key challenge when anonymising data is what do we do with the records that
do not achieve privacy requirements, named remaining records. Suppressing
the records ensures an individual’s privacy but the data cannot be used for
various useful purposes such as research, analysis, quality and safety measurement, public health, and marketing, that can enhance quality of services
and minimise cost. The approach of sequential incorporation of the remaining
records to the equivalence classes, as done by the existing algorithms, results
in substantial information loss that renders the data less useful.

This research proposed the approach that systematically incorporates the remaining records to the equivalence classes, named systematic incorporation
approach. This is done by calculating the values of the information loss metrics before the record is incorporated in an equivalence class that results in
a lower information loss. Unlike the sequential incorporation approach, systematic incorporation approach ensures that the record is incorporated in an
equivalence class that results in a lower information loss metric. The research
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shows that, the values of the information loss metrics resulting from the application of the systematic incorporation approach is reduced when compared
to the values of the information loss metrics resulting from the application of
the sequential incorporation approach.
 Bucketisation and Cell-based generalisation approaches

Another challenge in anonymising data is on deciding the approaches that
can be used in order to ensure an individual’s privacy while still striving to
reduce the amount of the information loss. Most of the existing solutions
use either bucketisation or generalisation approach to achieve privacy requirements. For example, Mondrian algorithm uses a generalisation approach but
not a bucketisation approach, which results in a substantial information loss,
and Anatomy algorithm uses a bucketisation but not a generalisation approach, which results in violating an individual’s privacy.

Therefore, this research proposed the use of both bucketisation and cell-based
generalisation approaches. These approaches reduce the values of the information loss metrics while ensuring an individual’s privacy. The research found
that, the values of the information loss metrics, that indicate a reduction in
the information loss, resulting from the application of both a bucketisation
and cell-generalisation approaches are reduced when compared to the values
of the information loss metrics resulting from the application of the generalisation approach only.
 Sorting the records according to quasi-identifiers

The distribution of quasi-identifier attributes (QIDs) is another factor that
contributes to the increase of the information loss. This research proposed
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the approach of sorting not only sensitive attributes, as done by the existing
algorithms, but also QIDs in order to consider their distribution. This was
done by introducing the approach of sorting the records according to quasiidentifier attributes before anonymising them.

The sorting approach reduces the possibility of the record values that are very
diﬀerent to be in the same equivalence class, which forces the need for a high
level of the generalisation hierarchy in order to make them indistinguishable
from each other. That increases the values of the information loss metrics
that indicate an increase in the amount of the information loss. The results
show that, the sorting approach results in a reduction of the values of the
information loss metrics when compared with the values of the information
loss metrics when the records are not sorted.

7.3

Benefits from this Research

There is much to gain from sharing information which is under pressure due to the
growth of diﬀerent technologies in the modern digital world. This will enhance real
time services by providing real-time decision aid such as alerts and reminders. Also,
access to enough information and interchange will enable researchers to discover,
analyse and predict correct trends of services. Moreover, electronic accessibility to
the collected data and knowledge can improve all types of decisions by the use of
decision support technology and will transform services. In general, sharing the
information will reduce service costs and improve quality by relating the outcomes
to service processes. Therefore, the proposed kl-redInfo algorithm anonymises the
data with a reduced information loss that renders it useful for many purposes.
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The beneficiaries of this research include:
 Data holders such as research and healthcare institutions, social networking

websites, and search engines, seeking to share their data without violating
an individual’s privacy. This is because the kl-redInfo algorithm is designed
to ensure an individual’s privacy with reduced information loss that renders
data useful. The data holder will enter the dataset to be anonymised and
the values of k and l depending on the user of the data and the purpose of
use. This is due to the fact that the level of privacy/anonymisation diﬀers
depending on the user of the data and the purpose of use. For example, if the
data is needed by the doctor for treatment purpose, its level of anonymisation
should be lower compared to the data needed by the researcher for a research
purpose.
 Privacy-enhancing researchers seeking to expand knowledge and understand-

ing how they can reduce the values of the information loss metrics on the
privacy-enhancing approaches.
The kl-redInfo algorithm can be used by any domain, but its software implementations may need to be customised depending on the quasi-identifiers to be
anonymised. The available software implementation uses the commonly used quasiidentifier attributes including date of birth, address, gender, and marital status.
Application of the kl-redInfo algorithm on the real healthcare environment, mainly
Muhimbili National Hospital in Tanzania where the survey was done, will be of
benefit. This will be followed by the prototype system to be registered under open
source general license in order to facilitate its adoption for the benefits of diﬀerent
data holders.
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7.4

Future Work

Several important issues regarding the designing of privacy-enhancing algorithms
have been addressed by this research. The research provides both theoretical and
empirical research on the domain. The main contribution made is the proposed
anonymisation algorithm for devising and implementing privacy-enhancing algorithms with reduced amount of the information loss. In the process, several challenges were encountered and addressed. This section highlights some of the remaining challenges as future research directions.
This research can be extended in diﬀerent research directions including:
 Extending the Algorithm to achieve other Privacy Models

The proposed kl-redInfo algorithm ensures an individual’s privacy by achieving k-anonym
isation and l-diversity privacy requirements. Therefore, the algorithm inherites characteristics of the achieved privacy requirements, as discussed in
Section 3.6.1. Thus, expanding the algorithm to achieve other privacy models
such as t-closeness and personalised privacy, will be of benefit to the body of
knowledge.
 Extending the Algorithm to anonymise other types of data

The proposed algorithm anonymises structured/relational type of data, which
is the subset of the healthcare dataset. Due to diversity nature of the healthcare data, extending the algorithm so that it can anonymise other types of
data including, unstructured text and numeric, images, blood sample reports,
codes, sounds, and videos, will be of great importance.
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 Extending the Implementation to other Domains

The kl-redInfo algorithm can be used not only on the healthcare domain but
also to other domains such as financial and education domain. This can be
achieved by customising its implementation depending on the quasi-identifiers
to be anonymised. The implemented algorithms uses the commonly used
quasi-identifier attributes including date of birth, address, gender, and marital
status. The generalisation hierarchies for these quasi-identifiers were manually
formed, automating this process or doing it intelligentlly may improve the
process significantly.
 Developing a Unified Metric for Quantification of Information loss

Quantifying the amount of the information loss is still a challenging problem.
Each of the existing metric uses diﬀerent aspects that indicates a reduction
in the amount of the information loss. For example, the DP measures the
information loss based on the size of the equivalence classes, the NCP takes
into account the size of the equivalence classes and the generalisation process,
while the KL-divergence takes into account the data distribution. Therefore,
there is no single metric that fully measures the amount of the information
loss. Developing a metric that takes into consideration all aspects of the
information loss will simplify the process of quantifying the amount of the
information loss.
 Developing Parameter Benchmarks for diﬀerent Data Recipients

Deciding the values of parameter k and l to appropriate anonymise the dataset
is still a challenging problem. This is because the selection of the parameters is
subjective depending on the recipient of the data and the purpose of use. The
implemented algorithms can be improved in order to automatically provide
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an anonymised dataset that takes under consideration the data recipient and
the purpose of use. Developing the parameter benchmarks for diﬀerent data
recipients will be the solution of the parameter selection problem. To achieve
this, a comprehensive study has to be done in order to take into consideration
characteristics of diﬀerent data recipient and the purpose of use.
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Appendix A
Information Classification

Information on the area of Privacy-preserving Data Publishing (PII) can be classfied as shown in Figure A.1 and explained in Table A.1. Note that, the privacy
significance increases when moving inward.

Figure A.1: Information Classification (Al-Fedaghi and Al-Azmi, 2012)
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Table A.1: Information Classification

Term

Explanation

Examples

Information

Information is data
that has been processed or analysed to
produce something
useful.
Information belonging to the private life
of an individual that
can uniquely identify
that individual when
are linked together
and not on their own.
Any information that
permits the identity
of an individual to
be directly and indirectly inferred

Census records, criminal records, and voter
registrations

Personal Information

Personal
Identifiable
Information
(PII)

Sensitive Personal Identifiable Information

PII that embeds sensitive information
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Protection
Measures
Not considered
confidential

Gender, Marital status, DOB, Address,
Country, and Race

Restricted
Access.

Name, date and place
of birth, biometric
records, medical, education, financial, and
employment information
inherently sensitive
intimate (e.g., medical or sexual information), judgmental
data, and biographical data

Rules and
Regulations

More
stringent
controls

Appendix B
Glossary of Terms

Term

Explanation

Anonymisation

Anonymisation is the process that ensures individual information remain un-identified within
the set of data.

Data

The building blocks for information. These can
be described as numbers, symbols, words, images
and graphics that have been validated but yet to
be organised or analysed.

Database

A collection of data that is organised so that its
contents can easily be accessed, managed, and
updated.

Data holder

A data holder is the individual or the legal person who either alone or with others, controls and
is responsible for the keeping and use of personal
information on computer or in structured manual
files.
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Data recipient

Any user of data or information produced by the
data holder. The data is used for a number of
purposes, including planning, decision making
and research.

Data subject

An individual who is the subject of data, for example, a patient admitted to a hospital.

Discernibility Penalty

The information loss metrics that measures the

(DP)

information loss based on size of the equivalence
classes.

Equivalence Class

The number of records that have the same quasiidentifiable attributes.

Information

Information is data that has been processed or
analysed to produce something useful.

Information Loss

Information loss due to un-identification process

Information and com-

The tools and resources used to communicate,

munication technology

create, disseminate, store, and manage informa-

(ICT)

tion electronically.

Input Perturbation

Privacy preserving technique that deals with disturbing data before the release

Kullback-Leibler diver-

Information loss metric that measures the infor-

gence (KL-divergence)

mation loss based on the data distribution diﬀerence of the anonymised dataset compared to the
original dataset.

Muhimbili National

The national hospital in Tanzania where the sur-

Hospital (MNH)

vey was done
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Normalised Certainty

The information loss metric that measures the

Penalty (NCP)

information loss based on eﬀect of generalisation

National Institute

The overseer of all healthcare research in Tanza-

for Medical Research

nia

(NIMR)
Output Perturbation

Privacy preserving technique that uses query
control mechanism to compute exact answers,
but it returns disturbed or noisy answers as a
response to the query

Personal Identifiable

Personal information is data relating to an indi-

Information (PII)

vidual who is or can be identified either from the
data or from the data in conjunction with other
information that is in, or is likely to come into,
the possession of the data holder

Privacy

The right of an individual to remain unidentifiable within a set of data

Privacy-Preserving

One of the broad areas of privacy-preserving that

Data Publishing

deals with un-identifying the data so that indi-

(PPDP)

viduals privacy remains preserved when shared
for diﬀerent purposes

Quasi-identifier At-

The Quasi-Identifier (QID) is a set of attributes

tribute (QID)

that could potentially identify the data subject
such as gender, race and marital status.
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Sensitive attributes

The Sensitive Attributes consists of sensitive
person-specific information such as disease,
salary, and disability status.
Table B.1: Glossary of Terms
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Appendix C
The Information loss metrics of the
algorithms without the proposed
modifications

Figure C.1: DP resulting from the application of the l-mondrian, g-anatomy,
and kl-redInfo algorithm without the proposed modifications on the Adult
dataset
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Figure C.2: NCP resulting from the application of the l-mondrian, g-anatomy,
and kl-redInfo without the proposed modifications algorithms on the Adult
dataset
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Figure C.3: KL-divergence resulting from the application of the l-mondrian,
g-anatomy, and kl-redInfo without the proposed modifications algorithms on
the Adult dataset
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Table C.1: The values of the information loss metrics resulting from the application of the kl-redInfo without the proposed modifications and l-mondrian
algorithm on the Adult dataset
Information loss Metrics
k,l

DP
l-

kl-

mondrian

without

2

136183

107812

3

155527

4

NCP
l-

kl-

l-

kl-

mondrian

without

mondrian

without

28371(21)

35464

27020

8444(24)

1.875

1.429

0.446(24)

123126

32401(21)

40502

30859

9643(24)

1.875

1.429

0.446(24)

171242

125567

45675(27)

44594

33977

10617(24)

3.25

2.762

0.488(15)

5

181186

133439

47747(26)

47184

35950

11234(24)

3.25

2.762

0.488(15)

6

188753

139429

49324(26)

49154

36451

12703(26)

3.25

2.762

0.488(15)

7

215012

164384

50628(24)

60784

49693

11091(18)

5.25

4.762

0.488(9)

8

227067

173928

53139(23)

63924

52085

11839(19)

5.25

4.762

0.488(9)

9

231156

192998

38158(17)

70197

55864

14333(20)

5.25

4.762

0.488(9)

10

285732

226204

59528(21)

74409

56693

17716(24)

5.25

4.762

0.488(9)

11

343044

291861

51183(15)

89428

68136

21292(24)

5.875

5.238

0.637(11)

12

455246

414153

41093(9)

126366

96279

30087(24)

7.5

6.714

0.786(10)

13

552877

464361

88516(16)

155645

141444

14201(9)

11

7.857

3.143(29)

14

586458

485946

100512(17)

195640

171916

23724(12)

11

7.857

3.143(29)

Average

Diﬀ (%)

KL

20%

Diﬀ (%)

21%

Table C.2: The comparison results from the application of the kl-redInfo
algorithm without the proposed modifications and l-mondrian on the Adult
dataset
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Diﬀ (%)

16%

Table C.3: The values of the information loss metrics resulting from the application of the kl-redInfo without the proposed modifications and g-anatomy
algorithm on the Adult dataset
Information loss Metrics
k,l

DP
g-

kl-

anatomy

without

2

119160

107812

3

136086

4

NCP
g-

kl-

g-

kl-

anatomy

without

anatomy

without

11348(10)

29865

27020

2845(10)

1.579

1.429

0.15(9)

123126

12960(10)

34107

30859

3248(10)

1.579

1.429

0.15(9)

149837

125567

24270(16)

37553

33977

3576(10)

3.263

2.762

0.501(15)

5

158537

133439

25098(16)

39734

35950

3784(10)

3.263

2.762

0.501(15)

6

165159

149429

15730(10)

41393

36451

4942(12)

3.263

2.762

0.501(15)

7

180635

164384

16251(9)

52766

49693

3073(6)

5.263

4.762

0.501(10)

8

181184

173928

7256(4)

55409

52085

3324(6)

5.263

4.762

0.501(10)

9

202261

192998

9263(5)

60692

55864

4828(8)

5.263

4.762

0.501(10)

10

250015

226204

23811(10)

62661

56693

5968(10)

5.263

4.762

0.501(10)

11

300478

291861

8617(3)

68308

68136

172(0)

5.789

5.238

0.551(10)

12

424591

414153

10438(2)

106414

96279

10135(10)

7.316

6.714

0.602(8)

13

523767

464361

59406(11)

146333

141444

4889(3)

8.263

7.857

0.406(5)

14

558150

485946

72204(13)

180013

171916

8097(4)

8.263

7.857

0.406(5)

Average

Diﬀ (%)

KL

9%

Diﬀ (%)

7%

Table C.4: The comparison results from the application of the kl-redInfo
algorithm without the proposed modifications and g-anatomy on the Adult
dataset
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Diﬀ (%)

10%

Appendix D
The information loss metrics of the
kl-redInfo with sequential and systematic
incorporation approaches

Figure D.1: DP resulting from the application of the kl-redInfo with sequential
and systematic incorporation approaches on the Adult dataset
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Figure D.2: NCP resulting from the application of the kl-redInfo with sequential and systematic incorporation approaches on the Adult dataset
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Figure D.3: KL-divergence resulting from the application of the kl-redInfo
with sequential and systematic incorporation approaches on the Adult dataset
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Table D.1: The values of the information loss metrics resulting from the
application of the kl-redInfo with sequential and systematic incorporation
approaches on the Adult dataset
Information loss Metrics
k,l

DP
kl-

kl-

NCP
Diﬀ (%)

sequential systematic

kl-

kl-

KL
Diﬀ (%)

sequential systematic

kl-

kl-

Diﬀ (%)

sequential systematic

2

107812

85114

22698(21)

27020

21824

5196(19)

1.429

1.154

0.275(19)

3

123126

97204

25922(21)

30859

24924

5935(19)

1.429

1.154

0.275(19)

4

125567

107026

18541(15)

33977

27443

6534(19)

2.762

1.846

0.916(33)

5

133439

113241

20198(15)

35950

29036

6914(19)

2.762

1.846

0.916(33)

6

139429

117970

21459(15)

36451

30249

6202(17)

2.762

1.846

0.916(33)

7

164384

141882

22502(14)

49693

41252

8441(17)

4.762

3.846

0.916(19)

8

173928

159417

14511(8)

52085

43184

8901(17)

4.762

3.846

0.916(19)

9

182998

164472

18526(10)

55864

47044

8820(16)

4.762

3.846

0.916(19)

10

226204

178582

47622(21)

56693

49790

6903(12)

4.762

3.846

0.916(19)

11

271861

214627

57234(21)

68136

55033

13103(19)

5.238

4.231

1.007(19)

12

384153

303279

80874(21)

96279

77764

18515(19)

6.714

4.615

2.099(31)

13

464361

345548

118813(26)

141444

114243

27201(19)

7.857

5.862

1.995(25)

14

485946

441536

44410(9)

171916

138855

33061(19)

7.857

5.862

1.995(25)

Average

17%

18%

Table D.2: The comparison results from the application of the kl-redInfo with
sequential and systematic incorporation approaches on the Adult dataset
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24%

Appendix E
The information loss metrics of the
kl-redInfo with generalisation and with
both bucketisation and generalisation

Figure E.1: DP resulting from the application of the kl-redInfo with generalisation and with both bucketisation and cell-based generalisation on the Adult
dataset
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Figure E.2: NCP resulting from the application of the kl-redInfo with generalisation and with both bucketisation and cell-based generalisation on the
Adult dataset
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Figure E.3: KL-divergence resulting from the application of the kl-redInfo
with generalisation and with both bucketisation and cell-based generalisation
on the Adult dataset
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Table E.1: The values of the information loss metrics resulting from the application of the kl-redInfo with generalisation and with both bucketisation and
cell-generalisation approaches on Adult dataset
Information loss Metrics
k,l

DP
kl-cell

kl-

NCP
Diﬀ (%)

kl-cell

BucketCell

kl-

KL
Diﬀ (%)

kl-cell

BucketCell

kl-

Diﬀ (%)

BucketCell

2

107812

96463

11349(11)

27020

23643

3377(12)

1.429

1.25

0.179(13)

3

123126

110165

12961(11)

30859

27001

3858(13)

1.429

1.25

0.179(13)

4

125567

121297

4270(3)

33977

29730

4247(12)

2.762

2.467

0.295(11)

5

133439

128340

5099(4)

35950

31456

4494(13)

2.762

2.467

0.295(11)

6

139429

133700

5729(4)

36451

32770

3681(10)

2.762

2.567

0.195(7)

7

164384

158133

6251(4)

49693

43856

5837(12)

4.762

4.167

0.595(12)

8

173928

166673

7255(4)

52085

45949

6136 (12)

4.762

4.167

0.595(12)

9

182998

173735

9263(5)

55864

50131

5733(10)

4.762

4.167

0.595(12)

10

226204

202393

23811(11)

56693

54606

2087(4)

4.762

4.167

0.595(12)

11

271861

243244

28617(11)

68136

59619

8517(13)

5.238

4.983

0.255(5)

12

384153

343716

40437(11)

96279

94244

2035(2)

6.714

6.5

0.214(3)

13

464361

404954

59407(13)

141444

133763

7681(5)

7.857

7.468

0.389(5)

14

485946

431741

54205(11)

171916

150427

21489(12)

7.857

7.468

0.389(5)

Average

8%

10%

Table E.2: The comparison results from the application of the kl-redInfo with
generalisation and with both bucketisation and cell-based generalisation on
the Adult dataset
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9%

Appendix F
The information loss metrics of the
kl-redInfo without and with sorting
approach on Adult dataset

Figure F.1: DP resulting from the application of the kl-redInfo without and
with sorting approach on the Adult dataset
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Figure F.2: NCP resulting from the application of the kl-redInfo without and
with sorting approach on the Adult dataset
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Figure F.3: KL-divergence resulting from the application of the kl-redInfo
without and with sorting approach on the Adult dataset

211

Table F.1: The values of the information loss metrics resulting from the application of the kl-redInfo without and with sorting approach on the Adult
dataset
Information loss Metrics
k,l

DP

NCP

kl-NoSort

kl-sort

Diﬀ (%)

2

107812

102137

3

123126

4

KL

kl-NoSort

kl-sort

Diﬀ (%)

kl-NoSort

kl-sort

Diﬀ (%)

5675(5)

27020

25792

1228(5)

1.429

1.364

0.065(5)

116645

6481(5)

30859

29456

1403(5)

1.429

1.364

0.065(5)

128567

125432

3135(2)

33977

32432

1545(5)

2.762

2.545

0.217(8)

5

135439

133889

1550(1)

35950

34315

1635(5)

2.762

2.545

0.217(8)

6

149429

141565

7864(5)

36451

35749

702(2)

2.762

2.545

0.217(8)

7

164384

156259

8125(5)

49693

46934

2759(6)

4.762

4.545

0.217(5)

8

173928

165300

8628(5)

52085

49217

2868(6)

4.762

4.545

0.217(5)

9

182998

173367

9631(5)

55864

53780

2084(4)

4.762

4.545

0.217(5)

10

226204

214299

11905(5)

56693

54116

2577(5)

4.762

4.545

0.217(5)

11

271861

257553

14308(5)

68136

65039

3097(5)

5.238

5

0.238(5)

12

384153

363935

20218(5)

96279

91903

4376(5)

6.714

5.455

1.259(19)

13

464361

434658

29703(6)

141444

135015

6429(5)

7.857

6.818

1.039(13)

14

485946

449843

36103(7)

171916

164102

7814(5)

7.857

6.818

1.039(13)

Average

5%

4%

Table F.2: The comparison results from the application of the kl-redInfo without and with sorting approach on the Adult dataset
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8%

Appendix G
The information loss metrics of the
kl-redInfo without and with the
proposed modifications on Adult dataset

Figure G.1: DP resulting from the application of the kl-redInfo without and
with the proposed modifications on the Adult dataset
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Figure G.2: NCP resulting from the application of the kl-redInfo without and
with the proposed modifications on the Adult dataset
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Figure G.3: KL-divergence resulting from the application of the kl-redInfo
without and with the proposed modifications on the Adult dataset
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Table G.1: The values of the information loss metrics resulting from the
application of the kl-redInfo without and with the proposed modifications on
the Adult dataset
Information loss Metrics
k,l

DP
kl-

kl-with

NCP
Diﬀ (%)

without

kl-

kl-with

KL
Diﬀ (%)

without

kl-

kl-with

Diﬀ (%)

without

2

107812

68092

39720(37)

27020

19567

7453(28)

1.429

1.034

0.395(28)

3

123126

77764

45362(37)

30859

22346

8513(28)

1.429

1.034

0.395(28)

4

125567

80621

44946(36)

33977

24604

9373(28)

2.762

1.448

1.314(48)

5

133439

85593

47846(36)

35950

25032

10918(30)

2.762

1.448

1.314(48)

6

139429

90376

49053(35)

36451

25120

11331(31)

2.762

1.448

1.314(48)

7

164384

97506

66878(41)

49693

28019

21674(44)

4.762

2.448

2.314(49)

8

173928

103534

70394(40)

52085

29751

22334(43)

4.762

2.448

2.314(49)

9

182998

115578

67420(37)

55864

33212

22652(41)

4.762

2.448

2.314(49)

10

226204

142866

83338(37)

56693

41053

15640(28)

4.762

3.448

1.314(28)

11

271861

171702

100159(37)

68136

49340

18796(28)

5.238

3.798

1.44(27)

12

384153

242623

141530(37)

96279

69719

26560(28)

6.714

4.138

2.576(38)

13

464361

356438

107923(23)

141444

102425

39019(28)

7.857

4.652

3.205(41)

14

485946

433229

52717(11)

171916

124491

47425(28)

7.857

4.652

3.205(41)

Average

34%

31%

Table G.2: The comparison results from the application of the kl-redInfo
algorithm without and with the proposed modifications on the Adult dataset
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40%

Appendix H
The information loss metrics of the
kl-redInfo with proposed modifications,
l-mondrian, and g-anatomy

Figure H.1: DP resulting from the application of the l-mondrian, g-anatomy,
and the kl-redInfo algorithm with the proposed modifications on the Adult
dataset
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Figure H.2: NCP resulting from the application of the l-mondrian, g-anatomy,
and the kl-redInfo algorithm with the proposed modifications on the Adult
dataset
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Figure H.3: KL-divergence resulting from the application of the l-mondrian,
g-anatomy, and the kl-redInfo algorithm with the proposed modifications on
the Adult dataset
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Table H.1: The values of the information loss metrics resulting from the
application of the kl-redInfo with the proposed modifications and l-mondrian
on the Adult dataset
Information loss Metrics
k,l

DP
l-

kl-

mondrian

redInfo

2

136183

68092

3

155527

4

NCP
l-

kl-

l-

kl-

mondrian

redInfo

mondrian

redInfo

68091(50)

35464

19567

15897(45)

1.875

1.034

0.841(45)

77764

77763(50)

40502

22346

18156(45)

1.875

1.034

0.841(45)

171242

100621

70621(41)

44594

24604

19990(45)

3.25

1.448

1.802(55)

5

181186

105593

75593(42)

47184

25032

22152(47)

3.25

1.448

1.802(55)

6

188753

116376

72377(38)

49154

29120

20034(41)

3.25

1.448

2.802(55)

7

215012

127506

87506(41)

60784

36019

24765(41)

5.25

2.448

2.802(53)

8

227067

129534

97533(43)

63924

39751

24173(38)

5.25

2.448

2.802(53)

9

231156

135578

95578(41)

70197

43212

26985(38)

5.25

2.448

2.802(53)

10

285732

142866

142866(50)

74409

51053

23356(31)

5.25

3.448

1.802(53)

11

343044

171702

171342(50)

89428

64340

25088(28)

5.875

3.798

2.077(34)

12

455246

242623

212623(47)

126366

79719

46647(37)

7.5

4.138

3.362(35)

13

552877

356438

196439(36)

155645

102425

53220(34)

11

4.652

6.348(58)

14

586458

433229

153229(26)

195640

124491

71149(36)

11

4.652

6.348(58)

Average

Diﬀ (%)

KL

43%

Diﬀ (%)

39%

Table H.2: The comparison results from the application of the kl-redInfo algorithm with the proposed modifications and l-mondrian on the Adult dataset
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Diﬀ (%)

50%

Table H.3: The values of the information loss metrics resulting from the
application of the kl-redInfo with the proposed modifications and g-anatomy
on the Adult dataset
Information loss Metrics
k,l

DP
g-

kl-

anatomy

redInfo

2

119160

68092

3

136086

4

NCP
g-

kl-

g-

kl-

anatomy

redInfo

anatomy

redInfo

51068(43)

29865

19567

10298(34)

1.579

1.034

1.545(35)

77764

58322(43)

34107

22346

11761(34)

1.579

1.034

1.545(35)

149837

100621

49216(33)

37553

24604

12949(34)

3.263

1.448

1.815(56)

5

158537

105593

52944(33)

39734

25032

14702(37)

3.263

1.448

1.815(56)

6

165159

116376

48783(30)

41393

29120

12273(30)

3.263

1.448

1.815(56)

7

180635

127506

53129(29)

52766

36019

16747(32)

5.263

2.448

2.815(53)

8

181184

129534

51650(29)

55409

39751

15658(28)

5.263

2.448

2.815(53)

9

202261

135578

66683(33)

60692

43212

17480(29)

5.263

2.448

2.815(53)

10

2590015

142866

107149(43)

62661

51053

11608(19)

5.263

3.448

1.815(34)

11

300478

171702

128776(43)

65308

64340

968(1)

5.789

3.798

1.991(34)

12

424591

242623

181968(43)

106414

79719

26695(25)

7.316

4.138

3.178(43)

13

523767

356438

167329(32)

146333

102425

43908(30)

8.263

4.652

3.611(44)

14

558150

433229

124921(22)

180013

124491

55522(31)

8.263

4.652

3.611(44)

Average

Diﬀ (%)

KL

35%

Diﬀ (%)

28%

Table H.4: The comparison results from the application of the kl-redInfo algorithm with the proposed modifications and g-anatomy on the Adult dataset
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Diﬀ (%)

46%

Appendix I
The information loss metrics of the
kl-redInfo algorithm, on the diﬀerent size
of the Adult dataset

Figure I.1: DP resulting from the application of the kl-redInfo algorithm on
diﬀerent size of the Adult dataset when k = l = 6
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Figure I.2: NCP resulting from the application of the kl-redInfo algorithm on
diﬀerent size of the Adult dataset when k = l = 6

Figure I.3: KL-divergence resulting from the application of the kl-redInfo
algorithm on diﬀerent size of the Adult dataset when k = l = 6
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